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Since 2000, a new round of suburbanisation characterised by mixed-use 
clustered development has begun to unfold in China. This research aims to 
explore the dynamics of recent suburban growth in China and also provide an 
empirical case for enriching suburban theory. It is held that suburbanisation in 
China in its current form is by no means a spontaneous process, but results from 
capitalism’s creation of a new space to facilitate accumulation. Based on this view, 
the study examines the underlying forces of contemporary suburban growth with 
regard to three questions: what is the role of suburbanisation in China’s 
contemporary capital accumulation regime? How are the suburbs developed under 
coalitions of different actors? And how is suburban development shaped by 
demand-side actors? The study is founded on an intensive case study of Shanghai 
and one of its suburban districts, Songjiang. Both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods are used. Firsthand data from interviews and a questionnaire 
survey and a wide variety of secondary data were collected, providing a rich fund 
of knowledge for the research.  
While similar forms and functions to (post)-suburban settlements that have 
recently emerged in Western countries are found in Chinese suburbs, 
suburbanisation through new town development in China is a strategy of capital 
accumulation in response to a range of new conditions specific to China’s local 
context. New towns deal with the recentralisation of both fiscal and land 
development powers on the one hand, and accommodate the increasing housing 
demands of a diverse labour force on the other. Moreover, a peculiar land-centred 
accumulation regime is established in which real estate development and 
industrial development mutually reinforce each other. The development of these 
suburban nodes is organised under state-led entrepreneurial governance in which 
  
ii 
coalitions are led by the suburban district government and followed by various 
public and private sectors; however, this is manipulated by the municipal 
government. Demand-based driving forces are manifold, including four 
interwoven processes: industrial restructuring and economic growth, 
outwards-migration, urbanisation, and capitalisation. Three types of people, 
namely migrants, local natives and residents from central Shanghai, constitute the 
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1.1 Research background 
Chinese suburbs are experiencing great transformation. In the pre-reform era, 
the urban periphery was dominated by vast rural areas punctured by industrial 
satellites and small scale towns. Because free residential mobility was restricted, 
there was little interaction between the city and its surrounding areas. Since 1978 
when market-oriented reform was launched, urban areas have begun to expand 
outwards. The urban edge became a highly vibrant zone in which different 
elements such as industrial development zones, large-scale residential areas, 
migrant urban villages and undeveloped agricultural areas coexisted (Cartier, 
2001; Deng and Huang, 2004). Academic studies ascribed post-reform massive 
suburban development to a range of institutional changes such as administrative 
decentralisation and the establishment of the land and housing market (Zhou and 
Ma, 2000; Zhang, 2000; Logan and Zhou, 2008). Since 2000, however, 
comprehensive suburban new towns have emerged as a new spatial pattern of 
suburbanisation (Wu and Phelps. 2008). Moreover, the new round of suburban 
development is characterised by a variety of landscape elements that are new to 
China, such as industrial parks, villa-style gated communities and suburban 
shopping malls. Metropolitan areas are evolving into a polycentric spatial 
structure (Feng and Wang, 2009; Yue et al., 2010).  





Recent studies have noted the phenomenon and attempted to provide 
explanations; some emphasise political economic factors. Feng et al. (2008) claim 
that market forces began to have a great impact on Chinese suburban development. 
Wu and Phelps (2011b) argue that suburban nodes were created by the 
territorialisation of the entrepreneurial municipal government; others, particularly 
those focusing on suburban gated communities, emphasise socio-cultural factors. 
It is demonstrated that housing consumption plays a constructive role in the 
process of contemporary social transformation (Fleischer, 2010). The emergence 
of gated communities indicates the new rich in China have a growing aspiration 
for a good life (Pow and Kong, 2007; Zhang, 2010). Wu (2010) shows how recent 
suburban residential development is packaged and branded as a new way of life to 
lure homebuyers, which plays an important role in facilitating Chinese 
suburbanisation.  
However, systematic study of the current suburban development in China is 
still lacking. There are important questions to be answered: why has 
suburbanisation evolved into its present form? How has it materialised within the 
Chinese context? Who are the suburban residents and why they have settled in the 
suburbs? And how can the similarities between those new elements and their 
Western counterparts be explained? By drawing up a case study of Shanghai and 
one of its outer suburban districts, Songjiang, this research attempts to examine 
the new dynamics of suburbanisation in China.  
 
1.2 Research objectives 
There are two objectives of this thesis. The first is to provide a full 
understanding of contemporary suburban growth in China. Existing studies on 
Chinese suburbanisation are largely restricted to the spatial pattern of population 
redistribution and urban expansion. The essential process and the role of suburban 
development in China’s current urbanisation, however, are unclear. On the 
production side, although there is little doubt that the state plays a leading role in 





building the suburbs, the rationale, policies, the way it is engaging other actors 
and the relationships among different actors in the process are unknown. With 
regard to consumption, commodity houses have become the dominant type of 
housing provision, and residents are able to personally decide where and how to 
live. Yet, the active role of suburban residents in shaping suburban space has been 
much less examined. The demand-based factors that have driven the rapid growth 
in the suburbs are still obscure. Therefore, the study will empirically examine the 
new forms and functions of the suburbs and reveal their underlying driving forces.  
The other aim of the thesis is to place Chinese suburbs in the global (post-) 
suburban world. Current suburban theory is mainly built on American-European 
countries. However, it is widely recognised that suburbanisation is a worldwide 
phenomenon (Clapson and Hutchison, 2010; Phelps and Wu, 2011). Moreover, 
diversity rather than conformity is found in many emerging economies. There 
emerges an urgent need to develop a common conceptual framework to theorise 
urban peripheries across the world. In particular, as Harris (2010: 17) states, it is 
important to bridge the global north and south, and theories based on advanced 
countries must be contextualised. China offers an important case for this purpose. 
In the past three decades, it has experienced unparallel economic growth and 
urbanisation, but under institutional arrangements and social transformation that 
differ from that of eastern European post-socialist countries or rising eastern and 
south-eastern Asian economies. Suburbs are now at the leading edge of growth. 
By investigating the development of Chinese suburbs, this research aims to shed 
some light on global suburban studies.  
 
1.3 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in seven chapters. The first three chapters introduce 
the research background, literature review and research framework, research 
questions and methodologies. Chapter 4-6 are the main body of the study. Chapter 
4 examines the suburban development project of Shanghai municipality. Chapter 





5 and Chapter 6 address an intensive study on Songjiang. While the former 
focuses on how Songjiang has developed under entrepreneurial governance, the 
latter addresses the views and actions of its residents. Finally, Chapter 7 
summarises the main findings of the research and reflects on its broader 
theoretical and practical implications.  
Following this chapter of introduction, Chapter 2 provides the literature 
review and the theoretical context for the research. It first examines diverse 
patterns of suburban development across the world and calls for a step beyond the 
classic US model to conceptualise suburbs within a specific local context. The 
chapter then focuses on existing studies on China’s suburbs. It is identified that a 
new phase of suburban development has emerged; however, the phenomenon is 
far from being understood in both theoretical and empirical terms. Finally, based 
on theories and findings elsewhere, a framework used to investigate the dynamics 
of Chinese suburbs is developed. Central to this analytical framework is the need 
to provide a base for comparative study on the one hand, but also emphasise 
interpretations based on locally-embedded factors on the other hand.  
Chapter 3 then raises sets of research questions and their hypotheses 
according to the research framework. Meanwhile, methods of data collection and 
analysis are detailed. The research is based on plenty of fresh secondary data and 
original firsthand data, which are then analysed by a mixed method combining 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Such multiple sources and analysis 
methods lay down the empirical foundation of the research and provide 
substantial insightful perspectives with which to answer the research questions.  
Chapter 4 aims to interpret Shanghai’s new round of suburban development 
from the perspective of capital accumulation. It is argued that new town 
development as a new pattern of suburbanisation is intentionally promoted by the 
municipality in search for a new spatial fix. By reviewing and analysing new town 
policies, the changing rationale, strategies, policies and practices are examined, 
demonstrating the active role of the state in facilitating capital accumulation 





through suburban development. In the end, based on macro statistical data, the 
contemporary spatial structure of metropolitan Shanghai is identified to examine 
the overall effects of the new town project.  
Chapter 5 turns to focus on Songjiang and examines how Songjiang New 
Town has been built under state-led entrepreneurial governance; it first analyses 
the institutional context and rationale behind the local district government’s 
decision to adopt the new town project as its key entrepreneurial strategy. Through 
closer investigation of the development of three mega-projects, how such a 
strategy was practiced by a new mode of development is revealed. Finally, the 
growth mechanism, i.e. how the new town functions as a growth machine, is 
explained by looking into changes to economic structure and capital investment 
over the past ten years. A land-centred accumulation regime that follows a 
different growth machine model is recognised.  
Chapter 6 attempts to identify demand-based factors acting on the 
development of Songjiang. Firstly, an overview of demand-based growth 
dynamics is provided and the main types of residents are recognised. This is 
followed by an empirical study based on data from the survey examining the 
heterogeneity of suburban residents and spatial patterns. A range of statistical 
analysis methods are applied to identify how different groups of people are 
significantly different from each other in terms of their socioeconomic attributes, 
housing preferences and settlement locations. Furthermore, qualitative analysis 
based on interviews is also used to help explain the quantitative results.  
Chapter 7 finally concludes the research. The research questions are 
answered by summarising the main empirical findings first. This is further framed 
by the concept of ‘post-suburbia’ and comparison of Chinese suburbs with similar 
patterns in other countries is provided. In brief, Chinese suburbs follow the same 
logic of capital as elsewhere, but result from specific local conditions. The 
broader implications of suburban development for Chinese new urbanism and the 
case of the Chinese state-led model for sustainability are provided at the end. 






LITERATURE REVIEW: PLACING CHINESE 
SUBURBS IN A (POST-)SUBURBAN WORLD 
2.1 Introduction 
A vast body of literature has greatly contributed to identifying the forms and 
processes of peripheral urban development. Suburban growth is becoming a 
global process, and the notion of suburbs evolves over time and varies in different 
national contexts. This process urges a re-think of current suburban theories that 
are mainly derived from European-American experiences. With their rapid growth 
and unique patterns, Chinese suburbs provide an important case for approaching 
global models of suburban growth. Central to the investigation is the clarification 
of any universal or specific forces driving suburban development in China.  
This chapter reviews the theoretical context for the empirical study of 
Chinese suburbs. A sketch of suburban patterns worldwide is provided first and 
then the need to go beyond viewing the US model as the hegemonic criteria to 
conceptualise suburbs within the specific local context is highlighted. The chapter 
then goes on to discuss existing literature on Chinese suburbs and notes the need 
for a full understanding of the forms and driving forces of contemporary suburban 
developments in China. Finally, drawing on relevant theories and empirical 
findings elsewhere, an analytic framework used to examine Chinese suburbs in 
this study is developed.  





2.2 Re-theorising ‘the suburbs’ in a global society 
2.2.1 Suburban American: the paradigmatic case 
Broadly speaking, ‘suburb’ refers to the peripheral area of a city. In tracing 
suburban origins, Harris and Larkham (1999: 3) explain the derivation of the term 
from sub urbe, i.e. close to (sub) the town or pre-urban nucleus (urbs). Although 
the meaning of the term suburb varies at different times and in different countries, 
in the United States several myths which depict the suburb as ‘the middle-class 
residential enclave’ exist (ibid: 6). In physical terms, suburbs are often 
characterised by low-density but uniform residential developments. In social 
terms, the suburbs accommodate the better-off families who live a distinctive way 
of life. Therefore, suburban living represents a bourgeois utopia (Fishman, 1987). 
This ‘traditional’ view of suburbs has made recent suburban changes an 
entirely new and shocking phenomenon. Along with rapid employment 
decentralisation, many terms, including ‘edge cities’ (Garreau, 1991), 
‘technoburbs’ (Fishman, 1987), ‘edgeless cities’ (Lang, 2003) and ‘post-suburbia’ 
(Teaford, 1997) have been invented to capture the mixed-use centres at the edge. 
Nevertheless, the co-presence of the middle class and working class does not 
indicate social inclusion. Middle-class residential developments have evolved into 
gated and master-planned communities (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Low, 2004; 
Knox, 2008), which often form a sharp contrast with nearby squatter settlements 
(Davis, 2006). Social polarisation and segregation are indeed reinforced in 
contemporary suburban forms (Low, 2004; 2008).  
Wu and Phelps (2008) summarise several features of post-suburban 
developments. Firstly, the new form sees a decline in inner suburbs, but a 
booming growth in exurban areas. Secondly, new developments take a disjointed 
form depicted as a ‘patchwork structure’. Thirdly, as the distinction between the 
urban and the suburban is increasingly blurred, it becomes difficult to identify the 
boundaries of the modern metropolis. Fourthly, post-suburbia continues to be 





invested with political and ideological content and its production involves a more 
complicated coalition among public and private sectors. Fifthly, post-suburban 
settlements achieve a greater balance between work and residence. Lastly, the 
mixture of land uses is a common feature of post-suburbia.  
Soja (2000) recognises the outward sprawl in post-suburban forms as an 
urban restructuring process and a distinct phase of urbanisation; the hallmark of 
the process is a growing convergence between urban and suburban densities and 
functions. The once relatively homogenous suburbia is seeing increasing 
economic and social diversity, which has been identified as urban character. 
Consequently, cities are turned inside out. The term ‘exopolis’ is used to describe 
the new urban morphology featuring both ‘outside’ (peripheral) and ‘ex’ (no 
longer) characteristics. For Soja (2011), it is a shift from a monocentric 
metropolitan mode to a new phase of regional urbanisation.  
Many studies have aimed to revise and organise well-established accounts of 
suburb development and its evolution. The myth that suburbs were becoming a 
prosperous residential place for the middle-class has been probed by vast 
historical research which shows that suburbs have never been as homogenous as 
they are framed by the media and academic publications. It is widely 
demonstrated that the decentralisation of manufacturing employment and 
working–class settlements has been an important trend since the middle of the 
nineteenth century (Harris and Lewis, 1998; Lewis, 2004; Harris, 2004; Kruse & 
Sugrue, 2006). Even when only addressing residential development, Hayden 
(2003) has identified seven patterns of suburbia with different development 
practices and architecture preferences. This evidence lends credence to the view 
that recent suburban transformation should not be treated as a new phenomenon. 
It is argued that trends such as edge city have their roots in much earlier urban 
patterns (Hise, 1997; Walker and Lewis, 2001). The concept of edge city is 
created to resolve people’s ambivalence toward cities, but actually failed 
(Beauregard, 1995).  





2.2.2 Beyond the model: suburban growth as a global 
phenomenon 
One distinctive character of the Continental model of urban development is 
that the urban core, rather than the outlying areas, is built as the bourgeois utopia 
(Fishman, 1987). This was particularly exemplified by Louis Napoleon’s and 
Haussmann’s rebuilding of Paris. Meanwhile, working class suburbs, known as 
banlieues, were intentionally created by the government. Today, these peripheral 
neighbourhoods are still places where poor immigrants, particularly those from 
North Africa, concentrate (Wacquant, 2008). Like France, many other nations 
introduced a similar top-down, centralised model of suburbanisation by building 
public houses for the working class.  
Nonetheless, European cities are often viewed as variations of the US form. 
This is because the meaning of suburbs shares many essential themes with the US, 
including the suburban living ideal, homogenous landscapes, private domesticity, 
etc. (Harris and Larkham, 1999). For example, Ebenezer Edward’s garden city 
and the ideal semi-rural lifestyle had a great influence on Britain’s post-war new 
towns programme (Clapson, 2000). Moreover, the suburban living ideal based on 
homeownership prevailed among the working class and soon led to an increasing 
trend of voluntary suburbanisation. Recently, studies on edge cities in Europe 
have emerged; although the form of these developments differs from that in the 
US, they conform to the definition of edge cities in terms of the function and 
development process (Nuissl and Rink, 2005; Bontje and Burdach, 2005; Phelps 
et al., 2006). More often than not, it is held that the main differences between the 
North American and European cities lie in the rate and timing of suburbanisation 
(Mazierska and Rascaroli, 2003).  
Suburban experiences of cities in the Global South do not follow the uniform 
pattern found in the Global North. Cities are experiencing the process of 
urbanisation as rapid urban expansion unfolds a different suburban landscape with 





high population densities and mixed urban and rural activities. In search of job 
opportunities in the cities, urban to rural and stepwise migrants concentrate at the 
urban fringe which often leads to massive squatter settlements. This phenomenon 
is apparent in cities of Latin America (Caldeira, 1996; Losada et al, 1998), 
modern Africa (Simon et al, 2008) and South and South-east Asia (McGee, 1991; 
Kundu et al, 2002). McGee (1991) has invented the term desakota to refer to such 
densely peripheral developments from the Indonesian language, in which desa 
means village and kota means town.    
 However, the traditional image of urban peripheries is in transition. Recent 
high-profile projects take development forms similar to those prevailing in 
Western suburbs such as high-end residential enclaves, industrial parks and 
shopping malls. Harris (2010:22-23) properly captured the change by reviewing a 
wide range of recent research concentrating on the fringe of cities that used to be 
dominated by squatter settlements. In his view, the general trends are to juxtapose 
people and mix things up, i.e. informal developments with poor infrastructure for 
the poor on the one hand and well-planned developments with high-quality urban 
services and amenities for the more affluent on the other hand.  
Suburban experiences in Central and Eastern European countries are a 
different story. In the socialist era, there were seldom large-scale suburban 
developments in socialist cities. Their compact size was often regarded as an 
important distinction from Western capitalist cities. As Berry (1976:12; also 
quoted in Nuissl and Rink, 2005) points out ‘…liberal capitalism, with its 
acceptance of big cities and growth as the inevitable accompaniment of success, is 
seeing its cities disintegrate under pluralized individualistic choices, …Marxist 
societies, committed to the emergence of a new settlement pattern for mankind, 
are preserving cities and centrality in a traditional sense’. This is largely 
associated with the inherent character of the socialist system of production; that is, 
the priority status of industrialisation on the one hand, and the long-term neglect 
of non-productive sectors on the other hand (Gentile and Sjöberg, 2006). 





Although socialist cities faced serious housing shortages, the provision of housing 
and other living facilities and services was very limited, and was often 
subordinate to industrialisation and military consolidation. In order to ease the 
excess housing demand led by the influx of rural-to-urban migration, and to make 
the best use of existing facilities, many socialist cities adopted policies that aimed 
at limiting extensive urban growth. With regard to outward-migration, the 
Western type of suburbanisation driven by people’s residential preferences was 
ruled out. This is not only because urban residents usually had little chance to 
change residences, but also because, to a large extent, central cities with job 
opportunities were still the optimal residential location for them (Tammaru, 
2001).  
Nevertheless, it is well documented that peripheral development actually 
occurred in the socialist era, but in different forms. According to existing 
literature, three types of socialist suburbs are identified. The first began in the 
1960s, millions of ‘khrushchevki’ for workers were built by the state on the 
immediate edge of large cities (Barter, 1980). These were standardised 
middle-rise buildings with an austere style and small apartment units which were 
often built into self-contained neighbourhood units (known as mikroraion). 
Secondly, the socialist state and industrial enterprises also invested in building 
satellite new towns, which were largely industrial-based and were relatively 
independent from the central cities (Bernhardt, 2005). Thirdly, summer cottages 
such as Dachas in Russia, Villas in Bulgarian, etc. were built for the social elite as 
their second or weekend homes (Lovell, 2003). There is evidence that summer 
homes gradually became a popular housing type after World War II. For example, 
in Russia, about twenty percent of the total number of urban families owned one 
dacha close to the city by the end of the 1980s (Kostinsky, 2001: 462). In Estonia, 
urban residents were increasingly allowed to construct single-family houses in the 
suburbs themselves (Tammaru, 2001).  Although summer cottages resulted from 
people’s housing demands and their desire to escape from the urban life, they 





were by no means the dominant form of socialist suburbs. Suburban growth in 
socialist cities was fundamentally driven by the expansion of industrial 
production.  
After the collapse of state socialism in 1989, these previously socialist 
countries began to experience rapid transformation. Some of the structural 
changes directly led to the restructuring of urban space: massive 
de-industrialisation, a shift from central planning to market mechanism (e.g. the 
reestablishment of private property rights and housing markets), relaxation of 
state control and power decentralisation to local levels (e.g. retreat from planning 
and poor regulation), an influx of foreign investment, and an increasingly 
important role of individuals’ residential choices (Szelényi, 1996; Stanilov, 2007). 
Overall, the introduction of a market economy based on neoliberal theory 
dominates the urban transition in post-socialist cities (Sailer-Fliege, 1999). 
Nevertheless, this does not imply a simply convergence on the Western model of 
urbanisation. As many have argued, market-based urban processes here ‘blend 
with the communist legacies and systemically unique processes attributable to the 
region’s past experience of socialism and central planning and the transition 
therefrom’ (Borén and Gentile, 2007: 95).  
This statement on the mixture of multiple forces is well embodied in the 
emerging suburban forms and their underlying dynamics. Among other examples, 
massive suburban development was regarded as the most remarkable phenomenon 
across post-socialist cities. Due to the lack of a well-established planning 
framework immediately after the collapse of the old orders, cities witnessed a 
wave of intensive private investment in new commercial and residential 
developments on the urban periphery, particularly at major transport nodes 
(Nuissl and Rink, 2005; Rudolph and Brade, 2005). In the meantime, empirical 
evidence has demonstrated that socialist suburbs became the main site 
accommodating population growth. Particularly, along with the economic 
recovery since 2000, employment opportunities in many capital cities have 





attracted large numbers of migrants from rural or lower-order provincial towns. 
Moreover, outward-migration driven by affluent households’ pursuit of quality 
life was also increasingly prominent (Tammaru, 2005; Hirt, 2007; Medvedkov 
and Medvedkov, 2007).  
Consequently, post-socialist suburbia presents different types of urban forms. 
Hirt and Stanilov (2009) identified four typical suburban elements: 1) squatter 
settlements informally built by poor residents in rural areas and small towns; 2) 
upscale individual housing built as single-family houses in former recreational 
zones; 3) master-planned suburban communities produced by private development 
companies for upper-to middle-class families; 4) non-residential suburbanisation 
such as large-scale retail and office developments. Based on this evidence, 
suburbanisation in post-socialist cities began to show trends more similar to 
Western residential suburbia and post-suburban multifunctional nodes, rather than 
those found in Eastern Asia. Suburban developments are increasingly 
characterised by relatively low density, based on private car use, and driven by 
better-off families’ residential preferences.  
Nevertheless, suburbanisation in post-socialist cities is underpinned by 
different political economic dynamics from the US-style growth machine or 
suburban governance in Western Europe. According to the existing literature, 
there are at least three characteristics of the political economy of suburban 
development in post-socialist cities. Firstly, the transformation in Central and 
Eastern European countries took place in a ‘big bang’ and institutional reforms 
occurred all at once rather than being progressive. The sudden collapse of the old 
central planning system led to an outburst of uncontrolled development in the 
peripheries of major post-socialist cities. In the process, few organised 
place-making strategies and pro-growth (or anti-growth) coalitions were involved. 
As depicted by Golubchikov and Phelps (2011:438), suburban growth in 
post-socialist cities was largely driven by “a spontaneous variety of opportunistic 





profit-making initiatives that are characterised by short-termism and yet are 
essentially disconnected from the ‘local’ city”.  
Secondly, actors involved in development processes were less pluralistic 
compared with those in the US (Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005). Local elites, which 
were mainly composed of previous technocratic elites and successful small 
business entrepreneurs, were the primary promoters of local economic growth. In 
the meantime, because local governments and state-owned enterprises often went 
into bankruptcy and had no funds to construct infrastructure, external actors such 
as foreign investors and the national state played an important role in undertaking 
a variety of commercial projects. Nevertheless, some actors significant in the 
Western context were much less important, such as banks, real estate companies 
and construction companies. Moreover, anti-growth grass-root groups and 
organisations were usually absent.  
Thirdly, post-socialist suburban development is influenced by some 
important socialist legacies. One of these legacies is the fact that the local growth 
agenda was largely led by political rather than strictly economic interests, and 
suburban development often involves specific political-bureaucratic processes 
(Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005; Borén and Gentile, 2007; Golubchikov and Phelps, 
2011). This was determined by peculiar fiscal and administrative systems with 
many inherited principles. Most post-socialist countries kept a centralised fiscal 
system, under which municipal governments not only had few resources under 
their own control, but also gained little from local economic growth. Local 
governments thus had to continue depending on political patronage by political 
leadership at a higher tier of government. Additionally, the administrative power 
structure was still based on a ‘presidential-authoritarian model’ (Rudolph and 
Brade, 2005: 136), and many local political positions were directly appointed by 
the central state. As a result, governors tended to use urban development to assert 
their own political power.  
 





2.2.3 Comparative framework 
Worldwide evidence presents a picture far more complicated than the current 
conceptualisation of suburbs indicates. Among those seeking to understand 
particular suburban forms and types across the world, one common thread is to 
treat the US experience as the norm. Many cases have been compared with, or 
interpreted as, instances of the diffusion of the American norm. For those 
developing countries, it is argued that the emergence of American suburban forms 
results from globalisation-driven technology transfer and economic growth. Dick 
and Rimmer (1998) identify elements such as edge cities, gated communities, and 
shopping malls in large-scale mixed-used new town developments in Southeast 
Asian cities, and therefore suggest a process of convergence between North 
American and South-east Asia. In order to explore the nature of suburbs in 
post-socialist countries, middle-class suburbia in Western countries is used as a 
typical style to examine whether peri-urban development there is an actual process 
of suburbanisation and whether post-socialist cities are evolving toward advanced 
capitalism (Hirt, 2007).   
Beauregard (2006) opines that behind the emergence of American suburban 
elements across the world was the triumph of the country’s global project. In the 
US, while urban areas were often associated with persistent problems of 
unemployment, poverty and racial discrimination, the suburbs and the 
consumer-based lifestyle they represent were consciously exported to fight 
communism and establish its post-war global dominance. Ideologically, it is noted 
‘the suburbs signalled a mixture of individualism and conformity, a democracy 
where people were equal and yet free to pursue their dreams.’ (Beauregard, 2006: 
171). Today, America claims to represent the world’s highest standards of 
prosperity and lifestyle; thus, many countries model their architectural 
development on the way that the American people have built their suburbs.   
A second theoretical thread of global suburban growth emphasises local 
particularities rather than taking the US model as the hegemonic criteria. Indeed, 





the literature on suburban forms beyond the Global North has been limited. 
Meanwhile, lacking references to or comparisons with other places, research on 
American suburbs is itself parochial. Therefore, recent research shifts have been 
made towards a re-sketching of suburbs as both a global process and a 
consequence of forces specific to place. This is evident in a special issue of 
Research in Urban Sociology dealing with social experiences of suburban growth 
worldwide (Clapson and Hutchison, 2010), an edited book on postsuburban 
development with an international perspective (Phelps and Wu, 2011), and an 
ongoing research project on suburban governance
1
.  
In terms of comparative frameworks, a traditional view often suggests using 
density, newness and peripheral location as the defining qualities of suburbs 
(Harris, 2010). However, problems could arise. Firstly, the social effects of certain 
physical environments remain to be explored. Moreover, distinctions between the 
city and suburbs have blurred and it has become difficult to assign recent 
suburban forms such as edge cities or technoburbs with clear boundaries. 
Therefore, Phelps et al. (2006) argue that restricting the term solely to form or 
appearance may obscure valid points of comparison. ‘Not only do post-suburban 
forms vary according to broad geographical region…but they clearly evolve to 
vary over time in any one geographical setting’ (ibid: 201).  
Instead, it is necessary to deploy a composite definition beyond the realms of 
appearance. Firstly, comparison and contrasts in terms of functions and 
development processes in different settings offer important aspects for 
comparative analysis. Phelps et al. (2006) exemplify that, although European edge 
urban areas have functional similarities with US edge cities with regard to being 
significant employment centres, in terms of the development process 
administrative bodies play a more significant role in European nations. Moreover, 
the dynamics behind such developments not only involve economic issues, but 
                                                          
1
 The project Global Suburbanisms: Governance, Land and Infrastructure in the 21st Century is 
directed by Roger Keil, based in Canada and supported by the Canadian Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council. See http://www.yorku.ca/city/?page_id=222.  





also social and political forces.  Secondly, the suburban experiences of those 
who have settled in the suburbs are another significant aspect (Harris, 2010). The 
traditional contentment of suburbia and postsuburbia has been associated with 
ambivalence about cities, the pursuit of personal freedom and social upward 
mobility. However, the conventional image and meaning of this view is 
challenged by the diversity of worldwide suburbs. The motives and actions of 
suburban residents, and the social meanings suburbs hold for them, could vary 
enormously even in the same geographical context. For example, moves to the 
suburbs do not necessarily imply suburban growth as a result of free individual 
preference; many residents may not have chosen to be displaced to the periphery. 
In this sense, a comparison with the views of insiders could have important 
implications for understanding the process of suburban growth.  
There are two essential aspects of this line of enquiry which conceptualise 
suburbs worldwide. Firstly, it is important to delineate a specific process and 
consequence of the suburbs to establish a generic theme for urban theory, i.e. to 
discover the common features of different suburbs. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
distinguish suburban developments in different places, i.e. how particular forms of 
suburbs are shaped by local economic and social forces. Phelps and Wu (2011) 
suggest using the term ‘post-suburbia’ to explore contemporary suburban 
settlements and their development process. Here, the prefix of ‘post-’ is not a 
temporal term, but rather emphasises the variety of forms and processes, as 
distinct from the previous understanding of the phenomenon built on suburban 
homogeneity. The post-suburban world ‘registers itself in multiple ways, 
reflecting aspects of change in these different places’ (Wu and Phelps, 2011a: 
255). In particular, current experiences of suburbanisation present highly variable 
growth trajectories (Table 2.1). While some emerging suburbs are developing 
urban characters, some cities and stereotypical suburbs may have declined.  
 
 





Table 2.1  
Urban development processes and relationships among settlement types 
 
Modern city 
i. City  Suburb 
 
Late modern city region 
ii. CitySuburb  Post-suburb 
 
City region of second modernity 
iii. Post-Suburb  City 
iv. Growing suburb  Post-suburb  City 
v. Stable affluent suburb  Stable affluent suburb 
vi. Declining suburb Sub-suburb 
vii. City  Suburb 
Source: Phelps and Wu, 2011 
2.3 Studies on suburban growth in China 
2.3.1 Evidence of suburban growth 
Suburban growth over the past three decades signals a clean break with 
socialist urbanisation. Drawing on census data or land-use data, many studies 
measured intra-urban population change and urban expansion in large cities over 
time. Usually, the land mass of a city is divided into three zones: city core, inner 
suburbs and outer suburbs. Quantitative evidence indicates the inner suburban 
area becomes the main region attracting population growth; with Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shenyang and Dalian in mind, it is claimed that Chinese cities have 
begun to experience suburbanisation (Zhou and Ma, 2000). Using the third and 
fourth national population censuses conducted in 1982 and 1990, Wang and Zhou 
(1999) model the change of population density in Beijing during the period. The 
study shows that while central districts in Beijing have experienced significant 
loss of population, suburban districts have gained substantial population growth. 
Feng et al. (2008) confirm that this trend was further reinforced in the 1990s. Not 
only did residential suburbanisation continue, but industrial and retail 
suburbanisation also accelerated. Similar patterns have been identified in 





Shanghai, Hangzhou and many other cities (Li and Tang, 2005; Feng and Zhou, 
2005).  
Alongside population growth, urban expansion has rapidly encroached on 
farmland. Based on China’s nation-wide land survey, annual urban statistics and 
Landsat images, Lin (2007) addresses the pattern of land conversion from the 
agriculture to the non-agricultural sector across the country. It is found that the 
urban sprawl of major cities, rather than the development of rural areas, becomes 
the most important driving force for the conversion of farmland into 
non-agricultural use. Land development came to be at the heart of economic 
growth. Based on more accurate and consistent information about the change in 
land use, other researchers studying major cities have also demonstrated that 
Chinese cities have experienced rapid outward expansion and have arrived at 
similar conclusions (Deng et al., 2009; Ma and Xu, 2010).  
Recent studies seek to test if there is a trend of re-concentration on the 
metropolitan scale after earlier decentralisation. By modelling the change of 
population density since the 1980s, Feng et al. (2009) show the evolution of the 
population density pattern in Beijing from a monocentric model in 1982, a 
dual-centred model in 1990, towards a seven-centred model in 2000. They imply 
that a polycentric spatial structure has emerged in Chinese cities. Corresponding 
change in land use pattern has been also detected. Yue et al. (2010) explore the 
polycentric urban development in Hangzhou and conclude that dispersed urban 
patches have been increasingly agglomerated into larger areas, especially along 
road corridors. By studying the emergence of two economic growth poles on the 
edge of Beijing and Shanghai, Wu and Phelps (2008) attempt to explore to what 
extent China’s rapid suburban growth could be characterised as a ‘post-suburban’ 
development. While it is premature to apply the concept to China, some individual 
suburban settlements do indeed display some post-suburban characteristics. 
 
 





2.3.2 Dynamics of suburban growth: market versus state 
Existing research indicates that the outward urban expansion is 
fundamentally associated with institutional changes, particularly the introduction 
of a market mechanism in urban development. Land and housing reforms are the 
two pillars for space commodification, which unleash both supply and demand in 
suburbanisation. Ding (2004) finds that the spatial pattern of land price and 
development density follows the logic of the land market. As the cost of land in 
the suburbs is much lower than in the urban core, many new and substantial 
projects, both industrial and residential developments, are located on the 
peripheries and lead to massive conversion of rural land into non-agricultural use. 
Feng et al. (2008) argue that market-oriented suburban developments have 
become increasingly apparent since the 1990s.  While suburbanisation in China 
is still heavily influenced by public policies, similar suburban elements driven by 
market forces have emerged. ‘Residential suburbanization is driven by rising car 
ownership and preference for suburban villas and quality housing; industrial 
relocation is facilitated by the development of suburban industries; and retail 
suburbanization began to appear in the form of large shopping malls and retail 
parks’ (ibid:84).  
Addressing the other side of the process, scholars argue the strong role of the 
state distinguishes the Chinese case. For example, Zhou and Ma (2000) argue that, 
although suburban growth is a reform-era phenomenon and directly results from 
economic restructuring, the state continued to play a direct role in large-scale 
suburban developments immediately after reform. Suburbanisation was initiated 
by the state through the establishment of the land market and the sponsorship of 
industrial relocation and new housing development. Alongside the establishment 
of the land and housing markets during the 1990s, the role of the state shifted 
from directly planning and investing in relocation projects to facilitating land and 
real estate development indirectly. Zhang (2000) argues that, in order to generate 
revenue through land leasing, local governments have great incentives to 





undertake land development. The ambiguous and incomplete land property rights 
and land use system led to ‘zone fever’ and ‘real estate fever’, creating a chaotic 
pattern of development and causing serious loss of arable land (Cartier, 2001; 
Deng and Huang, 2004; Zhu and Hu, 2009). Wu and Phelps (2011b) continue to 
emphasise the role of state entrepreneurialism in driving recent metropolitan 
development. A case study of the historical development of an outer suburban 
new town of Beijing reflects how a growth node was created by the municipal 
government’s entrepreneurial strategies.  
 
2.3.3 A critique on existing literature 
The evidence to date indicates that suburbs in China are becoming a new 
economic growth pole. As discussed, rapid economic growth and urbanisation has 
led to the coexistence of different types of suburbs in China. However, there has 
yet to be a systematic investigation of the forms and driving forces of suburban 
growth. Firstly, the majority of the existing research is restricted to population 
redistribution and urban expansion. Yet the term ‘suburb’ is conceptualised as a 
generic type of place with defining qualities different from the city proper. It is 
often associated with certain ideological meanings, unique living experiences and 
distinctive sets of political tensions, which could vary from place to place. 
Therefore, population gains and losses are not adequate to capture the process of 
suburban growth. There is a need to define what ‘suburban’ means in the Chinese 
context and examine the phenomenon more closely.  
Secondly, current studies commonly group the major driving forces of 
suburban development into two types: market-oriented and 
government-dominated forces. Those who address the increasingly important role 
of market forces tend to treat suburban growth as a spontaneous process (Ding, 
2004; Deng et al., 2009; Ma and Xu, 2010). Others argue that ‘economic 
restructuring has not significantly eroded the political power of the state, which 
can be expected to continue to play a powerful role in effecting China’s urban and 





suburban developments in the foreseeable future’ (Zhou and Ma, 2000). Chinese 
urbanisation is still greatly affected by the nation’s system of production and 
policies adopted by the state. However, such a dichotomous perspective overlooks 
the powerful role of the state in enabling these forces to operate. China’s 
emerging neoliberal urbanisation is largely ‘a mixture of market logic and state 
authority logic’ (He and Wu, 2009: 296). Contemporary suburban development is 
associated with the manipulation of market operations for the interests of state-led 
accumulation. In this context, it is necessary to examine how the state and the 
market work with each other to facilitate suburban growth.  
Last but not least, studies exploring the views and actions of suburban 
residents are few in number. Yet, the issue is of particular importance when 
placed alongside recent new town development which aims to develop 
comprehensive suburban settlements. It is true that great efforts have been made 
by the state and developers to promote suburban housing consumption. However, 
the social construction of the suburbs is not merely orchestrated by the producers, 
but also by those who settle there. As China’s suburban growth is by no means 
dominated by the pursuit of the suburban lifestyle of the more affluent, suburbs 
appear to accommodate different types of residents. Establishing the exact driving 
forces which affect demand is vital to the development of a full conceptualisation 
of Chinese suburbs.  
In this context, this study aims to investigate Chinese suburbs. The research 
is based on structural analysis from a political economic perspective on the one 
hand, whilst highlighting the role of human agents and their social activities in 
shaping the built environment on the other hand. It is held that China’s suburban 
growth follows the logic of capital accumulation as occurs elsewhere. However, 
the production and consumption of suburban space is mediated by a range of 
social actors and institutions with interests in such places; for example, the local 
state and developers, as well as suburban residents. In the following section, these 





three main themes are developed as a research framework to examine the 
dynamics of suburban growth in China. 
 
2.4 Suburbs as space for capital accumulation 
2.4.1 Spatial fix and capital switching 
From a political economy perspective, the accumulation process is central to 
the understanding of suburban growth. Under the system of capitalism, places as a 
commodity have value in terms of both usage and exchange. Capital drives 
peripheral developments through both aspects.  As a container for the 
reproduction of capital, suburb growth works as part of a ‘spatial fix’. For Harvey 
(1985), capital accumulation involves an inherent contradiction between fixity and 
mobility. There is a need for long-term investment in fixed structures. However, 
along with capital overaccumulation and intensification of competition, the profit 
rate may decline and local property capital may be devalued. This leads to 
capital’s constant tendency to undergo crises. Under the circumstances, the 
‘spatial fix’ has become an effective way to temporarily solve these system 
glitches. There are two forms of fix (Schoenberger, 2004; Jessop, 2006); the first 
is intensive investment in local physical installations in order to sustain and 
enhance the system’s ability to create wealth. As a result, coalitions among 
capitals, state agencies and labour factions are thus formed to resist the threats of 
devaluation and shrinking profits and places are engaged in ongoing creative 
destruction to defend local interests. The second is through geographical 
expansion of production and consumption, i.e. to incorporate more territory and 
transform the relationships between production and ways of life on an expanding 
scale.  
The exchange-value aspect of space contributes to suburban growth when 
capital flows into what Harvey (1985) terms the ‘secondary circuit of capital’. The 
circulation of capital is realised through three circuits: a primary circuit of 





material production and consumption, a secondary circuit centred on the built 
environment, and a tertiary circuit involving social and technological investment. 
It is argued that when the pressure of overaccumulation in the sphere of 
production is rising, capital flows from the primary circuit into the secondary 
circuit. Yet recent research conceptualises the secondary circuit as autonomous 
from the production system and the real estate industry as an investment channel 
in its own right (Beauregard, 1994; Charney, 2001; Gothman, 2006). In particular, 
investment in the built environment can be driven by speculative purpose and a 
search for investment opportunities outside the sphere of production. In this case, 
the role of space becomes not merely a physical container for capital 
accumulation, but a capitalisable element itself; that is, a factor used to generate 
wealth.  
 
2.4.2 Suburbia and post-suburbia: solutions to capital crises 
Post-war suburbanisation in the US has long been deemed a part of a spatial 
fix and is a result of capital switching into the secondary circuit of real estate. It 
was a necessary spatial reorganisation responding to the capital crisis at the time, 
i.e. a ‘solution’ to the problem of the 1930s economic malaise (Walkers, 1981). 
Mass suburbanisation ‘has served as a vast outlet for capital in all its forms; as 
direct investment in factories, infrastructure and housing production; as consumer 
buying; as credit creation’ (ibid: 409). Urban expansion was driven by the logic of 
capital rationalisation to form optimal land use patterns and the need to establish a 
whole new mode of consumption and reproduction. More importantly, however, 
characterised by the mass production of homogenous single-family houses, land 
and property development played a significant role in the process. The second 
circuit successfully expanded outlets for the over-accumulated capital from the 
sphere of production while stimulating demand for industrial products (Harvey, 
1985; Walkers, 1981).  





However, accumulation necessarily creates contradictions. Along with the 
eclipse of Fordist capitalism since the 1970s, mass suburbanisation as a solution 
soon reached another crisis point and became ‘an entrenched barrier to social and 
economic change’ (Harvey 1985: 122). It has been well documented that 
developers and governments strive to overcome this barrier by creating various 
new suburban forms. The role of the suburbs in the facilitation of capital 
accumulation has been reinforced rather than weakened. Firstly, as capital shifted 
towards the service sectors, the old manufacturing economy in the suburbs, 
notably the inner suburbs, rapidly declined. Suburbs are increasingly attracting 
office-based industries and witnessing the influx of corporate offices and residents. 
Although industrial decentralisation is not novel, it is the recent massive rise of 
economic activity on the suburban fringe across the world that indicates a break 
from previous Fordist suburbanisation (Fishman, 1987; Garreau, 1991; Lang, 
2003).  
Secondly, the aura of middle-class suburbia, particularly in the US, had truly 
been eclipsed by the 1970s. The image became negative, recalling the rampant 
spread of tract houses, as well as troublesome commuting and traffic; it was also 
criticised as ‘Sitcom Suburbs’ for its monotony and loss of urbanity (Hayden, 
2003). As a result, the retrofitting and regeneration of the old suburbs has become 
apparent (Dunham-Jones and Williamson, 2009). New suburban residences are 
characterised by high-density mixed-use planning, neo-traditional design and 
enclosed forms, and are often privately governed based on a range of covenants, 
conditions and restrictions (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). One the one hand, the new 
forms are a response to the demands of symbolic consumption among the ‘new 
bourgeoisie’ and ‘new petit bourgeoisie’; suburbia is packaged in themed settings 
and diverse lifestyles to re-enchant housing consumption (Knox, 2008). On the 
other hand, the forms are tied to the rise of neoliberalism and represent the private 
provision of public services (McKenzie, 1994; 2005).  





The rise of financial capital is recognised as the third pillar driving recent 
suburban growth. Since the 1980s, governments in many countries, notably the 
US and UK, have begun to approve the further expanded use of credit on the one 
hand and promote homeownership on the other hand to ensure economic growth. 
A range of novel tools to finance homeownership real estate development, 
including securitisation and subprime lending, were invented. Real estate has 
indeed become an independent economic sector in which the market-driven 
exchange value is increasingly more important than the use value (Gothman, 
2009). Meanwhile, a much greater percentage of the population has suddenly 
become able to be a homeowner or real estate investor via a mortgage (Wyly, 
2006). Heavily reliant on mortgage lending and consumer credit, the suburban life 
of the residents is to a great extent defined by new forms of financial 
self-discipline (Langley, 2009).  
Lastly, in spatial terms, a multimodal and fragmented pattern has emerged to 
replace the traditional monocentric form. The conventional pyramidal hierarchy of 
urban centres is restructured into a network of nodes, representing a new 
economic regime of accumulation. As a result, city-regions are often selected as a 
scale for state policies and practices (Brenner, 2000). On the scale, suburbs or 
edge areas are not only integral parts of major city governments’ entrepreneurial 
efforts to enlarge their spaces of engagement in response to intensified 
inter-regional competition (Cox, 1998), but are also the ‘projection spaces’ of the 
post-fordist economy in their own right (Phelps, 2010). It is well illustrated that 
the formation of the urban region of Frankfurt-Rhein-Main in Germany as a world 
city has not happened in the core of Frankfurt, but in the urban periphery. The 
peripheralisation of growth calls for a new regional mode of regulation (Keil and 









2.4.3 Chinese suburbs: a land-centred accumulation regime 
Chinese suburbs are becoming the frontier of the country’s capital 
accumulation. The development of suburbs is not just a consequence of economic 
growth, but also a driving force to expand the sphere of capital accumulation. 
There is a clear relationship between the expansion of urban built-up areas and 
local economic growth rates (Deng et al., 2010), as well as the amount of land 
sales and increases in local tax revenue (Tao et al., 2010). China’s particularity 
lies in the fact that the institution of urban development is based on public 
ownership of land and its incomplete marketised land system. Land is actually the 
most important resource in the hands of local governments to stimulate growth. 
Therefore, since the 1990s, local governments have begun to heavily rely on 
intensive urban development to capture capital investment. This is a different path 
from that of the earlier reform in the 1980s, which was anchored by vibrant 
private entrepreneurship in rural China (Huang, 2008). An alternative 
accumulation regime has been built upon massive urban (re)construction and 
outward urban expansion. 
Therefore, it is indisputable that land development is at the centre of China’s 
capital accumulation and that suburban growth plays a significant role in the 
process. However, this leads to a question regarding how capital accumulation is 
realised via a particular form of suburban development. Earlier research reveals 
that local governments rely heavily on land-related income to finance 
infrastructure construction, particularly when a large amount of capital is not 
available from budgetary sources (Yeh and Wu, 1996; Wang et al., 2011). In turn, 
the improved transport system and infrastructure help to raise land values to 
attract more investment. The model is known as ‘using land to breed land 
development’ (Yeh, 2005).  
However, it is worth noting that recent suburban development has shown a 
more mixed pattern of land usage which displays a greater balance between work 
and residence, serving as a regional growth node, Therefore, the claim that ‘the 





main driving force of urban sprawl in China is local government’s willingness to 
lease more land’ (Zhang, 2000:131) or the characterisation of China’s urban 
sprawl as merely ‘a land enclosure movement’ (Deng and Huang, 2004:219) is 
too narrow. The usage of land has become more sophisticated. Firstly, 
municipalities have managed to expand their power to the outer suburbs and gain 
control over the resources of surrounding counties through extensive 
administrative annexation (Zhang and Wu, 2006). Therefore, in essence, suburban 
growth is associated with the central cities’ efforts to expand their space of 
accumulation; suburbs provide the possibility of reorganising accumulation on a 
larger metropolitan scale. Secondly, on the local scale, capital accumulation is 
materialised based on the tactical mixture of land use. Local governments raise 
money by leasing land to private property developers for residential and 
commercial development through competitive bidding. Meanwhile, using the land 
leasing fees obtained from the open land market, they invest in infrastructure 
development and continue to use well-equipped low-priced land to attract 
manufacturing industries. While property development generates a quick return 
for primary land development and increases local revenue, industrial production 
ensures long-term economic growth and a strong local tax base (Tao et al., 2010). 
In this way, accumulations in the primary and second circuits reinforce each other 
and a land-centred growth machine is in operation.  
 
2.5 The building of suburbs: growth machine and urban 
regime 
2.5.1 Suburbs as a growth machine 
The spatial print of capitalism is realised through human activities. Space is 
not a mere reflection of capital accumulation and class reproduction, but is 
socially produced by the real behaviours of social agents and their institutions. 





Yet, the process by no means follows a free market mechanism, as if the city 
builders simply responded to consumers’ demand, while entrepreneurs and 
residents voted with their feet according to their needs and preferences. The city 
as a growth machine (Logan and Molotch, 1987) and urban regimes (Stone, 1989) 
are two of the most influential theories interpreting how urban development is 
jointly facilitated by a range of social actors. Highlighting the nature of places as a 
special sort of commodity, Logan and Molotch explore the conflict between use 
and exchange values in the city and how the conflict is organised and managed. It 
is suggested that, in the pursuit of high rent levels, various local entrepreneurs 
always tend to work together to promote growth and intensify urban land use. The 
city hence becomes ‘a growth machine’. Urban regime analysis seeks to further 
capture formal and informal modes of collaboration between business and 
government to make and carry out local governing decisions. As elected officials 
have to engage with non-government organisations to ensure access to resources 
beyond their reach, local politics turns into a contest between different interest 
groups.  
Suburban growth should therefore not be viewed as ‘spontaneous’ urban 
development. It is certainly a response to consumer demand. Yet, it also results 
from the manipulation or exaggeration of that demand by suppliers. Throughout 
the long history of suburban development in the US, ‘the physical realisation of 
this (suburban) dream has been in the hands of developers trying to turn a profit 
through suburban growth’ (Hayden, 2003: 9). What underlies suburban 
development is the builders’ intentionality. In addition, as Phelps (2006: 29) notes, 
‘various agents such as the state in its various guises, residents, land owners, real 
estate companies and financial institutions, property developers and construction 
companies, each play a role in the creation of different types of post-suburban 
settlement’. In other words, suburban development involves complex political 
contradictions and coalitions between different social actors. It is the politics of 





the development process that always distinguishes one locality from another 
(Jonas and Wilson, 1999).  
 
2.5.2 Role of business interests 
Central to the suburban growth machine is the role of business interests in 
driving suburban growth. At the heart of the machine are those who are directly 
involved in generating rents from land and properties such as farmers and 
landowners, real estate developers, brokers and financial institutions. Instead of 
‘passively’ waiting for the city to fill in the land beyond the urban fringe, they 
actively expand it by drumming up demand or luring speculative capital (Walker, 
1981). In addition to these groups are other private employers like manufacturing 
and service companies, although they might be less dependent on local growth. 
Having the power to command economic resources, in many cases they exert 
great influence in local decision making to serve their own infrastructure needs 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987).  
Zukin (1991: 135-177) provides a case study of Westchester County on the 
northern side of New York City where post-suburban development was jointly 
facilitated by both cooperative leaders and local land-based elites. Responding to 
a reorganisation of functions, corporate leaders searched for appropriate suburban 
locations for their business. Local land-based elites successfully captured their 
interests by consciously creating a homogeneous landscape. The presence of 
corporate headquarters in turn fed the market for upper-middle-class real estate 
development. Over time, corporations were locally linked and began to exert their 
own influence on local planning and other issues. ‘As both a market for 
corporations and a place for landed and political elites, Westchester County 
legitimized the new suburban marketplace’ (ibid: 175).   
 
 





2.5.3 Role of the state 
The state acts in different ways to facilitate suburban developments. In some 
cases, suburbs are approached by the state as inferior locations. This might lead to 
individually initiated, but chaotic developments. Even so, the state sometimes 
plays an active role in suburban development when the periphery is selected as a 
place for low-quality social housing development for the working class. This is 
particularly the case in Europe where the governments strongly commit to 
affordable housing projects (e.g. France, see Wacquant, 2008). In developing 
countries, suburbs are used as a marginal location by the state to accommodate 
disadvantaged groups displaced from the central city; for example, in South Seoul 
(Shin, 2008).  
Nevertheless, more often than not, suburbs are selected by the state as new 
growth poles. In this case, the state often actively promotes suburban growth to 
cater for the needs of private capital. It is well documented that the state 
governments in the US and Canada directly subsidised post-war suburbanisation 
by massively funding highways, providing generous tax benefits to homeowners, 
and allowing the accelerated depreciation of commercial real estate (Hayden, 
2003; Harris, 2004). On the local level, the state acts as a conduit for capital by 
means of zoning laws, urban plans and other financial rewards. Even suburban 
developments on the eastern seaboard of the US, which are commonly assumed to 
be the most apparent product of market forces, involved planning actions and 
federal programmes (Gottdiener, 1977; Hise, 1997).  
Alongside recent shifts in urban politics from social welfare policies to local 
development and economic growth, city governments now operate in a similar 
way to private entrepreneurs to attract investment and jobs (Harvey, 1989). Urban 
entrepreneurialism has become apparent everywhere. In Europe, where urban 
development commonly shows a higher level of involvement of the public sector, 
recent state invention and shifts in regional planning schemes are giving rise to 
the recruitment of business interests for local growth and bringing about the 





emergence of new suburban economic poles (Bontje and Burdack, 2005; Nicholls, 
2006; Nuissl and Rink, 2005). In Asia, the states have rediscovered the functions 
of the periphery. Local governments are enthusiastic about initiating high-profile 
infrastructure projects to build suburban industrial parks and new towns (Kennedy, 
2007; Firman, 2004; Lee and Shin, 2010).  
In addition to dealing with public-private partnerships, it is necessary to note 
any creation of special suburbs could result from state intervention at different 
scales. Cox (2010) has discussed two aspects that generate politics of scale; on the 
one hand, the contradiction between capital fixity and mobility has led to the 
emergence of local coalitions. On the other hand, however, locally-dependent 
actors do have broader interests in the growth of the metropolitan area. Due to the 
lengthening of commuting times and the journey to the local shops and the 
increase in locational substitutability, metropolitan areas must increasingly 
function as integrated labour and housing markets. Therefore, suburban politics 
commonly involves the inter-scalar relationship between the central cities and 
their edges, taking the form of urban secession or regional consolidation (Keil, 
2000).  
In many places, entrepreneurial strategies derived from local dependence are 
dominant, particularly in the US context. Political incorporation of suburban 
towns is an important way to promote suburban growth (Logan and Molotch, 
1987; Teaford, 1997). Suburban authorities prefer to break themselves off from 
the municipality. With governmental autonomy, local elite residents, business 
groups and industrialists are able to create a set of policies to serve local business 
needs. Nevertheless, the pursuit of local autonomy does not mean an absolute 
break from the central city. Phelps et al. (2006: 38) refer to such relationships as 
some sort of ‘complex and selective interdependencies’: suburban areas might 
remain largely dependent on the central city and have an effect on other suburban 
areas. Importantly, one significant strategy of suburban entrepreneurialism is to 





engage with powers at wider scales, i.e. to access non-local public resources to 
facilitate local growth (Althubaity and Jonas, 1998: 149).  
New developments at the edge of major cities could also be driven by the 
central cities’ efforts to attract international investment with enlarged spaces of 
engagement and regional coherence. In Western and Southern Europe, where 
local actors enjoy less autonomy on local issues, central state-led or municipal-led 
projects underpinned by a city-region consciousness for interregional competition 
are more common. ‘Central cities…are now aware that they need the peripheries 
in order to develop, or quite simply to keep their place, in the ranks of word cities’ 
(Lefevre, 1998:22). This leads Bontje and Burdack (2005) to argue that ‘the 
European suburban economic poles are not meant to be alternatives to the 
traditional town centres but rather thought of as complementary structures to 
support a polycentric development’.  
 
2.5.4 Chinese suburbs: a state-led mode 
The above review assumes that the production of suburbs involves both 
market forces and administrative process. Their dominance varies significantly in 
different historical and geographical contexts. Phelps et al. (2006: 18-19) proposes 
a distinction between ‘the relative geographical fixity of administrative or state 
practices, structure and agents on the one hand and the relative geographical 
mobility of functional (non-state, economic, social and informal political process 
and associated agents) on the other hand’ to chart the different dynamism of 
suburbs. Ekers et al. (2010: 10-11) identifies three styles of suburban development, 
i.e. self-built, state-led and private-led peri-urban growth, and suggests that 
distinguishing the three modalities of suburban governance provides a better 
comparative basis of suburban growth in different places.  
In the case of China, the monopolistic role of the state in urban development 
has been broken down since the launch of land and housing reforms. Land 
development is now a game involving a range of players with diversified interests 





(Wu, 1999). Many studies attempt to borrow the concepts of the ‘growth machine’ 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987) and ‘urban regimes’ (Stone, 1989) originated in the 
US to investigate how such interaction between different actors is shaping the 
urban development process (Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002). Moreover, outside the state 
system, the informal development of village houses by village collectives or rural 
peasants further complicates the picture (Tian, 2008; Wang et al., 2009). All in all, 
with the establishment of the land and housing markets, various new actors 
beyond the state, from private real estate developers to individual middle-class 
families, have tied their interests to suburban development and local growth. 
Suburban development is evolving towards a pro-growth governance regime.  
Nevertheless, it is notable that, due to China’s peculiar state-ownership of 
land, the state still plays a leading role in suburban development. While business 
groups play a major role in Western cities, the growth machine in China is 
dominated by the state’s entrepreneurship. For Wu and Phelps (2008: 479), what 
makes the emerging peripheral settlements in China distinct from the North 
American edge cities is the exact form of politics; ‘in China this is dominated by 
the local, regional and national governments and their adjuncts rather than “local 
bourgeois alliances” or “the growth machine”.’ Moreover, multiple levels of 
government are involved. In order to generate incentives for local governments, 
decision-making power is decentralised to the district governments. The 
performance of suburban district officials is evaluated through their promotion of 
local growth. As a result, suburban entrepreneurial governance is gradually 
characterised by a horizontal relationship between the central city and the 
suburban districts.  
In practice, the state is not just a regulator, but also an indispensible market 
player itself (Wu et al., 2007). A recent round of suburban development is 
essentially a process in which the state managed to manipulate market operations 
for the purpose of capital accumulation. On the one hand, through administrative 
means, the state removes all possible obstacles to suburban development. On the 





other hand, through heavy investment in infrastructure and other public facilities, 
the state helps to secure favourable conditions for capital investment. All these 
practises and the promotion of suburban development further transform people’s 
attitudes and change the overall investment climate.  
 
2.6 Living in the suburbs: suburbanism as a way of life? 
2.6.1 Homogeneity: suburbanism as a way of life 
It is assumed that the unique spatial patterns and socioeconomic composition 
of the suburbs have engendered specific norms of suburban living. Classical 
explanations emphasise that suburbanism is both an ecological phenomenon and a 
socio-psychological state (Fava, 1956). Suburbs feature single family houses, low 
population density, access to open space and are predominantly occupied by 
young, middle class married couples. Moreover, suburbs are regarded as being 
built upon individual residential preferences and choices. Suburban residents are 
self-sorted to the suburbs and show an orientation toward neighbouring and other 
rural values and practices. Subsequently, Gans (1968) argues that Wirth’s (1930) 
definition of urbanism as a way of life is insufficient to capture the social 
dynamics of the suburbs. He considers relationships between neighbours to be 
‘quasi-primary’, which are ‘more intimate than a secondary contact, but more 
guarded than a primary one’ (ibid: 634). For him, although physical and locational 
differences between the city and suburb have little to do with ways of life, he 
opines that the suburbs and the outer city exhibit a way of life that differs from 
that of the inner city. Beyond social relationships, the suburban way of life is also 
linked with distinctive attitudes towards minorities (Frey, 1979), family life (Bell, 
1958), modes of consumption (Dunleavy, 1979) and political ideology (Cox, 
1968).  
Whether or not all the suburbanites are indeed living in the manner described 
by the common accounts, the connotations of suburban lifestyle have been well 





established in the US. Generally, they are centred on consumption and defined by 
‘the low density of development, the reliance on the automobile, the stark 
separation of land uses, the social similarity of residents, the magnetic attraction 
of the malls, and the scarcity of employment centres’ (Beauregard, 2006: 131). 
Therefore, suburban experiences are in sharp contrast with the urban lifestyle that 
was characterised as being dense, diverse and mass-transit dependent (Jacobs, 
1961). It is often held that the homogeneity of the suburbs is in opposition to the 
heterogeneity of the urban core (Gans, 1968). Yet, such a new way of life rooted 
in the suburbs set the tone of American living in the early postwar decades to the 
extent that even urban residents began to adopt similar activities and became 
‘suburban’ (Beauregard, 2006: 143).  
 
2.6.2 Diversification of suburbs 
The recent transformation of suburban communities has challenged the 
conventional ideals of suburban life. Empirical studies have revealed that, since 
the 1970s and 1980s, suburbs in the US have become racially and socially diverse 
(Hall and Lee, 2009). Non-white immigrants, particularly those from Latin 
America and Asia, are increasingly important groups of suburbanites, which have 
given rise to the ‘melting pot suburbs’ (Frey, 2001; Fasenfest et al., 2006). 
Suburban residents are also becoming diverse in terms of income, education and 
occupational status, as working class occupants have moved out into the emerging 
employment centres (Baldassare, 1986).  The presence of moderate- and 
lower-income residents has accelerated the stratification of suburban places 
(Logan and Schneider, 1981; Orfield, 2002). In addition, suburbs have witnessed 
the arrival of non-family households, including the elderly and single people (Frey, 
2003; Frey and Berube, 2003). This has prompted the claim that ‘the new 
metropolitan reality is of heterogeneous suburbs’ (Halon et al., 2006: 2140).  
Diversity does not lead to social integration at the local and neighbourhood 
level, however. As Baldassare (1992: 1992) points out, ‘suburban communities 





are specialised, catering to the unique needs of different sub-groups of the 
suburban population’. Using multivariate analysis, Mikelbank (2004) categorises 
3,567 incorporated suburbs across the country into ten types. The result not only 
shows that merely half of the suburbs could be characterised by traditional traits, 
but also that the suburban clusters are different in terms of wealth, employment 
and race. Halon et al. (2006) identify poor, black, immigrant and manufacturing 
suburbs which are strikingly different from the traditional suburbia.  
Broadly, three threads of explanation are presented for the increasingly 
diverse suburban pattern. Classical ecological theory explains the growth and 
evolution of communities as the location choice of individual residential 
preference (Burgess, 1967). From this perspective, high-status households always 
seek to relocate to newer neighbourhoods to improve their status. Therefore, the 
arrival of low-income workers and immigrants could be driven by a 
‘spatial-assimilation’ process. Research suggests that ethnic minorities tend to 
move out from the central area to the suburbs for better surroundings (Massey, 
1985; Alba et al., 1999; Lacy, 2004). Alternatively, socioeconomic change could 
also be traced to the decline of suburbs as older communities, while many 
first-tier suburbs, particularly manufacturing areas, have begun to experience the 
same deterioration, aging of population, white flight and the influx of 
lower-income groups as the inner cities (Hudnut, 2003; Manden, 2003; Halon and 
Vicino, 2007). 
Community characteristics have become more complicated with the 
suburbanisation of employment since the late 1950s. Earlier research focused 
more on socioeconomic differentiation among suburbs due to different types of 
employment, i.e. trade and manufacturing (Logan and Golden, 1986). New 
suburban developments which are dominated by service sector growth show a 
more mixed pattern in individual suburbs, as the service sector is more bifurcated 
by high-end jobs and low-end services, and requires location proximity of the two 
(Downey and Smith, 2011). More often than not, however, residents with 





different jobs and statuses are sorted into different suburban places. It is often 
difficult for service workers or lower-income office workers to find affordable 
housing in the employment suburbs with high property values. Such stratification 
of suburbs driven by the division of labour is further reinforced when suburban 
institutions manipulate local resources to compete with others for economic 
growth (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Zukin, 1991).  
Beyond the US, many other countries have also witnessed suburban growth 
or transition into a heterogonous space in which wealthy and poorer 
neighbourhoods coexist near to each other; yet, the driving forces can be quite 
different. Suburbs in many European countries  which used to accommodate the 
working class have recently witnessed the emergence of middle class suburbs. On 
the edge of Paris, American middle-class suburbs have been imported with the 
creation of new peripheral economic poles (Bontje and Burdack, 2005). The 
periphery of post-socialist cities was once dominated by standardised housing 
complexes for employees of state enterprises. After the collapse of socialist 
regimes, residential decentralisation of the upper- and middle-class regions 
became apparent (Hirt and Stanilov, 2009). With regard to the cities experiencing 
rapid urbanisation in developing countries, residential patterns are even more 
complicated (Harris, 2010). Suburban growth is driven by both informal 
piecemeal and formal large-scale developments. Suburbanites could be previously 
rural peasants, residents forcibly displaced from the central areas, migrants from 
other places seeking economic opportunities in the city or wealthy families 
pursuing a better way of life in the suburbs.  
 
2.6.3 Uneven development and social polarisation 
Uneven development and residential segregation in the suburbs constitute 
another significant theme of the current suburban way of life. The utopian living 
ideal continues to be manipulated to re-enchant upscale suburban housing 
consumption, but is invested with new contents and new landscapes (Knox, 2008).  





The underlying ideology is no longer egalitarian liberalism or democracy. 
Suburban housing is also not principally built for middle-middle and 
lower-middle class markets. The affluent professional classes, referred to as 
‘advanced services middle classes’ generated by the new economy (Lash and Urry, 
1992), have emerged to drive the transformation of the suburbs. Consumption 
becomes an important means through which this group strives to indicate their 
distinctive lifestyle and exclusive social status. Subsequently, about the attraction 
of contemporary suburbia is its appeal to people’s obsession with security and 
exclusion to their self-identity as consumers. Suburban builders have quickly 
shifted away from standardised subdivisions. Suburbia increasingly features 
private master-planned communities, spectacular retail malls and gigantic 
churches. These new landscapes, which are labelled as ‘vulgaria’, are packaged 
with aesthetic designs, simulated settings and privately-owned amenities, and are 
well fortified by walls and fences and other security devices. For Knox (2008: 12), 
Vulgaria also acts a new morality that emphasises ‘an ideology of competitive 
consumption, moral minimalism, and disengagement from notions of social 
justice and civil society’.  
Meanwhile, the other side of suburban life presents a dismal picture. In the 
US, the suburbs, which once contrasted with the poverty and decline of central 
cities, have increasingly become areas where the poor concentrate. It is found that 
from 1990 to 2000, property rates and the number of high-poverty 
neighbourhoods (greater than 30% poverty) in the suburbs increased at a rate even 
greater than that of central cities (Berud and Frey, 2002; Kingsley and Pettit, 
2003). The socioeconomic decline is particularly apparent in the inner-ring or 
first-tier suburbs (Jargowsky, 2003; Halon and Vicino, 2007; Manden, 2003). 
Inner suburbs now face serious economic and social problems that might be worse 
than those experienced by the inner cities. In the Global South, the urban poor and 
rural migrants were expelled from the central cities by expensive housing prices. 
Squatter settlements continue to increase in the suburbs of major cities (Davis, 





2006). Allard (2004) points out that the poor suburbs have far less access to social 
service resources due to a lack of adequate provision and convenient ease of use. 
In many cases, local services were not oriented to the specific needs of poor 
populations (Murphy, 2007). Moreover, while most regeneration projects focus on 
central cities, those declining suburbs have often been neglected by public policies 
(Orefield, 2002). The marginal role of low-income groups, namely those who 
were previously peasants, migrants or displaced urban residents, in the urban 
economy could be further reinforced by the constrained life on the urban 
periphery.  
In sum, as the suburbs become the leading edge of contemporary urban 
developments, they have largely taken the place of central areas as zones of 
transition (Downey and Smith, 2011). Suburbanism as a way of life could hardly 
be characterised as homogeneous. On the contrary, it is the diverse economic and 
social landscapes that distinguish the suburbs from the well-established urban 
areas. Nonetheless, traditional suburban life continues to be practiced by the 
affluent in terms of physical and cultural exclusion. As a result, as Brown (1992; 
quoted in Harris, 2010: 28) argues with regard to Latin America, cities ‘have not 
one but at least two outskirts. One is affluent and integrated into the city with 
good transportation; the other is isolated, poor, alienated, and more populous’. 
 
2.6.4 Chinese suburbs: a heterogeneous world 
Earlier suburban development in China in the 1990s was predominantly 
driven by state-led industrialisation and urbanisation. Nevertheless, due to an 
asymmetrical land system, the suburbs experienced both formal and informal 
developments (Deng and Huang, 2004). On the one hand, state-owned urban land 
was allowed to enter the market. The state could easily expropriate farmland at a 
very low price and turned the land into industrial zones for profit afterwards. On 
the other hand, market transaction of the collectively-owned farmland was strictly 
forbidden. Having no right to transfer the land for their own sake, peasants tended 





to build or expand their houses to accommodate the demands of migrants. 
Therefore, from the outset, the Chinese suburbs have exhibited a heterogeneous 
character.  
Recently, the scenario has been further complicated. Led by new town 
projects, the suburbs are seeing massive real estate development. Developers 
endeavour to create an alternative living experience for home buyers by producing 
diverse properties, ranging from exclusive low-density villas to modern high-rise 
apartments. In China, the suburbs have never been an attractive residential 
location (Zhou and Logan, 2008; Wang and Li, 2004). Nevertheless, along with 
the building boom in the suburbs, large numbers of new households have been 
drawn to the periphery.  
Therefore, suburban residents are quite diverse in nature. Fleischer (2010: 
137) identifies a highly heterogeneous suburban area in Beijing. Young and 
affluent homeowners, rural migrants, and local natives ‘inhabit, experience, and 
thus produce the suburban space of Wangjing’ together. The research also reveals 
that housing and other consumption not only constitutes one’s suburban living 
experience, but also becomes a social practice to distinguish oneself from others. 
In this sense, residents choosing to live in different types of neighbourhoods ‘do 
not just follow blindly the lure of the market, but actively engage in the 
production of space’ (ibid: 146). Specifically, rich families have moved into 
high-end single-family houses in gated communities. Houses are more than 
shelter; they provide a package for a good life: aesthetic design, a safe and 
sanctified environment, as well as class identity and social status (Pow, 2009; Wu, 
2010). At the same time, better-off families self-selected into different 
neighbourhoods and locations based on their economic capacity and housing 
needs. As centripetal force remains strong, for many of these groups residential 
choices are actually tradeoffs between housing prices and distance to the centre. 
With limited access to the housing market, rural migrants tend to concentrate in 
places where abundant low-price private rental houses are available (Wang et al., 





2010). In short, different types of developments are created and juxtaposed in the 
suburbs and the resultant suburban space is a heterogeneous world.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
While traditional suburban living ideals may continue exerting their 
influences on developments on the urban periphery, realities found in different 
places call for a revision of conventional wisdom about suburbs. Rather than 
revolving around the paradigmatic case of America, new approaches take 
suburban diversity as the norm, emphasising commonalities and differences 
among particular types and development processes. In this sense, the research 
agenda may be redirected towards a ‘post-suburban’ phenomenon where suburbs 
present highly different characters and growth trajectories. In China, alongside a 
series of institutional changes, suburban landscapes have greatly changed. 
Importantly, it has been noted that recent suburban developments have morphed 
into new towns with comprehensive urban functions, which are quite different 
from previous industrial satellites. New dynamics for growth are created; however, 
a comprehensive understanding of these developments remains lacking. 
In order to provide a complete overview of these developments whilst 
studying Chinese suburbs in the broader ‘post-suburban’ research agenda, a 
theoretical framework is established. At the heart of the analytic perspective is the 
goal of linking current suburban growth with the accumulation of capital on the 
one hand, whilst examining how the particular accumulation regime is achieved 
by actors involved in the processes on the other hand. Accordingly, three themes 
are outlined to investigate the underlying dynamics of suburban development. 
Firstly, and fundamentally, suburban growth in China is a spatial fix of capital 
accumulation. This is a common generalisation, as in many other places. However, 
it is argued that the central role of the suburbs in the process should be interpreted 
in relation to China’s peculiar land development system. Secondly, from the 
perspective of space production, the suburbs function as a growth machine which 





is co-engineered by a range of land-interests. In particular, the role of the state and 
its entrepreneurial strategies should be highlighted in China’s context. The third 
theme, which has been less discussed so far, proposes that Chinese suburbs have 
grown into a space of consumption. This is by no means a convergence with 
Western residential suburbia, however.  Multiple driving forces are shaping the 
process here, which has given rise to a heterogonous composition of suburban 
residents, as well as different types of suburban developments. In sum, given all 
these specificities, investigation of the origins, forms and functions of suburbs in 
China will provide useful insights for the understanding of suburban growth as a 


























RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research framework 
Based on the literature review of existing suburban theory, a research 
framework is developed to examine the dynamics of suburban growth in China. 
Fundamentally, following Harvey (1985), Walker (1981), and Lefèbvre (1991) the 
research adopts a political economy approach to understand the production of new 
suburban space. It is held that the emergence of new suburban nodes in China is 
by no means spontaneous. They are a particular kind of spatial organisation which 
is socially constructed to ‘assure the reproduction of capital (accumulation) and 
capitalist social relations (holding class struggle in check)’ (Walker, 1981: 386). 
Whatever specific forms or means through which China has achieved its growth, 
the universal logic of capital works here. As Wang and Zhou (1999: 279) 
emphasise when explaining the similarities between urban structure in Chinese 
and Western cities ‘economic forces are universal, so even socialist countries 
cannot escape’. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the structural factors and 
accumulation regime that gave rise to the new pattern of suburban growth in 
China.   
In the meantime, however, the study attempts to avoid extreme functionalism, 
but stresses the important role of human agents and their activities, that is, ‘people 





dreaming, planning, and organizing themselves to make money from property are 
the agents through which accumulation does its work at the level of the urban 
place’ (Logan and Molotch, 1987:12). Bearing this in mind, Chinese suburbs are 
socially shaped by local actors and institutions. Actors are generally divided into 
two groups: those mainly on the production side and those on the consumption 
side. On the production side, the study aims to capture how suburban development 
is organised under coalitions of different actors, i.e. their motives, operations and 
relationships in the process. There have been many studies concerning the 
emergence of the ‘urban growth machine’ and ‘pro-growth coalitions’ since 
market-oriented reform (Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002; He and Wu, 2005). However, 
studies on how these concepts work in current suburbanisation are still lacking. 
On the consumption side, the study examines the activities of residents. In a 
Western context, people’s changing residential preferences are an important factor 
contributing to mass suburbanisation (Fishman, 1987). Some studies have noted 
that, in order to lure newly rich Chinese, suburban gated residences began to be 
packaged and promoted as a new and better lifestyle (Pow and Kong, 2007; Zhang, 
2010; Wu, 2010). Nevertheless, this type of estate is by no means the dominant 
form of the Chinese suburbs. The exact provenance of demand-based factors 
needs to be empirically investigated.  
Therefore, in order to understand the current pattern of suburban growth in 
China, this study will focus on political-economic and sociocultural changes on 
the macro level, and the activities and relationships of the builders and residents at 
the micro level. The three themes are also discussed with comparison with 
suburban experiences in other countries. It is argued that the rising suburbs are a 
response to China’s specific conditions, and have materialised through the actions 
of various actors at the local level.  
Shanghai and one of its outer suburban districts, Songjiang, have been 
chosen as the locations in which to carry out the research for its representativeness. 
Shanghai is not only one of the largest cities in China, but plays an irreplaceable 





role in the country’s efforts to connect its economy with the global economy. The 
rationale behind choosing Shanghai is that the entrepreneurship of Shanghai 
municipal government is prominent and at the leading edge of Chinese economic 
reform. It launched a range of institutional changes to promote suburban new 
town development as early as 2000 and has achieved substantial progress so far. 
Its experiences have been replicated by many other cities across the country. 
Songjiang lies at the far south-western edge of the metropolitan area, about 40 
kilometres from the city centre (Figure 3.1). It was developed as the experimental 
site for Shanghai’s new town project from the outset and, over the last ten years, it 
has been the fastest-growing district among all the districts in Shanghai. The 
municipal government is now going to build another three suburban new towns by 
following a similar mode of development over the next few years. Therefore, 
Songjiang is a fairly representative case to illustrate the process of contemporary 
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Figure 3.1  Map of Shanghai and Songjiang  





3.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
At the heart of this research is the quest to reveal the underlying dynamics of 
recent rapid suburban growth in China. The key research question is: why have 
Chinese suburbs evolved into their current form and how they have grown so 
quickly? Following the research framework mentioned above, three sets of 
questions to be answered and corresponding hypotheses are put forward as 
follows: 
 
1. What is the role of suburbanisation in China’s contemporary capital 
accumulation regime? What are the conditions giving rise to the current suburban 
pattern? How do they work to facilitate accumulation? And what is the role of the 
state in the process? 
Hypothesis: taking a new form of new town development, suburbanisation in 
China functions as an important means to facilitate capital accumulation under a 
range of new conditions. The state not only consciously adopts this strategy, but 
also actively facilitates the process by all means.  
 
2. What are the characters of suburban governance in China? How are 
pro-growth coalitions formed? And how do they work to facilitate suburban 
growth? 
Hypothesis: suburban politics in China are characterised by state-led 
entrepreneurial governance, whereby the entrepreneurial state introduces a new 
mode of development in order to engage a variety of actors to create innovative 
suburban space for the purpose of economic growth.  
 
3. What are the growth dynamics on the demand side driving suburban 
growth? Who are the suburban residents? What factors have driven them to move 
to the suburbs? And what are the characteristics of suburban spatial 
differentiations? 





Hypothesis: the demand-based forces driving the population growth of 
Chinese suburbs are myriad; they include: an influx of migrants seeking 
employment opportunities, outwards-migration of the urban new rich in search of 
better living conditions, the urbanisation of local farmers and investment capital 
spent on properties. As a result, the composition of the suburban population is 




This study is based on a three-step research strategy. Desk research is first 
carried out to obtain information about Shanghai and Songjiang’s suburban 
development and to prepare preliminary hypotheses. This is followed by a pilot 
fieldwork trip to Shanghai from December, 2009 to January, 2010. More 
secondary data covering general information regarding the whole city and 
Songjiang were collected from local governments, consulting companies and 
public libraries. Meanwhile, interviews with key government officials and 
planners who directly participated in Shanghai’s suburban development project 
and the Songjiang New Town project were conducted. Based on the pilot study, 
hypotheses were refined and specific research methods were developed. 
Interviews and surveys were used to collect first hand data. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted to collect qualitative material. Target interviewees 
were all kinds of actors involved in suburban development, including government 
officials, planners, design and planning consultants, property developers, real 
estate agents and residential committee staff, as well as home buyers. Because 
interviews with several homebuyers can hardly establish a full view of suburban 
residents, and official population statistics are also unavailable, a questionnaire 
based survey was used to collect information from residents in Songjiang. Both 
extensive interviews and the survey were conducted during the second fieldtrip 
that took place from May, 2010 to September, 2010. In brief, documents, data 





from interviews and the questionnaire survey are the three main kinds of empirical 
resources used by this study. Based on these data, both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis is applied to derive the final conclusion.  
 
3.3.1 Secondary data sources 
Secondary data used in this study includes materials with information on 
both the whole city of Shanghai and the Songjiang district. The main types of 
sources are listed as below.  
Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks from 2001 - 2011 (Shanghai Statistical 
Bureau, 2001-2011), Shanghai Suburb Statistical Yearbook 2002 (Shanghai 
Statistical Bureau and Shanghai Agricultural and Forestry Bureau, 2002) and 
Songjiang Statistical Yearbooks from 2001-2011 (Shanghai Songjiang Statistical 
Bureau, 2001-2011) provide longitudinal data for the whole city, districts under 
its administration and also detailed information regarding the Songjiang district, 
which includes various annual statistics for economic performance, industrial 
structure, fiscal revenue and expenditure and urban construction. As a supplement, 
the Almanacs of Shanghai and some suburban districts (Editorial Board of 
Shanghai General History, 1999; Editorial Board of Shanghai Songjiang Almanac, 
1991; Editorial Board of Shanghai Jinshan Almanac, 1990) are useful information 
on the history of these places.  
The fifth (2000) and sixth (2010) census data are the chief source of 
information on the demography at the metropolitan, district, and sub-district 
(street office) or township levels. However, these data are not sufficient for 
sociospatial studies. Firstly, the government only publishes aggregate statistics of 
the population. Moreover, the lowest spatial unit of these data is the sub-district, 
which makes it difficult to identify diversity within the sub-district.  
Other official publications including Shanghai Urban Planning history 
(Editorial Board of History of Urban Planning in Shanghai, 1999), Shanghai 
Spatial Development Strategic Research (Ye et al., 2003), Urban Planning 





Administration Practices in Shanghai (Shanghai Urban Planning Management 
Bureau, 2007), History of Urban Planning in Songjiang (Editorial Board of 
History of Urban Planning in Songjiang, 2009) and A Classical Planning of New 
Town in China (Wang et al., 2003) contain abundant information about changes to 
urban planning and development administration practices of Shanghai 
municipality and Songjiang district. Maps and cartographic materials are also 
included.  
Policy documents, planning and design documents, internal reports as well 
as promotional materials from Shanghai Urban Planning Management Bureau, 
Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Institute and other consulting companies are 
widely used to provide detailed information about institutional arrangements, 
short-term and long-term development strategies and specific project schemes and 
their development processes.  
Online media reports and relevant academic research provide plenty of 
information and the latest news on Shanghai and Songjiang. They not only 
include many useful facts and insights to aid understanding the process of 
suburban development in Shanghai, but are also a very useful way to acquire 
updated data, which is necessary after fieldwork has been conducted.  
 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
In order to examine how different actors are involved in shaping Chinese 
suburbs, semi-structured interviews were held to collect firsthand data on the 
subject. On the supply side, interviewees were those directly involved in the 
planning and development process such as government officials, planners, 
developers, and those familiar with relevant local issues such as experienced local 
realtors. On the demand side, interviewees were those involved in community 
management such as staff in local street offices and residents’ committees, and 
different kinds of residents in Songjiang based on their origins (local native, 
migrants from other places, and residents from the central city), their type housing 





(villa or apartments), and the different sub-districts in which they live. Based on 
the established local contact, a ‘snowball’ kind of approach was adopted to gain 
access to target interviewees.  
Semi-structured questions were tailored to different interviewees. Interviews 
with the actors on the supply side focus on development strategies, the rationale 
underlying the strategies, the formation of partnerships, development processes, 
outcomes of projects, housing markets in Songjiang new town, opinions of these 
space producers on suburban development, etc. On the demand side, the main 
information collected addresses the main types of homebuyers in different 
districts and neighbourhoods, the reasons for settling in Songjiang, residential 
preferences and choices, satisfaction with suburban living, etc. These questions 
were used as a guide , and during interviews, adjustments were made according to 
their relevance to particular interviewees.  
In total, 42 face-to-face interviews were conducted during the two fieldtrips. 
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. The number of interviews split by 
the type of interviewee is as follows: six government officials, seven developers, 
five planners and planning and design consultants, four real estate agents and 
consultants, two university administrators, nine staff of street offices and 
residents’ committees and fourteen residents (for details, see Appendix 1).  
 
3.3.3 Questionnaire survey 
The questionnaire survey aimed to explore the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of suburban residents, factors driving them to move 
to the suburbs, their satisfaction with suburban living, etc. The questionnaire is 
composed of three parts: 1) household demographic and socioeconomic attributes; 
2) current housing conditions, residential mobility and an assessment of the 
respondents’ neighbourhoods and sub-district; 3) information about respondents’ 
daily lives, such as modes of transport, commuting time, spending habits and 
neighbourhood interactions (for details, see Appendix 2).  





Instead of covering all sub-districts/townships in Songjiang, the study 
focuses on the three main urban districts: Fangsong (in which the new town 
project is located), Sijing and Jiuting, where property development was most 
concentrated. Besides, because this study mainly focuses on the dynamics of 
formal new town development, self-led informal development, known as urban 
villages, is not included. Based on on-site observation and interviews with 
community management staff, although the three districts have similar types of 
suburban neighbourhoods, the dominant type is different. Therefore, the survey 
aims to test if the three sub-districts represent different types of suburbs.  
The survey initially set the sample size at 100 for each sub-district, which is 
a small-sample case study. However, in order to obtain a representative sample, 
the survey followed the principle of random sampling and adopted a multistage 
clustered sampling method. Firstly, stratified sampling was applied. All 
neighbourhoods in each district were sorted into different typical types, i.e. luxury 
villas and gated communities for the rich, neighbourhoods of displaced residents 
from the central city, neighbourhoods of while-collar middle class, 
neighbourhoods of migrants from other regions, neighbourhoods of Songjiang 
local residents. This is based on information provided by a local community 
management office. Stratified sampling according to neighbourhood type 
effectively reduced sampling errors by ensuring the elements were drawn from 
homogeneous strata, and hence ensured the strength of the representativeness of 
the sample (Babbie, 2007).  
The second stage used the method of probability proportionate to size (PPS) 
sampling to select one neighbourhood from each type of neighbourhood. Take the 
villa-style gated communities in Fangsong district as an example to illustrate how 
neighbourhoods were selected. According to data provided by a local community 
management office, there are total of 11 neighbourhoods of this type in the district. 
A sampling frame was listed (Table 3.1). Besides the ID No. of each 
neighbourhood, its total number of households was used to compute the 





cumulative total running through the list. The final cumulative total was 4,394. 
Systematic random sampling was used to select a number between 1 and 4,394; 
the number was 2582, which fell within the range of numbers assigned to Gated 
Community No.6 (2293-2761). This neighbourhood was then chosen.  
 
Table 3.1 Listing of gated communities in Fangsong 
 
Gated community Number of households Cumulative Total 
No.1 1073 1073 
No.2 184 1257 
No.3 80 1337 
No.4 264 1601 
No.5 692 2293 
No.6 468 2761 
No.7 538 3299 
No.8 44 3343 
No.9 365 3708 
No.10 410 4118 
No.11 276 4394 
 
The third stage involved simple random sampling being used in each 
neighbourhood to select households. Questionnaires were distributed at a fixed 
interval. If the selected households refused to take part or were not available, then 
the next household was visited. The three-stage sampling guarantees that the 
probability of each household being selected is equal. The final sample can 
statistically represent the total population of each sub-district.  
However, because the proportion of households in villa-style gated 
communities to the total households of the sub-districts is much smaller compared 
to those in apartment neighbourhoods, only 9% in Fangsong, 5% in Sijing, and 
7% in Jiuting, the total number of households in villas selected would be too small 
to be analysed. Therefore, 30 households were surveyed in each selected gated 
community. Besides, in order to ensure that the number of valid questionnaires 
from each neighbourhood would be no less than planned, another one or two extra 





households were visited. These two practices made the sample disproportionate. 
Consequently, when all data were combined to represent the whole sub-district, 
the sample elements were weighted to ensure the principle of probability 
proportionate to size (PPS)
1
. To a certain extent, such technical processing 
somehow violated the reliability of the research. However, since data analysis 
mainly focuses on modelling relationships between variables, a larger sample size 
could actually help to promote the effect sizes of the statistic models. Sampling 
errors are tolerant and have no direct influence on the final results.  
After neighbourhoods were selected, questionnaire distribution was arranged 
with the residents’ committees that took charge of the selected neighbourhoods. 
The committees helped issue formal notices to make it easier for the interviewers 
to gain the trust of the households. In order to ensure most families were at home, 
the survey was undertaken on weekend mornings from the 10
th
 July to 1
st
 August, 
2010. Undergraduate students from Eastern China Normal University helped with 
the distribution. Questionnaires were given to household heads or their spouses, 
and most were completed and taken back by the student interviewers on the spot. 
However, home visits by the interviewers were denied by the two gated 
communities selected in Fangsong and Sijing. Instead, the residents’ committee 
staff helped to allocate and collect the questionnaires. With the help of residents’ 
committees, the rate of success is fair; about 85% of households visited agreed to 







                                                          
1
 For more details on the method of disproportionate sampling and weighting in clustered random 
sampling, see Babbie, 2007.  





3.4 Data analysis 
3.4.1 Qualitative analysis 
Based on types of qualitative data sources, methods used for qualitative 
analysis mainly comprise two categories. The first is document analysis. Policy 
documents were widely used to interpret the rationale of the suburban 
development, the values that are promoted, how these policies were mediated by 
different actors and how they affect different actors. This was supplemented by 
in-depth study of other sources of secondary data, such as promotional materials, 
media reports, etc. The second is conversation analysis. Notes of interviews were 
used as the major materials for analysis. All interviews were categorised and 
coded by the interviewees’ characters. In the rest of this thesis, interviews will be 
referred to according to their codes: G for government officials, D for developers, 
P for planners and design consultants, E for estate agents, C for community 
management staff, U for university administrators, R_F, R_S and R_J for 
residents of Fangsong, Sijing and Jiuting respectively. Interviews with those who 
were directly involved in the new town development were linked and compared to 
trace the development process. Interviews with residents were used to establish 
common factors with regard to residential preferences and housing choices, as 
well as dominant attitudes. 
 
3.4.2 Quantitative analysis 
Quantitative analysis was conducted on both macro statistical data and micro 
survey data. Macro statistical data such as that taken from statistical year books 
and census records were used to indicate the changing spatial structure of 
Shanghai. A database containing economic performance indexes, demographics, 
housing construction, etc. for each of the sub-districts of Shanghai was established. 
Spatial-analysis software Arc GIS was used to visualise spatial differences across 





the entire metropolitan area. Every question and relevant option in the micro 
survey data were coded and recorded into SPSS 16.0. Various statistical methods 
were used to analyse the dataset, including ANOVA analysis, Pearson’s 
Chi-square test and multinomial logistic regression analysis. More details are 
provided in Chapter six.  
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter explains the research framework of this study. Examination of 
the dynamics of China’s current suburban growth involves three aspects: 1) how 
suburbs function as space for capital accumulation; 2) how suburbs are socially 
produced; 3) how suburbs are shaped by their residents. It is argued that this 
framework will not only help acquire a full understanding of the phenomenon 
taking place in China, but also provide a platform for comparative analysis.  
The research then builds its empirical findings on a wide variety of 
secondary and firsthand data sources. Secondary data include comprehensive 
information on Shanghai’s suburban development project and the newest 
statistical data on current changes to Shanghai and its suburbs. Firsthand data 
were collected by means of semi-structured interviews and the questionnaire 
survey, both of which are particularly valuable considering official micro-level 
data is rarely available in China. Qualitative and quantitative methods were 
applied to these data to generate insights with regard to the research questions. 










SUBURBANISATION AND NEW TOWN 
POLICY IN SHANGHAI 
4.1 Introduction 
While suburbanisation and suburban developments have been 
well-documented in Western countries, the phenomenon is relatively new in urban 
China. In the socialist era, Chinese cities were relatively compact. There was a 
significant rural and urban divide; both rural to urban and outward residential 
mobility were quite low (Zhou and Logan, 2008). Instead, the state adopted a 
strategy to facilitate industrial development and used suburbs as a space for 
production. From the 1950s onwards, in order to find places in which to invest 
and prevent overconcentration in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, 
self-contained industrial satellite towns were developed. However, because of 
overspecialisation and the emphasis on productive infrastructure which resulted in 
a poor living environment, these areas were not attractive to residents. A large 
proportion of workers still commuted from the central city.  
Since economic reform, Chinese cities have witnessed massive industrial 
relocation and population redistribution due to the establishment of a land market 
and consequent land use changes (Zhou and Ma, 2000; Feng and Zhou, 2005; 
Feng et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009; Lin and Yi, 2011). Government-sponsored 
residential projects were developed in suburbs to improve living conditions and 
accommodate households relocated from redeveloped central areas (Wu, 2004). 
Suburban growth has also been driven by industrial relocation and a ‘land 





enclosure movement’ in the form of industrial development zones (Deng and 
Huang, 2004). Suburban development in this period was less planned, and usually 
mixed with residential projects, scattered industrial development zones and 
migrant villages on the urban fringe (Deng and Huang, 2004). The spatial pattern 
was rampant outward expansion of fragmented single-function uses.  
After the late 1990s, a new round of extensive suburban development began 
to unfold, which has differed from previous stages in at least three aspects. First, 
suburban development is promoted as the new field of development and has 
started to play a strategically important role in the process of urbanisation. In 
other words, suburbs are no longer merely an inferior location, mainly supporting 
the development of the central area. They are planned to grow into self-sustained 
settlements and to serve as drivers for growth in the regional and even global 
economy in their own right. Second, in spatial terms, suburban growth takes the 
form of clustered development in order to control the featureless expansion of the 
central built-up area on the one hand, and to develop a range of small to medium 
size urban settlements outside the central city on the other hand. The ultimate goal 
is to form a multi-centric metropolitan region. Finally, residential and commercial 
developments, along with a range of quality living facilities and services, have 
become widespread. Moreover, suburban settlements are often well-planned and 
have developed into mixed-use suburban new towns. This signals an important 
difference from the previous dominant form of development zones, which 
functioned mainly as production space.  
This chapter examines these new trends of suburban development. It is 
argued that the new form and function of suburbs are associated with local 
governments’ search for a new spatial fix in response to a range of new conditions 
for sustaining economic growth. The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, 
recent changes in the supply and demand spheres in space production are analysed, 
and the new approach to suburban development led by these trends is briefly 
summarised. Secondly, the case of Shanghai’s suburban development project is 





studied in detail. After a brief review of the history of Shanghai’s suburban 
development, the municipal government’s rationale for a new suburban 
development strategy is examined. The following section details the design and 
operations of suburban new town policy. Finally, an examination of the 
contemporary spatial structure of metropolitan Shanghai is provided to show the 
overall effects of these policies and to provide an overview of present suburbs in 
Shanghai.  
 
4.2 Changing conditions and a new approach to suburban 
development in China 
4.2.1 Political economic and social cultural change 
Economic reform has created a range of new conditions for suburban 
development (Table 4.1). In the political economic sphere, the state adopted 
market-oriented reform in 1979. As state-led industrialisation seemed to have 
reached its limits, the reform aimed to promote economic growth by introducing 
market operations in almost all aspects of the economy (Wu, 2010). This signals a 
shift from state socialism to capitalism. The reform led to a series of institutional 
changes which not only included the break-up of the state monopoly on resource 
allocation, but also rapid devolution of power to the localities. Commodification 
and privatisation represent the two key processes leading to economic 














Comparison of the main structural changes leading to current suburban 








 Shift toward the post-fordist 
accumulation regime 
 Deindustrialisation and a new 
economy based on 
non-material  products 
industries* 
 Neoliberalisation based on  
free-market doctrines 
 Entrepreneurial urban 
governance 
 Globalisation 
 Shift toward the post-socialist 
accumulation regime 
 Intensive accumulation through 
an export oriented strategy and 
commodification of urban 
development 
 Marketisation characterised by a 
mixture of market logic and 
strong state intervention 




 Cultural and attitudinal shift 
from modernism to 
post-modernism 
 Emphasis on styles and 
aesthetics to break away from 
past purity, unity and order 
 The rise of new bourgeoisie 
and new petite bourgeoisie 
involved in the new economy 
 Consumption as a means of 
signifying cultural taste in 
search of social distinction 
 Cultural and attitudinal shift from 
socialist ideology toward 
materialism and individualism 
 Emphasis on styles and aesthetics 
to break away from past plain and 
poor approach 
 The rise of new rich who have 
benefited from the reform and 
accumulated significant private 
wealth 
 Consumption as a means of 
signifying material wealth and a 
good life in search of social 
distinction 
* ‘The new economy’ describes the new sectors which have developed from an 
industrial/manufacturing-based economy and often includes technology-intensive 
manufacturing, services, cultural-product industries and design and 
fashion-oriented forms of production 
 
Many scholars suggest that the market-driven approach indicates China’s 
embrace of neo-liberalism. Harvey (2005) views China as an important variation 
of the global neoliberal shift. For instance, through the processes of 
decentralisation, land and housing reform, urban development is now an integral 
part of local governments’ entrepreneurialism. A new mode of neoliberal 





urbanisation has emerged ‘characterised by the renaissance of urbanism and a 
rapid process of urban-centred wealth accumulation’ (He and Wu, 2009:284). 
However, China’s exceptional distinction lies in the fact that, in the process, the 
role of the state has not been weakened has but actually grown in strength. Wu 
(2010:624) argues that the reform is indeed ‘a state-engineered process’ in which 
market-oriented development was forcefully supported, but also controlled by the 
state to facilitate state-led accumulation and legitimise its power. Therefore, some 
researchers (e.g. Harvey, 2005; He and Wu, 2009) depict the political economy in 
China to be a particular form which combines the logic of both market and state 
authority.  
The other dimension of change is an ideological and cultural shift in the 
sociocultural sphere. With an overall increase of social wealth and an 
improvement in living conditions, post-reform society has witnessed the 
proliferation of consumerism and material culture over the last three decades. 
Urban residents have experienced a ‘consumer revolution’ based on an overall 
improvement of living standards (Davis, 2000). The puritan communism of 
Maoist China always inculcated ‘a correct proletarian lifestyle of hard work and 
plain living (jianku pusu)’. Material consumption was denied to the masses 
because it was ‘bourgeois in origin and surplus to authentic human needs’. Yet, 
these ideas became obsolete in the face of the rampant spread of mass 
consumption. A new ideology of consumerism has ‘firmly entrenched itself in the 
void left by the bankruptcy of official Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in the new era 
of ideological disenchantment’ (Zhao, 1997: 46). Moreover, the practice of 
consumption has become the primary means to actualise the individual’s value 









4.2.2 Production: space commodification and urban 
entrepreneurialism 
Land and housing reforms have provided the most important preconditions 
for space commodification. Before economic reform, land and housing were not 
treated as a commodity. Land was administratively allocated by the state, while 
housing was distributed as a welfare benefit by state-owned enterprises. The 
central planning system, however, led to low efficiency and was financially 
detrimental for urban development. Since the 1980s, the land market has 
gradually been established with the institutionalisation of a land leasing system, 
which made it possible to transfer the land use rights of state-owned land to 
private developers. Meanwhile, housing reform was launched to break the state’s 
monopoly on housing provision. Particularly after the totally abandonment of 
public housing allocation in 1998, housing as a commodity has become the 
primary means of new residential supply. Overall, great economic incentives to 
undertake urban development have been generated.  
Administrative and fiscal decentralisation is another significant change 
which has boosted large-scale urban development. Local governments have not 
only gained greater discretion to deal with local tax and revenue, but also the right 
to manage land leasing and urban development themselves. Consequently, local 
governments’ willingness to lease more land to generate more revenue became the 
main driving force of urban sprawl (Zhang, 2000). In this case, local governments 
are not just regulators, but are also an indispensible market player themselves (Wu 
et al., 2007). In the beginning, suburban developments were largely driven by land 
enclosure and speculation as it is relatively difficult and time-consuming to 
acquire land in the inner city (Cartier, 2001; Deng and Huang, 2004). Rampant 
urban expansion caused serious loss of agricultural land (Ho and Lin, 2004). 
However, some changes have recently occurred. On the one hand, intercity 
competition has amplified, as earlier decentralisation of power engendered great 





initiatives for economic growth at the local level. City governments became 
entrepreneurial actors and nowadays compete with each other to attract footloose 
investment capital (Wu, 2002; Xu and Yeh, 2005). This creates long-term demand 
for land resources and the continuing need to invest in infrastructure and other 
large-scale projects. One the other hand, however, in order to control local 
discretion and retain its regulatory power, the central state began to launch a series 
of recentralisation policies (Xu and Yeh, 2009). Firstly, the tax-sharing system 
identifies different sources of central and local taxes, which has the effect of 
greatly reducing local taxes while leaving the burden of a large proportion of 
social expenditure to the local government. Secondly, since 2003, in order to 
constrain the quantity of land leased, the central government has begun to allocate 
land development quotas to local governments. It has thus become more difficult 
to release massive amounts of rural land for urban uses.  
Under such circumstances, with less resources and administrative power, 
local governments now face greater challenges to sustain growth. Land sale 
income is still under the direct control of local governments and has become the 
most important growth factor. Suburban development as an entrepreneurial 
strategy thus becomes more imperative; but more sophisticated tactics are needed 
to develop suburbs as a method of capital accumulation. Firstly, a mix of land uses 
has emerged in recent suburban development; both residential and commercial 
projects are encouraged. Land for such developments is leased out to the highest 
bidders in open auction, which raises a large amount of capital. Meanwhile, local 
governments continue to offer low-price land for industrial investment, with the 
aim of raising local tax returns (Tao et al., 2010). Secondly, unable to convert as 
much rural land as they wish, local governments widely use place promotion and 
marketing to present the suburbs as a nice place to live and work in order to 
encourage demand, which could help to raise land prices and thus maximise land 
revenue. Suburbs are now built as a place to live and work, and the previously 
undesirable status of suburban living is purposely promoted as a better way of life.  





4.2.3 Consumption: pro-ownership housing reform and social 
differentiation 
Radical housing reform was adopted in China in 1998. Welfare allocation of 
housing was abolished and commodity housing became the primary means of new 
housing supply. This was largely to offset the difficulties faced by China’s export 
sector during the Asian Financial Crisis. Housing and other infrastructure was 
then used to boost domestic demand, ensuring economic growth and social 
stability. With the establishment of the housing market, homes became 
commodities to be consumed; they could be made more attractive, advertised and 
marketed to make profits. Individual households replaced work-units as the major 
buyers in the housing market and were granted the freedom of housing choice. 
Although institutional variables such as jobs and types of employer still have an 
effect, demographic attributes such as life cycle and socioeconomic status such as 
income have become important factors in housing consumption (Huang, 2003). 
Importantly, homeownership, which was once despised and regarded as the 
sign of an unfavourable ‘bourgeoisie’ class, is now consciously promoted as a 
symbol of well-being by both the government and the developers (Huang, 2004). 
In order to stimulate housing demand, new home financing instruments were 
introduced (Li, 2010). All commercial banks were encouraged to request low 
down-payments and offer low-interest and long term personal housing loans. A 
nationwide mandatory Housing Provident Fund (HPF) was established to ensure 
funding for affordable housing construction. Individual home buyers are now able 
to borrow from the HPF at a lower interest rate than that offered by the market. As 
the recent dramatic rise of house prices has made it almost impossible to pay off 
the purchase cost in one lump sum, mortgage loans have become an important 
means to realise ordinary people’s dream of homeownership.  
Yet access to one’s dream home is unequal across society. Housing has 
become one of the new defining factors of social inequality (Bian and Liu, 2005; 





Logan et al., 1999). With the rise of consumerism and material culture, the 
emerging urban rich (Goodman, 2008) and new middle classes (L. Zhang, 2010) 
are no longer satisfied with the previous uniform and low-quality apartments and 
ascetic lifestyle
2
. With greater purchasing power, the new rich have become the 
biggest buyers in the newly-established housing market. Housing and relevant 
domestic consumption constitute the central focus of spending and are a 
significant means to achieve better lives (Davis, 2005).  
For this group of people, housing does not merely represent a place to live, 
but a means to establish their social distinction; in simple terms, ‘to choose a 
house means to choose a lifestyle’ (Fleischer, 2007:287). Referring to the concept 
of ‘spatialization of class’, Zhang (2010) elaborates how the establishment of the 
new middle class has become possible through the production and consumption of 
new residential spaces. Diverse aesthetic residences and landscapes offer ‘a 
tangible location for a new class to materialize itself through spatial exclusion, 
cultural differentiation, and lifestyle practices’ (Zhang, 2010: 3). Moreover, given 
the continuous price escalation of residential property, buying a house in effect 
preserves and adds value to homeowners’ assets. Motivated by such 
considerations, housing consumption has expanded to include speculation, which 
gives the public a greater role in shaping the real estate market.  
With spacious rooms, aesthetic landscapes and a recreational environment, 
suburban living signals a breakaway from the socialist past and is an attractive 
option. Evidence suggests that exclusive residential land use, green space and 
high-quality amenities are favourable factors and buyers are willing to pay higher 
housing prices for them (Jim and Chen, 2007; Zheng et al., 2009). As a result, real 
estate developers go to great lengths to build diverse themed settings and a nice 
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economic reform and have accumulated significant private wealth. But it is also an emergent and 
unstable group without pre-established cultural norms and symbolic capital. They are eager to 
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define the group in terms of traditional criteria such as occupation, they are linked by a similar 
orientation in their search for the good life and embrace of consumerism. 





environment for their products, mimicking Western suburbia; gated communities 
have become a common strategy to capture the growing aspirations of the newly 
rich (Wu, 2010; Pow and Kong, 2007).  
Another new class created by economic reform and closely related to 
suburban housing demand is formed by newly-arrived rural migrants. The 2010 
census data shows that migrants make up a sizable proportion of urban residents 
in large cities, with 35% in Beijing and 39% in Shanghai. They come to large 
cities in search of better job opportunities; however, the temporary rural-urban 
migrants without local hukou, who constitute the majority of the group, often have 
the least prestigious occupations and earn the least income and receive the fewest 
benefits (Fan, 2001; 2002). Even worse, household registration continues to be a 
significant factor denying their access to better urban living (Huang and Jiang, 
2009; Logan et al., 2009). The group is thus severely disadvantaged in the housing 
market. They are less likely to gain access to subsidised housing than the native 
urban residents, while the money they earn could never catch up with inflating 
housing prices. The rental of private housing represents their most common 
residential choice (Wu, 2002).  
Consequently, migrants tend to concentrate in peripheral areas of the city 
where low-price rental housing is readily available (Feng and Zhou, 2005; Wu, 
2008). In particular, houses built by rural peasants in peri-urban villages are the 
most common choice (Wang et al., 2010). Recently, in response to migrants’ 
increasing demand for housing, many examples of newly-developed commodity 
and vacant resettlement housing have also entered the rental sector. An apartment 
with two-to-three bedrooms may be divided and leased to several migrant families 
separately. This new type of rental is called qunzu (literally, co-renting) and has 
become prevalent in many major cities. In many cases, housing conditions for 
migrants are bad (Wu, 2002). Facilities inside the houses are poor, while room 
sharing and overcrowding are very common. Yet, most migrants report that their 
feelings are neutral about this or that they are satisfied. When choosing where to 





live, migrants are unlikely to make their living environment their main 
consideration. Instead, convenient proximity to their work or business, as well as 
cheaper rent, is much more important.  
 
4.2.4 A new approach to suburban development 
Given all the structural changes analysed above, it is clear that local 
governments began to find it tough to sustain growth. With regard to production, 
they experienced a reduction in resources to mobilise capital investment after the 
recentralisation of fiscal and land development power. On the other hand, a rise in 
consumption meant they needed to accommodate the increasing housing demands 
of different groups. Consequently, a new round of suburban development has 
emerged in China since the late 1990s, which is distinctive not only due to its 
scale, but also for its nature. One after another, municipal governments began to 
adjust their administrative boundaries by annexing surrounding counties (Wu and 
Zhang, 2007). Mass urban transport systems were developed to provide rapid 
access to the exurbs (Cervero and Day, 2008) and the outer suburban areas were 
opened up for development. Moreover, the new strategy focuses on developing 
suburban growth nodes with comprehensive urban functions. Aiming at upgrading 
labour-intensive and low-cost manufacturing industries to become high-tech and 
producer services, many mature economic development zones have attempted to 
shift their manufacturing sector to a more balanced economic structure between 
the secondary and tertiary sectors (Wong and Tang, 2005). Suburban new town 
projects with high-quality amenities and services are ubiquitous among large and 
medium cities. Featuring multifunction land uses, these new towns represent a 
more mixed land use pattern and greater balance between work and residence, 
containing not only industrial zones and high-tech parks, but also residential 
subdivisions, shopping malls and university towns (Wu and Phelps, 2008). In 
addition to manufacturing industry, residential development has become an 
important driving force in these well-planned new towns (Wang et al., 2010). With 





various packaging and marketing approaches, the image of the suburban district 
has shifted from industrial satellites to liveable cities (Wu, 2010; Wu and Phelps, 
2011b). As a consequence, cities are witnessing the emergence of a polycentric 
metropolitan structure (Feng et al., 2009) in which different urban areas and new 
towns are integrated to form clusters in a densely urbanised region. 
In sum, faced with a range of new conditions for economic growth, suburbs 
are no longer treated as secondary places. The strategy of suburban development 
in Chinese cities now goes beyond industrial and population relocation from the 
central city to the suburbs. Instead, suburban new towns and other kinds of 
settlements are built as solutions to a range of issues brought about by the 
previous mode of extensive growth. Having economies of scales as their key 
advantage, the new towns and the like will serve as regional growth poles to 
absorb capital and labour power. Meanwhile, urban concentration in the suburbs 
will also help to intensify land use and encourage better distribution of public 
facilities, as well as cause the remission of growth pressure in the central city. 
Central to the new mode, however, remains the entrepreneurial strategies for 
growth. In the remainder of this chapter, recent suburban development in 
Shanghai is examined to further reveal the rationale behind the new strategy, as 
well as detail its measures and evaluate its influences.  
 
4.3 The history of Shanghai’s suburban development 
The earliest attempt to develop the periphery of Shanghai dates back to the 
1940s. After the anti-Japanese war, in order to respond to rapid urban growth and 
revive the largest international finance centre in the pre-war Far East at the time, 
the Nationalist government formulated a master-plan to develop several new 
towns on the edge of the city encompassing 1.6 to 1.8 million people each. 
However, the principal of ‘organic decentralisation’ and the plan itself were 
discarded soon after the new government took over the city. Instead, Soviet 
planning experts, who were invited to give advice on how to develop the city, 





suggested that new developments should not go beyond the existing urban core, 
but should be located at the immediate periphery
3
. Consequently, ten specialised 
industrial areas were built on the fringe of the city proper, followed by nine 
housing projects in the form of ‘workers’ villages’. Such a suburban development 
strategy favoured the monocentric model and was aimed at economising in the 
supply of public utilities.  
Ten years later, in 1956, when Shanghai was positioned as the largest 
industrial base in China, the municipality proposed the development of several 
satellite towns to accommodate massive industrial development. This was 
partially associated with the shift in the general national urban policy from the 
Soviet model of industrial centralisation toward an emphasis on decentralising the 
population and industries to small and medium-size cities. Ten adjacent rural 
counties of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces were placed under the city’s 
administration. After that, the municipality was given formal administrative 
power over its hinterland. A general plan to construct five industrial satellites in 
15 years was launched
4
. Nevertheless, to a large extent, this first generation of 
satellite towns turned out to be a failure. The programme made little progress in 
the following three decades. Although a number of factories were allocated to the 
new towns, most workers still lived in the centre (Kirkby, 1987).  
Shanghai’s second generation satellite towns were initiated when Baoshan 
county and Jinshan county were selected by the state to develop two large-scale 
industrial projects in the 1970s. The master plan of Shanghai compiled later in 
1982 designated Jinshan and Baoshan as two key satellites to be intensively 
constructed. The two towns and their surrounding areas were figuratively depicted 
as the city's two wings. By the end of the 1980s, to a certain degree, both had 
developed into self-sufficient suburban communities. Along with the construction 
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 See On Shanghai’s Urban Reconstruction and Development by BEHEHиKOB, 1949, quoted in 
the Editorial Board of History of Urban Planning in Shanghai, 1999.  
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 See General Map of Preliminary Planning of Urban Construction 1959, quoted in Editorial 
Board of History of Urban Planning in Shanghai, 1999.  





of two industrial bases, namely Baosteel Complex in Baoshan and Shanghai 
Petrochemical Complex in Jinshan, housing and other residential facilities were 
gradually developed for workers. More than half of the workers had settled down 
in the towns (Shanghai Jinshan Almanac Editorial Board, 1990). They did not 
merely move from the central districts; a large number were from other provinces 
and were local peasants who lost their land to urban construction. 
During the 1990s, however, the concept of a multinodal urban system was 
greatly eclipsed by the focus on Pudong. The Pudong New Area project signalled 
a radical shift in urban development. Various institutional reforms were launched 
to facilitate urban construction and infrastructure improvements. Within a decade, 
the area adjacent to the east of the Huangpu River, previously composed of broad 
acres of farmland and some small industrial enterprises, was not only built into an 
outstanding urban district, but was also the vehicle for the development of an 
outward-oriented new economy. Indeed, the success of the project marked the 
state’s recognition of the pivotal role of urbanisation in promoting economic 
growth and it opened up a promising path for future development (Olds, 1997).  
Over all, as the largest metropolis in China, Shanghai has an administrative 
area of 6, 340 km
2
, containing nine central districts and ten suburban districts and 
counties. Nevertheless, the city remained dense and compact until 2000. Most 
suburban development was dominated by industry and the image of suburbs was 
remote and desolate. Until 2000, the central districts, which make up only 4.5% 
(289 km
2
) of the total area, still contained 42.2% (6.93 million) of the total 
population (16.40 million)
5
. While the average population density for the whole of 
Shanghai rose to 2,588 people per square kilometre, it declined with distance from 
the centre. The four core districts (Huangpu, Jingan, Luwan and Hongkou) were 
the most congested, with more than 35,000 people per square kilometre, while all 
outer suburban districts had a population density of less than 2,000/ km
2
 .  
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4.4 Changing rationale and strategy of suburban 
development 
After several rounds of suburban development projects, the idea of nodalisation 
was revived again when the Shanghai Master Plan (1999-2020) was relaunched in 
1999. The aim, as clearly stated, is to rebuild Shanghai metropolitan area into a 
spatial structure characterised as ‘multi-axis, multilayer, multinuclear’. 
‘Multi-axis’ means to focus new development along three major transport arteries, 
the Shanghai-to-Nanjing axis, the Shanghai-to-Hangzhou axis, and the 
Riverside-to-Seaside axis. ‘Multilayer’ means to build a five-level urban system, 
namely: one central city, new towns, central townships, central villages and 
villages. ‘Multinuclear’ refers to the central city and several new towns in the 
suburbs. This spatial structure implies a reassertion of the strategic role of the 
suburban towns and hinterlands of Shanghai that was proposed in the early 1950s, 
but with a different rationale. The new round of suburban development has been 
driven by the goal to rebuild Shanghai into a global city, to use housing 
development as a driver for economic growth, and to concentrate expansion in 
suburban new towns to manage enlargement and prevent sprawl. 
 
4.4.1 Rebuilding Shanghai as a ‘global metropolis’ 
When the reboot of Shanghai’s economy was initiated by the central state in 
the early 1990s, its strategic role was recognised as a link between the country and 
the world economy. The city was envisioned to be a global metropolis. Therefore, 
the development strategy greatly emphasised the open door policy to attract 
Foreign Direct Investment. In addition to various market-oriented institutional 
changes, new production spaces such as Pudong New Area, Minhang ETDZ 
(Economic and Technological Development Zone), Hongqiao ETDZ and 
Caohejing High-tech Park were developed to accommodate capital flows. 





Meanwhile, by restoring historical zones and building symbolic landscapes, the 
municipal government has also gone to great effort to project a prosperous, 
cosmopolitan image.  
After great success in urban construction and ten years’ rapid growth, the 
municipal government then aimed to enhance the city’s competitiveness by 
reorganising economic activities on the metropolitan level. Crucially, an effective 
city–region network was regarded as very important for the transition to become a 
world city. Strategic plans, reports and even academic papers referred to New 
York, Tokyo, Paris and London as models; the development of a polycentric 
structure was a necessary condition and self-contained satellite cities were an 
advanced and effective mode (Shanghai Municipal Planning Bureau, 2001; Ye et 
al., 2003). With regard to Shanghai, one important consideration when following 
this model was to further promote service sectors in the central area to catch up 
with other global cities, while maintaining its traditional strength in 
manufacturing in the suburbs. In addition, suburban development could also ease 
increasing population pressure and environmental degradation in the central 
districts, while in turn promoting the city’s image and helping to attract 
international business. As the slogan says, ‘the central city shows urban prosperity 
while the suburb embodies economic strength.’ In essence, this round of suburban 
development was to rebuild Shanghai on the larger metropolitan scale and to 
develop a well-integrated global city region. 
 
4.4.2 Land and housing development as a new economic growth 
pole 
The revival of Shanghai since 1990 has largely been founded on the 
improvement of the built environment and large-scale infrastructure projects. For 
instance, during the construction of Pudong New Area, vast amounts of 
investment were injected into urban development and a range of infrastructure 





constructions. Investment in the built environment has become a crucial economic 
growth pole. The improvement of the infrastructure and land leasing has brought 
about land revenues; impressive developments help to promote the city’s new 
image and attract global capital. Importantly, the property industry itself has 
become a pivotal sector in the urban economy. In other words, the role of urban 
development has been rediscovered.  
Therefore, when China’s export sector encountered difficulties during the 
Asian Financial Crisis at the end of the 1990s, the state decided to use housing 
and infrastructure to boost domestic demand. Urban development has indeed 
become a vehicle for capital accumulation. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan launched 
in 2000, it was claimed that Shanghai’s development strategy was not merely to 
focus on manufacturing, but also to expand urban development into the outer 
suburbs. One government official pointed out that the decision to undertake 
suburban development was largely made because there was no more land 
available in the central districts ‘during the last decade, we have achieved great 
success in urban renewal. There is not much land left in the central area and the 
cost is high. So the government decided to shift towards the undeveloped 
periphery’.6 Therefore, three points were strongly emphasised as key factors for 
the success of suburban development: a high-quality living environment, full 
service facilities and rapid transport links to the central city. All are aimed at 
promoting land prices and further expanding property development to the edge of 
the conurbation.  
 
4.4.3 Growth management and ‘Three Concentrations’ 
By the time it was decided to extend urban development further, Shanghai 
had already experienced massive population growth. Spatially, the city rapidly 
sprawled into inner suburbs. The ring just around the central city was the fastest 
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growing region, showing a concentric urban growth pattern. It was a matter of 
great concern that this uncontrolled trend is not conductive to sustainable social 
and economic development in the long term and would eventually cause severe 
damage to the quality of the urban environment.  
Such spontaneous kind of mode depends entirely on the market. It requires 
lowest development cost and infrastructure investment. Nevertheless, it 
would not only lead to inefficient land use but cause overpressure on central 
city’s facilities. The city is now absorbing its surrounding areas such as 
Baoshan and Minhang. If we do not stop it now and adopt effective measures, 
Shanghai would be developed into an overcrowding, no-green-shelters, 
unhealthy pie-shaped urban giant. (Ye et al., 2003: 27). 
The suburbs themselves had already undergone a degree of transformation 
owing to economic reform. Driven by the urban government’s pursuit of land 
revenue which was realised by leasing more land, the suburbs saw a 
disproportionate conversion of farmland to urban use. Additionally, along with the 
rapid development of township enterprises, non-agricultural industries replaced 
the traditional farming economy and became dominant sectors in the suburban 
rural areas of Shanghai. However, under rigid administrative institutions, each 
township created industrial parks and urban constructions in its own way, 
resulting in dispersed small-scale developments. The municipal government 
considered this pattern of urbanisation to be unsustainable as it disregarded 
economies of scale and, in general terms, fostered unhealthy competition.  
However, there was a more important hidden reason for controlling scattered 
developments. Since the late 1990s, the central state has reinforced its regulation 
over land development. The government thus could not arbitrarily convert 
agricultural land anymore. The central state set an annual quota for the total 
amount of land allocated to urban construction that must not be exceeded. In other 
words, the municipal government had much less land available to facilitate 
economic growth. It thus had to search for a new growth mode based on the 





intensification of land use rather than extensive land development. Meanwhile, in 
2004, the central state initiated a new policy on quota allocation
7
. According to 
the policy, which fell within the jurisdiction of the local governments, if a certain 
amount of land used for construction in the countryside was reclaimed for 
agricultural use, an equal amount could be added to the total quota for 
construction land in the urban area. This policy was originally designed to 
reinforce the preservation of agricultural land and increase the efficiency of rural 
land use. However, the local governments figured out that they could acquire a 
greater amount of land for urban construction by reclaiming farmers’ housing 
plots and unused land in the rural areas. The new policy was then tactically used 
to facilitate urban development. 
Against this context, the Shanghai government initiated a new guideline for 
suburban development known as ‘Three Concentrations’ – concentration of 
industry towards planned industrial parks, population towards cities and towns, 
and land development towards scale management. Following this principle, the 
metropolitan area would be reorganised into a multilayer urban system consisting 
of settlements of different sizes. In this way, economic activities and urban 
development could become relatively concentrated in certain sites and thus take 
advantage of agglomeration economies. At the same time, land in remote rural 
villages with less growth potential would be reclaimed for agricultural use to 
secure land supply in urban settlements. Therefore, although the policy was 
justified in the name of environmental protection and in order to narrow the gap 
between the urban and rural areas and improve the living standards of suburban 
farmers, its fundamental aim was still to facilitate urban development and 
economic growth. 
In sum, for all the considerations above, the development of suburban new 
towns with an employment-residential balance emerged as an optimal strategy for 
further growth. While the municipal government aimed to achieve global city 
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status by promoting a service economy, the suburban new towns would 
accommodate its traditional industrial sectors and help sustain its rapid economic 
growth rate. At the same time, property development in the new towns would 
contribute to the local revenue and tax base. Finally, building its economy on the 
back of an agglomeration economy, new towns would facilitate an intensive 
growth mode. This would help to ease congestion problems in the central city. 
Nevertheless, it was a tricky strategy for growth in the face of tightened land 
development policies.  
 
4.5 Projects, policies and practices  
New town development in Shanghai was formally launched in 2001; thus far, 
the development could be generally divided into two periods. During the Tenth 
Five-year Plan (2001-2005), under the name of ‘One-City-Nine-Towns’, relevant 
policies were first framed and the development mode was tested in ten selected 
suburban towns. The operation system was extended to the whole metropolitan 
area throughout the Eleventh Five-year Plan (2006-2010). The project was called 
the ‘1966’ urban system and was aimed at spatially reorganising development by 
constructing a range of urban settlements of different sizes, namely one central 
city, nine new towns, sixty new townships and six hundred central villages. 
Throughout the two projects, the state developed a number of devices to boost the 
growth of suburban economy. At the core of these policies was the intention to 
create favourable conditions for capital investment. Four types of institutions 
dealing with different aspects of new town development are identified to have 









4.5.1 Projects: from One-City-Nine-Towns to the ‘1966’ urban 
system 
The project known as ‘One-City-Nine-Towns’ was formally launched with 
the Shanghai Municipality No. 1 Decree: ‘Announcement on Promotion of 
Urbanisation in Experimental Towns’ in 2001. Ten towns were selected from each 
suburban district or county to be experimental sites for suburban development 
(Figure 4.1). According to the document, the ultimate goal of the project was to 
construct all ten towns into well-designed and fully-equipped urban settlements. 
What distinguished the project from previous satellite town development is the 
fact that the government attached particular importance to infrastructure 
construction and aesthetic urban landscapes. The primary task of the project was 
to draw up ‘high-profile’ master plans and urban designs. Moreover, the towns 
were built to replicate authentic Western townscapes in Britain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Scandinavia, and North America respectively. The 
plan indicated that all the towns would not only be based on concepts generated 
from their corresponding Western countries, but would also contain a 
master-planned community with landscapes and building forms taken from those 
countries. 
By 2005, although two of the towns abandoned the original plan
8
, the level 
of achievement was extraordinary. In total, eight towns finished the land 
development of an area comprising 4,105 hectares, which included 6,992,000m
2 
of private housing and 3,242,400 m
2
 of public facilities
9
. Driven by this project, 
urban development began to boom in the suburbs. By the end of 2004, there were 
more than 600 km
2
 of urban areas, and the level of urbanisation in the suburbs had 
                                                          
8
 The two towns were Lingang in Nanhui and Chenjiazhen in Chongming. Lingang was removed 
from the project because it was later reassigned as a separate new town project directly developed 
by the municipality. The development of Chenjiazhen was put aside as the location was near an 
international wildlife reserve and urban development was strictly controlled.  
9
 ‘Assessment report on the development of experimental towns’, internal report of the Advisory 
Board of Shanghai Municipal Government, December, 2005.  







. The municipality claimed that the project of 
One-City-Nine-Towns greatly improved the level of urban planning and 
development in the suburbs and provided valuable experience for future suburban 
development. Importantly, the project set up the basic policy framework for the 





Figure 4.1 Locations of One City and Nine Towns 
Source: compiled from ‘Assessment report on the development of experimental 
towns’, internal report of the Advisory Board of Shanghai Municipal Government, 
December, 2005. 
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Based on the One-City-Nine-Towns project, the goal of the 1966 urban 
system was to further suburban development and reorganise urban and industrial 
development throughout the metropolitan area. According to the municipality’s 
planning document
12
, Shanghai was to be developed into a spatial structure in 
which a variety of urban clusters, graded in a multi-layer system both small and 
large, would be rationally distributed, but would be well connected with each 
other; they would resemble the stars planted in a galaxy (Figure 4.2). Nevertheless, 
the main task at the centre of such spatial restructuring was to develop new towns 
as economic growth poles to benefit the metropolitan area as a whole. 
In total, nine new suburban towns were programmed to be built into 
middle-scale urban settlements, based on the pre-existing central towns of each 
suburban district/country, with the exception of Pudong. The new towns were 
planned to be the political, economic and cultural centres of their districts and the 
main places where employment and population growth be would concentrated. 
Ideally, they would be relatively independent from the central city, but contribute 
to the metropolitan economy with specialised economic structures (Table 4.2). 
Some were developed to contribute to the manufacturing industry, including 
Baoshan for iron and steel, Minhang for microelectronics, Jiading for the 
automotive industry, Jinshan for petrochemical business and Lingang for 
equipment. Others, however, were intended to focus on service sectors. For 
example, Songjiang, Qingpu, Nanqiao and Chengqiao were assigned to enhance 
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 Shanghai Municipality No. 45 Decree (2004): ‘Planning Framework on the implementation of 
“three concentrations” to accelerate suburban development in Shanghai’. 























Figure 4.2 1966 urban system in Shanghai  
Source: Compiled from Follow-up study on suburban planning, Shanghai 














Table 4.2 Visions for suburban new towns in Shanghai 
 
New Towns Visions 









‘Steel Baoshan’ built upon an economy of steel manufacturing and logistics  81.35 (51.22) 650,000 
Minhang New 
Town 
‘Aerospace Minhang’ built upon an economy of aerospace manufacturing 
and technologic innovation 
193.7 (165) 1,050,000 
Qingpu New 
Town 
‘Green Qingpu’ characterised by traditional water townscapes and based on 
tourism, leisure and convention and exhibition industries 






‘Auto Jiading’ and ‘a comprehensive node city in the Yangtze Delta’, 







‘Silicon Valley of Petrochemical Industry’ built on petrochemical and 
related industries 

















Table 4.2 (continued) 
 
New Towns Visions 









‘Liveable cultural city’ and ‘Socialist New Suburbs’ with a suburban-oriented real 
estate market; ‘Higher Education Base’; ‘A comprehensive node city in the 
Yangtze Delta and the hub of south-west Shanghai’, specifically targeting advanced 







‘Water Garden City’ mainly focusing on the green economy and tourism and leisure 
industry  
28 (26.12) 200,000 
Nanqiao 
New Town 
‘Eco City’ built on sustainable planning and design; ‘Low-carbon city’ for the 
development of a low-carbon economy; ‘Intelligent city’ at the cutting edge of 
technological innovation; ‘A comprehensive centre on the northern bank of 








‘International shipping centre’ based on Yangshan International Deep Water Port 
and the equipment manufacturing industry 
296（164.8） 830,000 
* Updated targets in recently published revised master plans (2010-2020) 
Source: Compiled from Shanghai Planning and Land Resources Bureau, 2008; and Master Plan (revised version, 2010-2020) of Qingpu New 
Town, Jiading New Town, Jinshan New Town, Songjiang New Town, Nanqiao New Town, http://www.shgtj.gov.cn/, accessed on 29 August, 
2011 





In terms of population, the new towns were conceived to be ‘anti-magnets’ to 
agglomerate the population and control continuous urban sprawl. This follows a 
principle of ‘decentralised concentration’13. Decentralisation was intended to ease 
the increasing population and environmental pressure on the central area, whereas 
concentration would create agglomeration economies and optimise the 
distribution of public facilities. The government hoped that these new towns 
would accommodate half of the total number of suburban residents, that is, about 
5.40 million by 2020. Based on their roles in the overall spatial strategy, the 
recent-updated plan aims to populate Songjiang and Jiading, as the two largest 
settlements, with 1.0 million inhabitants by 2020, followed by Qingpu, Nanqiao 
and Lingang with 0.6-0.8 million, and Jinshan and Chengqiao with 0.2-0.4 
million.  
According to the plan, the new towns were to be developed in phases, 
reflecting the municipal government’s long-tem development strategy. Based on 
their development conditions and the significance of building the competitiveness 
of Shanghai, some were designated to be developed into bigger cities first. Since 
Jiading and Songjiang border Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and their 
connections to the inner areas have recently been reinforced with the opening of 
two high speed railways, they were assigned as the ‘node cities’ of the Yangtze 
Delta, and the main sites to compete with other cities in the region. Qingpu, 
Nanqiao and Lingang were identified as the commercial and business centres of 
their surrounding areas. Jinshan and Chengqiao will be placed on reserve, without 
large-scale urban development in the immediate future. The municipal 
government chose to give its support to selected strategic sites among these new 
towns at different stages. During the Eleventh Five-year Plan (2006-2010), 
Songjiang, Jiading and Lingang received development focus along with 
substantial support from the municipal government. For the next five years, 
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 Suggestions on suburban planning and development in Shanghai, Shanghai Municipal 
Government, 2004 





Jiading, Qingpu and Nanqiao are the priority sites in the second round of new 
town development. 
Above the new town layer is the central city, namely the area inside the outer 
ring of Shanghai. By the end of 2005, there were a total of 9.76 million residents 
in that area, and population density was about 15,500 per square kilometre. The 
aim of the plan was to control population growth in this area. The total population 
target was 9.50 million in 2010, and a further reduction to 9 million in 2020. 
Economic development in this area focuses on deindustrialisation and the 
development of service sectors such as financial services, international trade, the 
information industry, etc. At the same time, the government will continue to 
redevelop old high-density neighbourhoods to upgrade the urban environment.  
Below the new town area, there are two layers of smaller settlements. The 
first is 60 new townships distributed across the suburban areas; there are four 
types of new townships: 1) townships that used to be district or country centres; 2) 
townships that are close to the central city or near major metropolitan 
infrastructures; 3) townships that are next to large industrial parks; 4) townships 
that are outstanding for their agricultural production and good ecological 
environment. With great potential to accommodate growth, they are intended to 
constitute the most basic unit for administrative management and the distribution 
of public facilities and social services. Generally, each new township was planned 
to accommodate 50, 000 residents. Nevertheless, some with a stronger historical 
foundation and better development conditions are expected to maintain a 
population of about 100,000 to 150,000. The municipality also aimed to place its 
large-scale affordable housing projects there.  
The second layer comprises 600 central villages at the bottom of the system. 
Central villages constitute the basic unit of rural communities. The strategy was to 
promote intensive land use by re-concentrating the farmers that are currently 
sporadically distributed in 50,000 natural villages into a smaller number of 
well-planned new villages. Apparently, this idea encompasses many trivial tasks 





and might take more than 20 years to finish. However, as it would create more 
available land to sustain rapid economic growth, the building of central villages 
was considered to be vital to the whole project. The scale of these villages could 
vary significantly according to the characteristics of local agriculture and the 
cultivated area. Generally, in the inner suburbs, the total number of central 
villages was planned to be smaller and each was to accommodate around 1,000 
households. In the outer suburbs, which comprise a larger proportion of the rural 
population, there would be more villages built; each was designed for merely 
500-600 households.   
In review, both projects, namely ‘One-City-Nine-Towns’ and the ‘1966’ 
urban system were to facilitate suburban growth through new town development. 
However, they had different focuses and affected suburban development in 
different ways. The ‘One-City-Nine-Towns’ project promoted suburban growth 
by intensive urban construction. From the outset, high-quality plans and aesthetic 
landscapes, as well as investment in public facilities and transport infrastructure, 
were regarded as the main tasks. These were believed to be vital for attracting 
both capital and residents. By the development of the ‘1966’ urban system, the 
spatial strategy has become clearer, that is, to develop specialised economic 
growth poles on the metropolitan scale. While the central city would be further 
upgraded to accommodate service sectors, suburban new towns were to be 
multifunctional urban settlements, yet based on industrial development. 
Meanwhile, the project intentionally covered vast rural areas, where smaller 
settlements were to be planned and developed. In essence, however, this strategy 
was still designed to support the development of new towns. As explained earlier, 
a new land development policy made it necessary to develop an intensive pattern 
of land use. This was achieved through concentrating land development in the 
new towns on the one hand, and relocating famers in remote villages for a greater 
land development quota on the other hand. Therefore, the new townships and 
central villages were designed to accommodate those landless farmers. After the 





two projects, new town development was successfully initiated. The following 
paragraphs turn to an analysis of the policies and practices through which the 
projects were carried out.  
 
4.5.2 Policies: boosting supply and demand 
In order to support new town development, the municipal government 
launched a series of policies and institutional changes concerning almost all 
relevant aspects including planning, land leasing, the development system, 
industrial concentration and population growth. Central to the strategy of these 
policies was the creation of conditions favouring capital accumulation. State 
intervention could be divided into four types, both supply and demand. On the 
supply side, the most important kind of policies addressed land assembly. On the 
one hand, the municipal government assigned a larger quota for construction land 
and relaxed land development control in the new towns that were selected as key 
sites. For example, according to the central state’s policy, when agricultural land 
has been occupied by urban construction, the local government can reclaim 
agricultural land occupying the same area in other places. The key new towns, 
however, were allowed to reclaim only half of the total area they converted to 
urban use, while the remainder would be made up by the municipal government in 
other places. On the other hand, a range of institutions designed to convert 
collectively-owned land to state-owned land were launched, such as the 
state-collective co-development model, housing plot exchange policy (zhaijidi zhi 
huan) and land for social insurance policy (tudi huan baozhang) etc. By all these 
means, the government settled the problem of land shortage and ensured the 
provision of land in the new towns.  
Secondly, the government directly invested in infrastructure construction and 
mega-projects. This is particular apparent in the pilot project of 
‘One-City-Nine-Towns’. The government not only undertook primary land 
development and prepared land to be ready-for-development for private 





developers, but also used its power over planning and development control to 
ensure a quality living environment for all the new towns. The government set up 
various development corporations to perform these tasks, which were often in 
charge of primary land development and infrastructure construction, as well as 
attracting private investment afterwards. Importantly, in order to address financial 
issues, these corporations were allowed to raise funds through diverse channels, 
particularly market operations such as loans from banks or private investment 
companies. In effect, these projects helped lower the cost of development, 
promote the overall image of the towns, and thus lowered the risk of investment.  
On the demand side, policies address both industrial development and real 
estate development. According to the government’s document14, the strategy was 
claimed to be ‘using industrialization to drive urbanization, meanwhile using 
urbanization to propel industrialization’. The development of new towns was first 
understood to be supported by industrial growth. The government endeavoured to 
attract industrial investment, but wished to concentrate these factories in the 
industrial parks of the new towns. Importantly, tax generated from the enterprises 
in these parks was fully refunded to local district governments. Consequently, 
great incentives were created for local governments to lure enterprises by offering 
various preferential policies such as under-priced land or tax exemptions. In 
addition, for large and important companies the governments might even offer 
real estate in the new towns to their senior managers (Interview D2). This 
presented an interesting case in which industrial development and housing 
development were mutually reinforced.  
When it comes to real estate development, the government’s efforts mainly 
concentrated on a prosperous housing market in the new towns, which was to be 
achieved by absorbing large amounts of the population to boost the housing 
market in the towns. When building the ‘1966’ urban system, policies were 
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mainly targeted at three groups of people (Figure 4.3). Firstly, local farmers were 
encouraged to give up their land and relocate to the new towns. The municipality 
imposed a project of ‘Cheng Xiang Yitihua’ (literally, urban-rural integration), 
which aimed to narrow or eliminate the development gap between the urban areas 
and countryside by improving farmers’ living standards. In essence, the policy 
urged farmers to leave their rural lives and to work and live in towns and cities. 
One important practise was the policy known as housing plot exchange (zhaijidi 
zhi huan). Local township governments or the collectives negotiated with farmers 
to transfer their housing plots to the government in return for acceptable 
compensation and benefits. Generally, farmers could choose between two 
alternatives, in-kind compensation or cash. In the former case, farmers were 
compensated with another new apartment in the government-planned new 
townships or central villages. In the latter case, they could buy into commodity 
houses in the new towns, and acquire urban registration status and enjoy their 
welfare as urban residents at the same time. Therefore, in this sense, urbanising 
the farmers not only made room for construction, but also created a fresh group of 
possible residents for the new towns. 
Secondly, central residents were encouraged to relocate to the suburbs. In 
order to attract them with a better living environment and comprehensive public 
facilities, nearly all the plans for the new towns placed an emphasis on liveability 
and the local quality of life. Meanwhile, the municipality adopted rigid 
development controls in the central areas to displace projects and populations. For 
example, one significant principle known as ‘Shuang Zeng Shuang Jian’ (literally, 
two incenses and two reductions), to increase green space and public space while 
reducing plot ratios and high-rise buildings, was formally legislated in the 
Shanghai Urban Planning Ordinance Amendment in 2003. It aimed to decrease 
urban density to relieve environmental problems such as ground settlement and 
the increasing effects of the urban heat island, while promoting housing prices in 
the central areas to dispel new arrivals in an indirect way. 






















Figure 4.3 Ideal directions of population flows in the 1966 urban system 
Source: compiled from Follow-up study on suburban planning, Shanghai 
Planning and Design Research Institute, 2008 
 
Finally, new towns were also planned to accommodate the influx of migrants 
from other places to Shanghai. Ten years after the suburban new town 
development was launched, local planners now admit that, rather than pulling 
massive residents out of the central city, this strategy might be a more feasible 
solution to control the growth of the core, given that centripetal forces continue to 
be dominant in Shanghai. It is estimated that the number of migrants will soon 
exceed local residents in the near future. One interviewee describes the growth 
potential of the housing market in the new towns (Interview G1): 
An apparent fact is that, due to very high housing prices, the fresh 
university graduates cannot afford commodity houses in the central city 
at all. We are building the most attractive communities with most 
convenient transportation, but much lower prices. People will make wise 
decisions. This is a liveable dream available for the masses.  





Therefore, since 2010, policies have begun to identify the white-collar class that 
have newly arrived in Shanghai as their main targets. The development strategy 
will focus more on public transit development and large-scale affordable housing 
projects.  
 
4.5.3 Practices: a mode of suburban governance 
For the purpose of extending its power to the outer suburbs, since the 1990s 
the city has begun to gradually merge with its peripheral counties and convert 
them into city districts; the earliest assimilations were Baoshan, Shanghai (county) 
and Jiading, followed by Jinshan, Songjiang, Fengxian, Qingpu and Nanhui. The 
municipality was then able to directly organise its development strategy in an 
enlarged space. Administratively, however, through power devolution, district 
governments were endowed with an increasingly significant role in local growth. 
In order to mobilise local enthusiasm and enhance local economic vitality, the 
municipality has gradually devolved its power and responsibility to district and 
county governments since the 1990s. In 1992, an administrative system known as 
‘two-level governments, two-level managements’ was proposed, defining a new 
political labour division characterised by ‘unified leadership (by the municipality), 
decentralised administration (by the local governments), and sector-specific 
guidance (by the municipality)’. For the suburban districts, this was later refined 
as ‘three-level governments, three-level managements’, an administrative 
structure constituting the municipality, the district government and a number of 
town and township governments. When the new town project was launched, the 
district governments themselves were in charge of the development.  
Therefore, suburban development in Shanghai involves a dialectical process 
of both consolidation and fragmentation (Figure 4.4). First and foremost, 
development results from the central city’s thirst for land and other production 
factors in response to regional and global competition. Within China’s peculiar 
system of ‘city administering county’ (literally, shi guan xian), it owns the 





legislative capacity to administrate its surrounding areas. The municipality 
managed to restructure its jurisdiction and force an amalgamation of the 
metropolitan area. Nowadays, the municipality controls vital issues of the region, 
but expands its regulatory influence into the suburban space. In the sector of urban 
planning and land development, for example, the principle reads as ‘unified plans 
and regulations, decentralised administration and management’ (Shanghai Urban 
Planning Management Bureau, 2007). The municipality is not only in charge of 
formulating metropolitan plans and allocating annual construction land quotas, but 
also directly administrates the development of all key sites and strategic projects 
(Figure 4.5). To a large extent, its control lies in its power over the selection of 
strategic sites and relevant policy preferences and investment in infrastructure 
construction, which could greatly influence economic activity at the local level. 
As one planner in the municipal planning and design institute points out 
(interview G7):  
The lessons we learnt from the past ten-year period of suburban 
development are that, without the support of the municipality, these outer 
suburban areas have very little chance to grow up into multifunctional 
new towns in their own right. Only after they were selected as strategic 
development sites would the municipal government guarantee their land 
development quota, locate large-scale residential projects and put 
essential infrastructure into place. It is the municipality that gives them 
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Figure 4.4 Processes of urban development under the municipal-district administrative system  






Areas controlled by the Municipality
Areas controlled by both the municipality and district governments
Areas controlled by district governments
Historical conservation areas  
Figure 4.5 Area division by the administration body of planning and 
construction management 
Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Management Bureau, 2007 
 
 





However, the building of the ‘1966’ urban system is by no means a task 
initiated by the municipality and implemented by local district governments. In 
practice, although the district governments are required to complete certain 
assignments, they were granted the right to orchestrate the development in their 
own ways (see figure 4.4). The district governments formulated the master plans 
for the new towns themselves. After acquiring planning approval from the 
municipality, they set up their own development corporations to take charge of 
land expropriation, infrastructure construction, land leasing, investment attraction 
and all other relevant work. Meanwhile, local governments were entitled to set up 
their own coffers to organise local development. They were allowed to maintain 
various extra-budget and off-budget revenues; particularly, all land leasing fees 
and tax generated from local industrial parks would be fully refunded to the 
localities. Therefore, district governments were not only given great autonomy 
over local issues, but also great incentives to pursue growth and thus play a 
leading role in the development process.  
The new relationships between the municipality and suburban district 
governments are not without tension. Facing fierce inter-locality competition, 
district governments are more concerned about local economic interests than the 
goals of Shanghai as a whole. They compete with each other for projects initiated 
by the municipality, but only for those favouring local growth. For example, they 
are reluctant to contribute their land for resettlement housing development. Those 
without the municipality’s support are also unwilling to lag behind and often go 
beyond the plans of the municipality. It is notable that, despite being envisaged as 
complementary centres, all the new towns endeavour to mobilise all possible 
resources for growth. All have set up their own industrial parks, competing for 
factories in similar industries. At the same time, all have framed their visions with 
the rhetoric of an excellent suburban living environment and a high quality of life. 
Consequently, competition with homogeneous industries is not uncommon. Under 
such circumstances, the municipality is generally in an uneasy position when 





coordinating developments and enforcing its grand plans.  
 
4.6 A new metropolitan structure of Shanghai 
Although it may still be too early to state that the spatial restructuring of 
Shanghai has created a new multimodal model that is recognised in the US as 
‘exopolis’ (Soja, 2000), the relationship between the core and the periphery has 
been redefined. Importantly, with the implementation of the new metropolitan 
plan, the suburbs are emerging as new subcentres for population growth (Figure 
4.6). The total population share of the suburbs in the metropolitan area rose from 
57% to 70% between 2000 and 2010. With the exception of Chongming and 
Jinshan, all experienced spectacular rates of growth varying from 50% to 150%. 
Notably, as one major site in the first round of new town development, Songjiang 
was the location with the fastest population growth.  
The rapid population growth in the suburbs was partially attributed to the 
movement of residents from the central city. During 2000-2010, on average, the 
population of the central areas did not significantly increase. Moreover, five out of 
nine central districts experienced population loss (see Figure 4.6). Among others, 
three districts, namely Luwan, Huangpu and Jing’an, experienced a reduction in 
population of more than 20%. Additionally, the suburbs accommodated the influx 
of a large number of migrants. Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b) show how the proportion 
of migrants in each area relative to the average level varies across different 
districts. Concentrations of migrants are found in five suburban districts: Minhang, 
Fengxian, Jiading, Qingpu and Songjiang, the latter three of which have greater 
migrant populations than native citizens. The central areas continue to be 
dominated by native residents, who account for 75% of their total population.  
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Figure 4.6 Population growth rate 2000-2010 by district 
Sources: 2000 and 2010 Shanghai census data 
 
This led to a difference in the composition of the population between the 
centre and the suburbs in terms of their socioeconomic categories. During 
1990-2000, the central cities witnessed an increase in professional occupants and 
better-off families (He, 2009). Although the latest data on disposable incomes or 
occupations at the district level is not available, the distribution of education 
among residents shows a similar pattern in the following decade and implies the 
higher socioeconomic status of those living in the central districts (Figure 4.7c). 
For example, the central area has a higher concentration of people who have 





undergone higher education, which amounts to about 32% of the total population. 
In contrast, the ratio of this group to the total population in many suburban 
districts is merely around 10%, while people with only primary education or less 
make up more than 60% of all the suburban districts.  
Population redistribution was accompanied by economic restructuring in the 
metropolitan area. Unsurprisingly, the dominant role of the central city has not 
been weakened, but reinforced. The central areas have enjoyed the fastest 
economic growth over the past ten years; the annual growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) has reached as high as 78% (Figure 4.8a). This was accompanied 
by a successful deindustrialisation process (Figure 4.8b). In 2009, tertiary sectors 
alone contributed 85% to the total growth of the central areas. Pudong New Area, 
even after annexing Nanhui district this year, has maintained its leading role in the 
region and achieved good performance in both manufacturing and tertiary 
industries. The other suburban districts, however, have grown strong due to the 
manufacturing sector, mostly through the electrical and electronics, chemicals, 
equipment manufacturing and automotive industries. In some districts such as 
Minhang, Songjiang, Jiading and Qingpu, manufacturing industry contributes 
more than 65% of the local economies.  
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Figure 4.7 Population structure in Shanghai: 
a) concentration of migrants; b) proportion of migrants vs. natives; c) proportion of residents with different education levels 
Sources: 2000 and 2010 Shanghai census data
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Figure 4.8 Spatial economic structure of Shanghai 
a) Distribution of economic growth 2000-2009 in Shanghai b) Economic structure in different districts  
Sources: Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2001; 2010





In short, the new patterns of population distribution and economic growth 
present a spatial division of labour at the metropolitan scale. On the one hand, the 
central city has managed to shift its economy towards service sectors and produce 
a new middle class faction involved in the service-based economy. On the other 
hand, manufacturing has been decentralised, which in turn has led to the arrival of 
migrant workers in the suburbs. Given the fact that service industries have also 
emerged in many suburban new towns, such division of economic sectors is not 
absolute. Nevertheless, it is evident that while the central city retains its dominant 
position, the suburbs have grown into new economic centres. With specialised 
economies, the central city and the suburbs began to complement each other and 
form an entire mega-city for global competition. In this sense, the municipality’s 
original plan of spatially reorganising its economy has been achieved.  
 
4.7 State-led suburban development in China 
China’s contemporary suburbanisation represents a case where the 
entrepreneurial state plays an important role in the process (Figure 4.9). To a large 
extent, suburban growth resulted from ‘a state project’. In the face of new 
conditions, the municipal government schemed to develop suburban new towns to 
sustain local economic growth, and managed to ensure efficient implementation 
of its plan subsequently. The great capacity of the state to facilitate rapid progress 
meanwhile control the consequences lies in the mixed use of both market 
mechanism and state interventions.  
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Figure 4.9 State-led suburban new town development in China 
 
On the one hand, through privatisation and commodification of land and 
housing development, the monopoly power of the state was broken down. In the 
meantime, market operation was introduced in the production of built 
environment. Such transition mirrors the path of neoliberalisation noted by 
Harvey (2005: 2), that is, reform policies aimed to establish ‘an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade’. Specifically, the government launched a series of institutional changes to 
facilitate the establishment of a suburban housing market by working on both 
supply and demand sides. On the production side, fiscal and other powers were 
decentralised to district governments, leading to the rise of urban 
entrepreneurialism at the district level. The establishment of land-leasing system 
permitted the entry of private capital and facilitated the transfer of land use rights 
based on market mechanism. And, as a result, public-private partnership became a 
common form of urban governance in response to fierce inter-locality 
competition.  
On the consumption side, the government attempted to stimulate the demand 
for housing on the periphery by absorbing different kinds of potential residents, 





including local farmers, migrants and residents from the central city. The 
abandonment of welfare allocation of housing liberated urban residents’ freedom 
to choose where to live. Commodity housing newly-built on the periphery became 
the primary type of new housing provision. Hukou system, which was once the 
key barrier to rural-urban interaction, was greatly relaxed. Residents’ employment 
was no longer necessarily restricted to the locations of their hukou. Millions of 
migrants freely flooded into large cities which provided plenty of employment 
opportunities. The local government also attempted to urbanise local farmers by 
offering them urban Hukou and associated welfare benefits. Besides, taking an 
entrepreneurial stance, while the governments intentionally promoted 
homeownership and domestic consumption as a symbol of well-being, the image 
of suburbs was also recast as a nice place to embrace such consumer culture and 
enjoy a good life.  
On the other hand, however, the state maintains strong control power over 
development processes. First and foremost, while land use rights are allowed to be 
transferred to private developers, the state retains the public ownership of urban 
land and adopts a top-down plan-making process. In this way, private developers 
must follow strictly the development plans made by the governments. Second, 
during the processes, the state set up state-owned development companies to 
undertake various tasks on its own behalf, such as land expropriation, resettlement, 
infrastructure construction etc. Although these companies are responsible for their 
profits and losses, they work directly for the governments and the heads of the 
companies were appointed by the governments as well. And the government-led 
projects were usually implemented as political tasks. In other words, 
governmental interventions, even through political-bureaucratic processes, greatly 
influenced the shape and pace of suburban development.  
In sum, current suburbanisation in China is largely driven by local 
governments’ pursuit of economic growth, facilitated through risk-taking 
activities, but implemented by cautious privatisation and deregulation, and 





full-scale controlled through heavy state interventions. In this sense, the dynamics 
of China’s suburban development is quite close to those driven by urban 
entrepreneurialism but with some distinct Chinese characteristics. Although the 
state still plays an important role in the process of suburban development, a step 
towards neoliberalism is steady, with regard to organisation of decision making (a 
developmental state), mechanisms for coordination (an emerging market 
economy), property rights (partially privatisation), incentives (both profit 
maximisation and social stability ) (see also Zhu, 2009:555). This state can no 
longer simply locates projects through administrative orders but has to influence 
suburban development through the market. It is this transitional process that 
results in the prevalence of urban entrepreneurialism.  
In the meantime, there are still some legacies of central planning which 
continue influencing China’s contemporary suburbanisation. Firstly, the state is 
more entrepreneurial in nature than many other states. Because local governments 
are the de facto land owner, they function as not only market regulator, but also 
market player themselves. Development companies were precisely set up by the 
governments to operate in the market environment. Therefore, even though the 
state recycled money into services and infrastructure, the underlying rationale is to 
stimulate growth instead of welfare provision.  
Secondly, urban entrepreneurialism in China is underpinned by not only 
economic but also political interests. One important feature of China’s reform is 
that, while market transition has taken steady steps in economic sphere, political 
system has far less been liberalised. Local government officials are appointed by 
higher levels of administrative bureaucracy. While they pursue personal career 
advancement based on their achievement in office, economic growth and urban 
retrofitting are most important indicators.  
Thirdly, compared with entrepreneurial governments in Western developed 
countries, the state in China still holds greater economic capacity and political 
power, which can be regarded as another important political legacy of central 





planning system. With critical resources such as capital and land in its hands, the 
state possesses the ‘commanding power’ (Stone, 1989) when dealing with other 
actors involved in pro-growth coalitions, such as such as private developers or 
rural farmers. In addition, the role of the state in social control is still pervasive. In 
order to guarantee progress and accomplish their goals, local governments tend to 
use administrative tools to eliminate any obstacles and uncertainties.  
Lastly, the municipal government plays a significant role in the development 
of suburban areas. This is particularly different from the case in the US where 
suburban entrepreneurialism is usually local-based and even leads to secession 
from the municipality (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Keil, 2000). In China, suburban 
counties used to be under the administration of central cities. Through converting 
these counties into urban districts, the municipal government managed to extend 
its power across the metropolitan region and acquire more resources to compete 
with other cities. In order to generate incentives for local government, however, 
fiscal and administrative powers are decentralised to suburban district 
governments and also lower-level township governments, which in turn give rise 
to fierce inter-locality competition and a fragmented pattern of suburbs.  
Finally, a typology model based on the role of the state in suburbanisation is 
developed to identify the mode of Chinese suburban new town development 
among other types of suburbanisation across the world (Table 4.3). Two aspects 
of the local state differentiate the types of suburban development. First concerns 
whether the state’s stance is entrepreneurial or managerial. Entrepreneurial state 
tends to promote suburbanisation as growth machine, while managerial state tends 
to control rapid urban expansion for environmental or social benefits. Second, the 
capacity or control power of the state directly determines the actual results of the 
implementation of its plan. The role of the state is thus divided into four types: 
strong entrepreneurial state, weak entrepreneurial state, strong managerial state, 
and weak managerial state. These four types of role often lead to four different 
types of suburban development respectively: state-led growth developments, 





private-led growth developments, welfare developments, and informal 
developments. It is notable that the stance and capacity of the state here refer to 
relative terms, and may vary in different times, places and specific projects, and 
also can coexist in a same country.  
 
Table 4.3   Typology of suburban development according to the role of state 
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Table 4.4  Characters of different types of suburban developments 
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Table 4.4 shows the characters of the four typical types of suburban 
developments. Type I-1, i.e. spontaneous Informal developments takes place 
where the role of the local state in suburbanisation is rather passive due to lack of 
resources. Urban periphery accommodates migrants in low-quality informal 
houses. Type I-2 refers to welfare projects led by the state, while sometimes 
public-private partnership is involved. In most cases of this type, the state usually 
has strong control over urban expansion. If there were any suburban developments, 
they usually take the form of social housing projects. Different from these two 
types, Type I-2 is supported by the state to facilitate economic growth. It fits those 
conforming to the classic growth machine model in America where local 
entrepreneurial state, due to lack of fiscal capacity, relies heavily on private sector 
to undertake suburban development. In the end, type I-1 represents the cases 
where the entrepreneurial state holds enough resource and power to facilitate 
suburban growth as it plans. Chinese new town development is well captured by 
this type, at the core of which is a political economy characterised by state 
entrepreneurialism. For both types, formal pro-growth coalitions formed in the 
development processes, though the coalitions are led by different actors. Aiming 
at attracting high-end businesses and middle- to upper- residents, the resultant 
suburbs are usually built with quality infrastructure and living environments.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Massive suburban development in China came about after market-oriented 
reform, along with the country’s prosperity; but it is by no means merely a natural 
consequence of economic growth. In fact, China’s peculiar institutions confer land 
development with a central role in its economy. With the establishment of the land 
market, land became an important resource in the hands of local governments to 
generate revenue and attract capital investment. Therefore, from the outset, 
suburban growth is largely associated with local governments’ usage of land 
development to stimulate economic growth. Earlier local development strategies 





relied heavily on extensive land development, characterised by a disordered 
sprawl and fragmented industrial zone developments. Since 2000, however, a 
range of new conditions have emerged and posed new challenges to sustained 
growth. On the production side, confronting increasingly fierce competition, local 
governments need more land and resources to preserve their economic advantages. 
Yet thanks to a recentralisation of land and fiscal authority by the central state, 
they are forced to find a more intensive growth mode. On the consumption side, 
rapid economic growth in the first two decades after reform has created 
unprecedented population growth and housing demand. There appears to be an 
urgent need to deal with the influx of population and resultant urban problems.  
It is against such a backdrop that a new round of suburbanisation anchored 
by new-town development was launched. As illustrated by the case of Shanghai, 
this new approach was favourable for the government’s entrepreneurial efforts for 
three reasons. Firstly, by engaging in intense interspatial competition, particularly 
with nearby boom cities in the Yangtze River Delta, Shanghai positioned itself as 
a global city and needed more space to reorganise its economic activity; that is, to 
develop service sectors in the city while reinforcing manufacturing industries in 
the suburbs. Secondly, faced by increasingly recentralised fiscal and land policy 
on the one hand, and unfavourable external environments during the financial 
crisis on the other hand, the government urgently needed money to fill the gap in 
local finance and continue investing in infrastructure to sustain growth. Through 
building new towns, land and property development could provide an important 
means of generating land income. It was expected that agglomeration and urban 
concentration would prop up land and housing prices in the suburbs. Finally, new 
town development was regarded as a rational approach to intensive growth. On 
the one hand, new towns were expected to ease the pressure of overconcentration 
in the central city and improve the efficiency of disordered peri-urban 
development, dealing with the negative effects of the previous growth mode. On 
the other hand, a stringent land policy made extensive development impossible 





and forced the adoption of a more efficient usage of land. Further growth had to 
be more dependent on agglomeration economies. In all these aspects, new town 
projects not only expanded the space of accumulation for Shanghai, but also 
created a new spatial fix to overcome the emerging barriers to growth.  
In practise, the municipal government designed a range of policies and 
institutions to facilitate new town development. However, unlike previous 
methods whereby the projects were directly located by the government through 
administrative orders, the new strategy made efforts to establish preconditions for 
a prosperous land and housing market in the suburbs. State intervention on both 
production and consumptions sides could be identified. On the production side, 
the government organised land assembly and provided infrastructure for new town 
development. On the demand side, policies aimed to facilitate both industrial 
growth and housing development at the same time. While industrial investment 
was attracted to the industrial parks of the new towns by various preferential 
policies, the government also attempted to influence the demand for housing 
consumption by absorbing different kinds of potential residents, including local 
farmers, migrants and residents from the central city.  
New town development was also facilitated by a new mode of suburban 
governance. It resulted from power devolution by the municipal government to 
create local initiatives. The new relationship between the core and the periphery is 
not similar to the previous top-down approach under the traditional planning 
system. On the one hand, the municipality retained the power of decision on key 
issues for the whole region, as well as appointments and removals of district 
leaders. On the other hand, however, local district governments were granted great 
autonomy to deal with local growth themselves. Suburban governance is thus 
characterised by diverse tensions, involving not only leadership and obedience, 
but also partnership and negotiation between the central city and the suburbs.  
Finally, over the past ten years, due to great effort expended by the 
government, some suburban places experienced rapid economic and population 





growth in a different manner from that brought about by previous suburban 
development. Zhou and Ma (2000: 227) observed that, for China, ‘the suburbs are 
still very much subordinate to the central city, both administratively and 
functionally…the Chinese urban scene is still decidedly dominated by the city in 
all aspects of city-suburb relationship’. However, an examination of the current 
metropolitan structure of Shanghai shows that suburbs are becoming a spatial fix 
for capital accumulation for its own right. Economically, the outer suburbs were 
not only opened up to absorb industrial capital, but also property investments. 
Meanwhile, they were also seeing the arrival of both migrants and residents from 
the central city. Administratively, suburban district governments played an 
increasingly dominant role in suburban growth, although in a different way to 
Western countries such as the US, where suburbanisation was often accompanied 
by the decline of the central city; it is evident that both centripetal and centrifugal 
forces are contributing to metropolitan growth together. In the US, the shift from 
the core to suburban areas was largely associated with different changes such as 
deindustrialisation, the loss of manufacturing jobs and environmental degradation 
in the centre (Beauregard, 1993; Hill et al., 1995; Adams et al., 1996). In China, 
however, the central areas and the suburbs are now evolving as complementary 
nodes. While the central city promotes a service-sector economy, the suburbs 
maintain their specialism in the manufacturing industry. This arrangement should 
be seen as a unique pattern of metropolitan growth for China. In the next two 
chapters, the study will take a close look at Songjiang, the key site of the whole 
project over the past ten years, to further illustrate in greater detail how suburban 
growth and new town development is achieved by different actors involved in the 
process. 






BUILDING SONGJIANG NEW TOWN UNDER 
ENTREPRENEURIAL GOVERNANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
Songjiang is a historical country town which was established during the Tang 
Dynasty (618-907) and was promoted as a prefecture capital in 1277. It has become 
the administrative and economic centre of the region since then, and reached the 
peak of its prosperity along with a thriving textile industry in the Ming Dynasty 
(1368–1644). After Shanghai was opened to foreign trade and grew to become an 
important sea port in the 19
th
 century, the old city of Songjiang gradually declined. 
In 1958, Shanghai launched a satellite town programme to accommodate industrial 
development. Songjiang County was incorporated into Shanghai and designed as 
one of its industrial satellites. According to the original pla
1
, the target population for Songjiang town was 360,000; the plan, however, was not 
a success. In a centrally-planned command system, the government directly 
allocates industries to the satellites. A number of factories owned by the central 
state and the municipality were directed to Songjiang in 1960 and an industrial area 
was built up on the west of the old city. Yet, due to lack of funds for non-productive 
investments, urban construction made little progress in the following two decades. 
                                                          
1
 Songjiang City Plan was completed by Shanghai Urban Planning, Investigation and Design 
Institute in December 1958.  





Due to a lack of living facilities, plus lower wage rates and benefits than those 
received by Shanghai residents, workers were unwilling to settle there. As a result, 
there was no significant population growth in the city, which rose from 50,672 in 
1958 to just 52,492 by 1978 (Shanghai Songjiang Almanac Editorial Board, 1991). 
Songjiang County remained a predominantly rural county with about 82% of its 
total population involved in agriculture. The primary sector still accounted for 
nearly a half of the district’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Shanghai Songjiang 
Statistical Bureau, 2008). 
Thanks to a range of market-oriented reforms, Songjiang’s economy took off 
in the 1980s. In particular, it saw rapid growth in the industrial sectors. Even when 
compared with all the other suburban districts, industrial development in Songjiang 
was outstanding. In 1994, Songjiang Industrial Zone to the east of the old city was 
approved as one of the municipal level industrial zones. The total added value of 
industry in Songjiang maintained rapid and steady growth afterwards. By 2001, the 
amount reached 8.86 billion Yuan, contributing 59% to local GDP that year. Both 
the monetary value itself and its proportion in the economy were ranked third 
among all suburban counties (Figure 5.1).  The pace of urbanisation in Songjiang, 
however, did not accelerate during the two decades after reform. While the three 
inner suburban districts i.e. Pudong, Baoshan and Minhang had been experiencing 
rapid urban expansion and real estate growth, more than 60% of Songjiang’s 
population was still involved in agriculture by 2001 (Figure 5.2). The urban 
development and real estate industry was still moderate. 
Against this background, the rapid urban growth of Songjiang over the past ten 
years is astonishing. Contrary to the earlier stage which was dominated by 
industrial development, the main task was to promote the pace of urbanisation. The 
aim was to concentrate population in urban settlements by developing a three-tier 
urban system, i.e. one new town (Songjiang New Town), several central new 
townships, and a number of central villages. In the following years, urban 
development and population in Songjiang made unprecedented progress. Songjiang  





















Added Value (Billion Yuan)  
Figure 5.1 Economic performance of suburban districts in Shanghai in 2001 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Bureau and Shanghai Agricultural and Forestry 
Bureau, 2002 
 














Figure 5.2 Population of suburban districts in Shanghai in 2001 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Bureau and Shanghai Agricultural and Forestry 
Bureau, 2002 
 
New Town was built in a very short period. From August 2001 when construction 
started to the end of 2005, 23 km
2
 was turned into urban areas, as planned. It now 
boasts a comprehensive mixed-use urban area composed of large-scale industrial 
parks, various residential estate, a university town and public squares, as well as 
commercial and retail complexes. At the same time, Songjiang witnessed the influx 
of a large number of people. Over the past ten years, Songjiang has been the 





fastest-growing district among all 18 districts and counties in Shanghai with 
regard to population. By 2010, the total population of Songjiang had increased by 
146.80%, to 1,582,398 residents
2
. 
Doubtlessly, the rise of Songjiang as a suburban settlement was difficult to 
achieve in the pre-reform era.  Since the introduction of a market mechanism, 
land began to acquire an exchange value, the suburban frontier began to attract 
massive real estate development and thus attracted residents. Nevertheless, there 
are further significant factors beyond the establishment of a market. 
Suburbanisation in Western countries is often underpinned by coalitions between 
private business groups and public sectors and their pro-growth agendas (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987). In the US, growth-coalitions are characterised by the dominant 
role of private sectors as the local government relies heavily on business interests. 
Suburban development is now witnessing an increasingly widespread form of 
private governance in the forms of gated communities or edge cities (Garreau, 1991; 
Blakely and Snyder, 1997). In Europe, the state exerts the most influence in 
organising the urban growth machine (Harding, 1991). With the exception of some 
examples in the UK, business interests on the urban edge have little influence on 
local issues and are subject to the political consideration of local politicians. 
Besides, authorities at a higher level have a greater role in structuring suburban 
governance (Bontje and Burdack, 2005; Phelps et al., 2006).  
In the case of Songjiang, it is the state’s urban entrepreneurialism that played a 
crucial role in initiating and facilitating the growth machine. Led by the 
governments, pro-growth coalitions among a range of interests were formed to 
facilitate suburban growth. Therefore, this chapter seeks to examine the role of 
entrepreneurial governance in driving suburban growth. In the following sections, 
the intuitional context for the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism, the 
imperative to create innovative space for competition and the rationale for taking 
new town development as its new focus are firstly described. The new strategy is 
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 Songjiang 2010 Census Data Bulletin, Shanghai Songjiang Statistical Bureau, 6
th
 May, 2011.  





then detailed with regard to its discourse, urban form and the new method of 
space production. After identifying the new strategy, the development process of 
three mega-projects are presented in section 4 to section 6 to further investigate 
the entrepreneurial politics involved in the process. Finally, an analysis on 
economic performance and capital investment in Songjiang is carried out to reveal 
the underlying growth mechanism and discuss how the strategy managed to 
stimulate growth.  
 
5.2 The rise of urban entrepreneurialism in Songjiang 
5.2.1 Institutional context 
The emergence of urban entrepreneurialism in Songjiang is related to the 
downscaling of governance from the municipal government to localities. After the 
mid 1980s, in response to decentralisation from the central state to local 
municipalities, Shanghai Municipal Government further decentralised both fiscal 
and administrative power to its district governments (see chapter four, section 4.5). 
Importantly, after surrendering a fixed amount to the municipal government every 
year, they could keep and use the surplus revenue according to their own needs. 
Such fiscal flexibility created great incentives for district governments to pursue 
economic growth and generate revenue. 
The Tax Sharing System launched in 1994 further reinforced the engagement 
of district governments in promoting local growth. In terms of central–local fiscal 
relations, under the new fiscal system taxes were divided into three types: central 
taxes, local taxes, and taxes shared between the two. Some major taxes were fully 
assigned to the central government including Consumption Tax and Customs 
Duties. Value Added Tax (VAT) was shared between central and local, with central 
taking 75% of the total. Enterprise Income Tax was originally classified as local 
tax, but the central state began to share it in 2002, first by 50% and later by 60% 
in 2003. Therefore, in effect, the new system greatly decreased the tax shared by 





municipal governments. In the meantime, however, expenditure responsibilities 
were not reduced, but increased (Tsui and Wang, 2004).  
In such a situation, the Shanghai Municipal Government correspondingly 
adjusted its fiscal relations with district governments. The strategy, however, was 
to mobilise local initiatives by further decentralisation of responsibilities and 
powers. On the one hand, local public expenditure such as education, 
infrastructure construction and administration fees should be all have been paid by 
local governments except for large strategic projects. On the other hand, the 
municipality took the larger part of the taxes. For example, all taxes categorised as 
‘local taxes’ were assigned to the municipality. Meanwhile, the municipality 
shared major taxes with district governments
3
; however, in order to provide local 
incentives, the ratio of the municipality to the locality was 40:60. In addition, a 
certain amount of tax could be refunded to the local governments as a reward 
according to the growth rate of their revenue each year, which means that the more 
revenue generated, the more could be refunded.  
Consequently, the great pressure to collect revenues was passed the district 
governments. Firstly, they were required to take charge of more administrative 
responsibilities. Secondly, they had to continue promoting economic growth in 
order to acquire rewards from the municipal government, which included a greater 
amount of refunded tax and political promotion. In addition, they had to face fierce 
competition with other district governments. However, there was much less 
disposable budgetary revenue in their hands. Consequently, they became far more 
enthusiastic about enabling new projects and developments than ever. On the one 
hand, they aimed to attract various industries to consolidate the local tax base and 
reclaim more tax for their budgetary accounts. On the other hand, they had to rely 
heavily on extra-budgetary incomes to facilitate local growth. It is thus at the 
district level that the pro-growth economic policies were most apparent.  
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 ‘Advice on the implementation of municipality-district fiscal reform’, Shanghai Municipality 
No.10 Decree, February, 2004.  





5.2.2 Land development as the vehicle for growth 
Under China’s peculiar land development system, land then became the most 
important instrument in the local district governments’ hands to achieve growth. 
This was particularly significant for suburban districts. According to Shanghai 
Urban Construction Committee’s Policy Document No.365 (1993)4, the district 
governments of Pudong New Area and another six outer suburban districts, 
including Nanhui, Songjiang, Jinshan, Qingpu, Fengxian, and Chongming had the 
right to deal with land leasing management and urban construction themselves. 
Moreover, apart from only 5% which was paid to the central state, they were also 
able to keep most of the land lease fee themselves. Although the municipal 
government began to share land lease fees with suburban local district 
governments in 2001
5, as the key site of the municipality’s new town project 
Songjiang District Government was exempt from this policy.  
Therefore, an entrepreneurial strategy based on land development emerged to 
increase both budgetary and extra-budgetary incomes. For budgetary accounts, 
suburban district governments continued to attract industrial investment through 
low-priced land and preferential tax policies. Due to this policy, local 
governments might have suffered a financial loss and been unable to generate 
profits immediately. But in the long run, manufacturing factories provided a stable 
tax base. At the same time, local governments relied heavily on leasing land for 
residential and commercial use to generate large sums of extra-budget income. 
This was realised via market-oriented processes such as public tender (zhaobiao), 
auction (paimai), or open bidding (guapai), and land prices were determined by 
the highest bid in open auctions. In other words, land and property development 
became a main source of revenue and helped cover the expenses resulting from 
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 Document for Instruction on Further Devolution of Land Leasing and Establishment of a 
Two-level Management System, Shanghai Urban Construction Committee, 1993.  
5
 Notice on the implementation of land conveyance fee management, Shanghai Municipal 
Development and Reform Commission, No. 50 Decree, 2001 





land acquisition and infrastructure construction, as well as other public 
expenditure. Notably, land and property development did not directly stimulate 
growth; however. Its main contribution was to generate revenue, which was only a 
one-off return. The government in turn used the money to support manufacturing 
industries and other public expenditure. Following this logic, ‘inducing 
investment’ and ‘leasing land’ became two basic and interrelated paths of local 
economic growth.  
 
5.2.3 Changing entrepreneurial strategies of Songjiang 
Based on the above analysis, for Songjiang District Government to start up 
the new round of economic growth, it was necessary to promote both industrial 
sectors and property development. As mentioned above, competitive strategies for 
the two were quite different. Competitive advantages for attracting industrial 
capital were mainly related to those location-specific benefits that help reduce cost. 
Therefore, the government established industrial zones in 1996 to provide 
low-priced land, tax breaks and other preferential policies to build its 
competitiveness. However, it turned out to be relatively difficult for Songjiang to 
attract investment in its property industry. As an outer suburban town, Songjiang 
had never been a favourable residential area. Although the land price was far less 
than that in the central districts, few investors were optimistic about commercial 
and housing projects there (Interview G1; D3). Hence, there emerged an urgent 
need to change Songjiang’s traditional image as merely a place of production and 
to redefine the objects of its entrepreneurialism. In other words, applying Jessop 
and Sum’s (2000) analysis of the entrepreneurial city, it became necessary to 
promote innovation in urban forms to facilitate capital accumulation in the face of 
new conditions. Central to this was the drive to develop Songjiang into a desirable 
suburban town.  
The rationale behind the adoption of this strategy spans three dimensions. 
Firstly, the government needed to collect revenue to invest in land development 





and attract industrial capital to sustain economic growth. Secondly, new town 
development helped boost the local property market so that the government could 
recapture the rent gap of land value. Thirdly, new town development created the 
distinctive identity of Songjiang, which in turn facilitated capital attraction. 
Around this entrepreneurial object, new discourses, a new type of space and new 
method of development were invented, which effectively mobilised diverse actors 
in the project. These entrepreneurial strategies and practises are examined further 
in the next section. 
 
5.3 Building Songjiang New Town as an entrepreneurial 
city 
5.3.1 Entrepreneurial discourse: from industrial satellite to 
comprehensive suburban new town 
In search of a new entrepreneurial strategy, the district government grasped 
the gist of successful land management: it had to convince investors and home 
buyers of the town’s promising future. This required a distinct image from its 
industrial past. Therefore, from the outset, planning and urban design was regarded 
as the first and foremost task. In 2001, when Songjiang was selected by the 
municipal government to be the key site of its suburban new town development, 
an international design competition was organised to formulate a new identity for 
Songjiang. The contracts for the bid were completed in early February 2001. As 
overseas companies were not allowed to make master plans, the winning design 
company was required to prepare a strategic plan for the entire 60 km
2
 Songjiang 
New Town, a design of city style for the 23 km
2
 pilot area (the new development 
area on the north of the old town), and detailed urban design schemes for a 6 km
2
 
central business district and a 1 km
2
 transportation hub, as well as an authentic 
English-style residential district of 1 km
2
. The government then attempted to 





contact some design companies through professional organisations such as the 
Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI). Some officials visited Europe in February 
2002 and negotiated with eight companies based in the UK, France and Italy, five of 
which were formally invited to the bid: Atkins, Natural Building Design, Sheppard 
Robinson from the UK, Architettiriuniti from Italy and S.C.U. from France. Three 
jury panels, a panel of experts for a technical review, municipal officials for a policy 
review and district officials for a feasibility review were organised to 
comprehensively evaluate the submitted schemes. Ultimately, Atkins from the UK 
was announced as the winner (Wang, 2003). The total fee for consultation 
amounted to$6 million (Wang, 2002).  
Overall, the final plan
6
 envisages Songjiang New Town as ‘a comprehensive 
suburban new town of Shanghai’. It aims to strengthen Songjiang’s economic base 
by industrial development. Manufacturing industry, rather than tertiary industry, 
will continue to be the pillar of its economy. At the same time, however, the new 
town’s fresh identity was ‘a liveable city with beautiful living environment’ and ‘a 
historic, cultural and ecological garden city’7. This signalled an abrupt shift in 
development strategy from that of the 1950s and 1990s (Table 5.1). Finally, it is 
notable that Songjiang attempted to insert itself into the metropolitan-scale and 
regional-scale of capital flows. With regard to industrial development, Songjiang 
contributes to the economic growth of the whole Shanghai metropolitan area. As 
far as urban development is concerned, Songjiang New Town aims to 
accommodate the population growth of Shanghai. Above all, Songjiang New 
Town aims to function as ‘the hub of south-west Shanghai’ and ‘a comprehensive 
node city in the Yangtze Delta’.  
                                                          
6
 The Master Plan of Songjiang New Town was approved by the Shanghai Municipal Government 
in 2004. Its final form was based on three previous versions, i.e. Songjiang Northern New Area 
Planning and Design (1997), Songjiang City Proper Master Plan (1999), and Songjiang New 
Town Master Plan (2001). However, both place promotion and construction for the plan had 
actually begun before the plan was approved.  
7
 Songjiang New Town Master Plan (2004), quoted in Editorial Board of History of Urban 
Planning in Songjiang, 2009, page 61. 









Table 5.1 Changing Development Position of Songjiang 
 
Planning Documents Position 
Population 
Target 
1958 Songjiang City Plan An industrial satellite town based on light industry  360, 000  
1982 Songjiang Master Plan 
An industrial satellite town of Shanghai 
The administrative, economic and cultural centre of Songjiang County 
A  historic town 
150, 000  
(by year 2000) 
1990 Songjiang Readjustment Master 
Plan  
An industrial satellite town of Shanghai based on light and machinery industry 
The administrative, economic and cultural centre of Songjiang County 
A historic and tourist town 
250, 000 
(by year 2000) 
1996 Songjiang New Area Master Plan 
A municipal-level industrial zone 
The administrative, economic and cultural centre of Songjiang County 
An important historic and cultural town of Shanghai 
A growth centre along Shanghai-Hangzhou corridor 
A  medium-sized city and the main urban area of Songjiang county  
300,000  
( by Year 2030)  
1999 Songjiang City Proper Master Plan 
A new town and historic cultural town of Shanghai 
The administrative, economic and cultural centre of Songjiang district 
An independent modern medium-sized city with comprehensive urban 
functions 
250, 000 
(by year 2010) 
 









Table 5.1 (Continued) 
 
Planning Documents Population Target 
Population 
Target 
2001 Songjiang New Town Master Plan 
A suburb representing Shanghai’s economic strength and competitiveness 
A medium-sized liveable city 
An cultural and ecological garden city 
300,000  
( by Year 
2020) 
2004 Songjiang New Town Master Plan 
(approved) 
A suburb representing Shanghai’s economic strength and competitiveness 
A liveable city with beautiful living environment 
A historic, cultural and ecological garden city 
600, 000 
(by Year 2020) 
2005 Revision of Songjiang New Town Master 
Plan 
The administrative, economic and cultural centre of Songjiang district 
The main outlet for population evacuation from Central Shanghai  
Higher education base of Shanghai 
1,000,000 
(by year 2020) 
2010 Revision of Songjiang New Town Master 
Plan 
A comprehensive node city in the Yangtze Delta 
The hub of south-west Shanghai 
A suburb representing Shanghai’s economic strength and competitiveness 
A liveable city with distinctive natural landscape and historic and cultural 
heritage 
1,100,000 
(by year 2020) 
Source: Compiled from Editorial Board of History of Urban Planning in Songjiang, 2009 
 





5.3.2 Entrepreneurial space: new town development 
The new town was created as an innovative type of space to develop an urban 
economy. Therefore, over the past ten years, great entrepreneurial efforts have 
been guided by the principle of Chengshi Yishi (literally, the consciousness of 
being urban) (Editorial Board of History of Urban Planning in Songjiang, 
2009:61). In essence, Chengshi Yishi is meant to promote the new town as an 
attractive place to live in order to lure property investment and residents and thus 
prop up land and property prices. This principle has two important aspects: the 
introduction of spaces with urban functions and the aestheticisation of landscapes. 
The overall plan for the new town mixed new residential and commercial 
developments with existing industrial zones. While the old downtown in the south 
would be redeveloped for traditional business services and cultural tourism, the 
new area in the north was planned to accommodate functions such as education 
and administration, as well as commercial and office development. The layout of 
the new town turned out to be a mixed-use urban settlement, which had a business 
centre in the middle, surrounded by Songjiang Industrial Zone in the east, 
University Town in the north, an English residential quarter in the west, and the 
old downtown in the south (Figure 5.3).  
Moreover, the design of the new town highlighted image construction 
visually through the creation of aesthetic urban landscapes. For example, urban 
greening was regarded as the most important element by government leaders. It 
aimed to provide ‘an ecological environment centring on greening, wining with 
greening, and setting in greening to embody the essence of modern cities’8. In the 
centre of the new town, two large central green belts were developed to constitute 
its landscape axes. One was 3.1 km in length and 300 m in width, from east to 
west, the other one was 1.5 km in length and 250 m in width, from south to north. 
Together they constituted a green area of 660,000 m
2
, and were to symbolise 
                                                          
8
 See the official site of Songjiang New Town, http://fsjd.sj.net.cn/index.aspx, accessed on 22, 
April, 2011.  





‘vitality, originality, innovation and eco-friendliness’9. Construction of these belts 
was the earliest project undertaken by the district government. Thanks to a total 
investment of 48 million Yuan, one greenbelt was finished in mid 1998, while the 
other was completed at the end of 2001. In addition, in the new town, there is also a 
public square and two central parks, as well as many small green spaces in and 
around neighbourhoods. According to the approved version of the new town’s 
master plan, there will be 1433.5 ha of public green space by 2020. If the total 
population in 2020 is 600,000 as estimated, it accordingly means that the green 
space per capita will be 24m
2
. In 2005, by virtue of such a high rate of green 
coverage, Songjiang won the honour of ‘International Garden city’ in the Ninth 


























Figure 5.3 Layout of Songjiang New Town 
 
                                                          
9
 Songjiang Northern New Area Planning and Design, 1997; quoted in the Editorial Board of 
History of Urban Planning in Songjiang, 2009, page 55. 





Equally visible and symbolical aestheticisation named ‘Yi Cheng Liang Mao’ 
(literally, one city with two styles) was achieved through strict design control by 
the local government. The new area in the north is built in an English style (Figure 
5.4). The whole city boasts about ‘not only having the flavour of old historic towns 
of Oxford and Bath, but also the new garden cities as Milton Keynes’ exemplified 
by the mixed zoning, neighbourhood accessible by the pedestrian, unique green belt 
and open space’(Xue and Zhou, 2007). The old city, on the other hand, was restored 
as a traditional Chinese village with a water landscape. Not only were the key 
heritage sites preserved and refurbished, but all newly-developed buildings were 
required to follow the traditional style. For instance, the height of all buildings 
along the rivers and in the old market areas must not exceed two stories. In order to 
maintain a coherent look, all buildings should also be painted black, white, grey or 
be natural wood and have traditional-style roofs, doors and windows (see Figure 
5.5)
10
. Whether the style is based on an English theme or a vernacular theme, it 
represents an imaginary landscape to link Songjiang with a distinctive and fantasy 
lifestyle.  
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Figure 5.4 Typical English building style in Songjiang New Town 
Source: Photo by author 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Typical traditional building style in Songjiang old city 
Source: Photo by author 
 





In short, the aim of Songjiang New Town was to re-image Songjiang with 
almost all the popular elements that could be required by people to satisfy their 
demand for a good life, such as a natural environment, modern living facilities, 
Western or vernacular themed settings and access to the metropolitan centre. As the 
advertisement of Songjiang New Town reads
11
,  
With scientific and rational city layout, efficient multi-dimension 
transport network, stylish and distinctive modern architecture, excellent 
eco-environment, comprehensive living facilities and services, Songjiang 
New Town is the most liveable modernized urban area in south-west 
Shanghai. Like the newest and most beautiful picture painted on a blank 
sheet, it represents the essence of a 21
st
 century modern city. Meanwhile, 
having easy access to central Shanghai, it enjoys all the advantages of the 
metropolis. With its creative spirit and high-quality living environments, 
Songjiang New Town is destined to be a heaven for people.  
 
5.3.3 Entrepreneurial governance: mega-projects and a new mode 
of development 
To build a new town from scratch was by no means an easy task, let alone 
making it attractive and profitable. However, the Songjiang District Government 
successfully achieved its original goal by undertaking four important high-profile 
prestige developments: Central Green Park, Songjiang University Town, No.9 
Metro Line, and a master-planned community, Thames Town: 
 Central Green Park, a public facility aiming to beautify the urban 
landscape; developed by the district government. 
 Songjiang University Town, a facility fostering the development of an 
urban economy by importing 100,000 students and staff as instantaneous 
residents of the new town; the town was co-developed by the district 
                                                          
11
 See http://www.fangsong.gov.cn/, accessed in April, 2010 





government, the municipal government, the Municipal Education 
Commission (MEC), and seven universities. 
 No.9 Metro Line, an infrastructure providing rapid access to Shanghai 
and thus opening new markets for housing development in the new town; 
it was co-developed by the district government and the municipal 
government. 
 Thames Town, a flagship real estate development which recast the 
identity of Songjiang as a desirable place to live; it was co-developed by 
the district government, the municipal government and private property 
developers. 
In effect, none of the projects were individually profitable, but each helped to 
create favourable conditions for different aspects of a booming real estate market. 
Altogether, they created an optimistic environment for property investment. 
Meanwhile, with the exception of Central Green Park, the development of the 
other three illustrated different pro-growth coalitions of the local government with 
diverse actors, who were all engaged in tying their economic interests to the rise 
of the land and housing market in Songjiang. These actors provided important 
sources to initiate these projects.  
The formation of a pro-growth coalition was facilitated by a range of 
innovative institutional arrangements and a new mode of development, in which 
Songjiang District Government set up development companies as its agency to 
finance and organise the projects. Specifically, the 23 km
2
 of land to be built was 
divided into four parts. Each included a government-led flagship project. Four 
state-owned development companies were set up to develop each of the areas:  
 Fangsong Construction and Investment Co., Ltd. (FCIC), responsible 
for building the Central Green Park and cultivating its surrounding land 
for commercial and residential developments 
 University Town Construction and Development Co., Ltd. (UTCDC), 
responsible for preparing land for the university town project and the 





surrounding land for residential developments. 
 Chengtong Rail Transit Investment and Construction Corporation 
(CRTICC), responsible for participating in the construction of a metro 
line and the land surrounding the stations for residential developments.  
 New Town Construction and Development Co., Ltd. (SNTDC), 
responsible for building Thames Town, a master-planned real estate 
project, and its surrounding land for residential developments 
 
The operational mode of these companies was described by the government 
as ‘taking infrastructure as the leading factor, functional development as the main 
task, environment improvement as the target, and property development as the 
driver’12. Their operations were mainly based on land management. The circuit of 
capital followed comprised: land acquisition  mega-projects and infrastructure 
construction land leasing to private developers and the recovery of investment 
and profits  reinvestment in developing another plot of land. Land was allocated 
by the government as initial capital, but the development companies were 
responsible for their own profits or losses. Meanwhile, the local government acted 
as collateral security by pledging other state-owned facilities or infrastructure as 
security and helped the companies to raise initial funds via bank loans. The 
companies’ task was to acquire collective-owned land in the area through land 
requisition and resettle farmers. They then had to level the land and construct 
infrastructure. Afterwards, they were directly in charge of the flagship 
development, leasing the surrounding land out to private developers. In other 
words, their operating process was to invest in and build the flagship project first, 
and then earn returns by leasing the surrounding land to real estate developers. In 
this way, short-term goals of financing the project and generating land revenue, 
and long-term goals of attracting residents and developing a suburban settlement, 
were both achieved. Additionally, these companies also provided a platform from 
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which various public and private actors were invited to co-develop the flagship 
projects.  
In sum, the building of Songjiang New Town represented entrepreneurial 
efforts explicitly pursued by the local government to enhance its economic 
competitiveness in both the Shanghai metropolitan area and Yangtze Delta. When 
considering the strategy, innovations in three fields can be identified as having 
contributed to the achievement of the goal. Discursively, a new discourse 
favouring property industry was envisioned for Songjiang’s future development. 
Materially, new town development was facilitated through the development of 
mega-projects and practically, a new mode of place production was developed, 
which not only captured new sources of supply, but also promoted the 
entrepreneurial governance capacities of Songjiang. Taking the development of 
three mega-projects, i.e. the University Town, No.9 Metro Line and Thames Town 
as examples, the next three sections further illustrate the mechanism of the new 
development mode and how the whole project materialised under entrepreneurial 
governance.  
 
5.4 University Town: forming a coalition with universities 
5.4.1 Bidding for the project 
In 1999, the same time as Songjiang was about to establish a promising land 
market, the country’s education department implemented its policy to expand 
higher education. The total number of students enrolled in universities that year 
was 1.59 million, an increase of 41.2 percent from 1998
13
. The number continued 
to grow at approximately 30% per annum in the following years (Li et al., 2008). 
By 2001 Shanghai had 45 universities with 310,000 students in total.  However, 
the Municipal Education Commission (MEC) aimed to promote the enrolment 
rate of higher education to 50% in five years, which meant that there would be 
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more than 500,000 students of higher education by 2005. Therefore, in order to 
accommodate growth, the Municipal Education Commission decided to relocate 
those universities to the suburbs where large plots of cheap land were available.  
Its overall redistribution plan
14
 was to form a ‘2+3+X’ spatial pattern, i.e. to 
expand the two existing education areas, construct three new university towns and 
relocate some professional schools into suburban industrial parks.  
The redistribution project was publicly justified as an integral part of the 
municipality’s suburban development project. Universities would not only bring 
large numbers of people to the newly-constructed suburban settlement, but also 
provide a catalyst for the development of an urban economy and help form an 
urban atmosphere in a short period of time. Moreover, it was also claimed that the 
knowledge spill-over effects and externalities would contribute to local economic 
growth. Therefore, it was envisioned that the relocation of universities would open 
up a unique ‘education-led’ path to rapid (sub) urbanisation15. For suburban 
district governments, however, the arrival of universities could generate more 
tangible benefits. It was expected that, in order to support their relocation, the 
municipal government would set favourable policies and invest in major 
infrastructure construction. More importantly, the arrival of the university town 
project itself could help promote positive expectations about local development, 
which would immediately inflate land prices and attract investment capital.  
Therefore, the attraction of university town projects became a bitter contest 
among suburban districts. All district governments competed to win by offering a 
lower land price than their rivals. In the end, Songjiang District Government 
successfully beat others by donating a free area of 3km
2
 to four universities. Later 
in 2001, after three universities had been built and begun operation, another three 
settled in the town. In total, the local government contributed an area of 5.47 km
2
 
to the project for free. Moreover, the government promised to invest in and 
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undertake land acquisition, resettlement and infrastructure construction for the 
town. In a sense, instead of soliciting manufacturing industries, Songjiang had 
placed a bet on universities for growth.   
 
5.4.2 Development process 
According to its plan, Songjiang University Town was to be built for a new 
mode of higher education. As there were seven universities clustered together, 
they shared educational resources with each other, which helped improve their 
management efficiency and the quality of education.  The degrees offered by the 
universities are complementary; students are thus accordingly allowed to take 
different courses in different universities. Moreover, all the universities share 
common student accommodation, dining rooms, sports centres and theatres, etc. 
The development of the university town is a joint venture between the MEC, 
Songjiang District Government and the newly-arrived universities. The Songjiang 
District Government took charge of primary land development, the MEC was 
responsible for building public facilities and the universities developed their own 
campus and teaching buildings
16
.   
The first and foremost task for all the participants was financing the project; 
they made many diverse attempts to raise money. Songjiang District Government 
established Songjiang University Town Development Corporation (SUTDC) to 
operate the development of the land. The company was given an area of about 4 
km
2
 in the north of the university town as its initial capital.  With the land as 
collateral and the local authority as a guarantor, the corporation managed to raise 
enough money for site formation and infrastructure works via a 1 Billion Yuan 
bank loan. After the primary development was completed, the land around the 
university town was leased out for real estate development to recoup the initial 
investment.  
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The educational sectors had little money to initiate their expansion at the time. 
In the past, their operation had depended heavily upon governments’ revenue 
budge. Now they had to finance the construction primarily via bank loans and 
private capital. It was expected that their borrowing could be covered by the 
enrolment of a huge number of students afterwards. The MEC set up a subsidiary 
organisation, Shanghai Municipal Education Capital Construction Management 
Centre (SMECCMC), to undertake its task. With the support of Shanghai 
municipality, it received a 1.5 Billion Yuan loan from a state-owned bank, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, to build common facilities in the town. 
The construction and management of student accommodation was subcontracted 
to a state-owned real estate company, Shanghai Oriental Real Estate Co., Ltd.  
All the universities wished to occupy as large an area of land as possible, to allow 
for future expansion. In order to secure finance for their new campus, in addition 
to bank loans, some borrowed research funds from their academic staff, some sold 
off their old campus in the central city. An interesting case is the development of 
Shanghai International Studies University. As the university was not able to raise 
large sums of money, the university campus was fully funded and developed by 
Shanghai Oriental Real Estate Co., Ltd., and then rented out to the university for 
50 million Yuan a year. The university makes these payments using the tuition 
fees it collects from students. In this sense, some universities are indeed operated 
as enterprises themselves.  
While the financing of the project included mobilising market operations and 
private investment, the development was carried out as a political task. It was 
listed as one of the major projects of Shanghai municipality, and directly 
monitored by the Deputy Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Committee. The heads 
of all the organisations formed a board which directly monitored and coordinated 
the whole development process. Additionally, a special office was also jointly 
established to operate specific tasks. The main responsibility of the board and the 
office, however, was to ensure the progress of the project as required by the 





municipal government. The work was subject to an extremely tight timetable. In 
May 2000, the town’s master plan and design was reviewed and approved. The 
first phase of construction started soon afterwards in November. The municipal 
government instructed that the main buildings and facilities should be finished 
before the next new term began.  Therefore, the group leading the project laid 
down detailed targets for the different stages involved in the construction of each 
institution. Meanwhile, an incentive mechanism was set up in order to mobilise 
workers and staff. Progress was monitored and reported every month. By 
September 2001, a total construction area of 220,100 m
2
 was completed. Three 
universities began operation in October 2001 and 5,700 students began to live and 
study in the town. The second phase was constructed in 2003. With another four 
universities settling there in the following years, at present there are 
approximately 100,000 students and staff living in the town.  
 
5.4.3 Local economic impact 
To assess the economic impact of the university town project, it is first 
necessary to establish whether the project resulted in profits for those involved. 
By moving into Songjiang, the universities substantially reinforced their fiscal 
capacities through the expansion of enrolment on the one hand and the investment 
of their assets in land and properties on the other hand (Interview, U1).  
SMECCMC, the agency of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 
(MEC), was not able to pay back its 1.5 billion bank loan in the end, because it 
was mainly in charge of the development of the non-profitable public facilities of 
the university town. The money, which was taken from other public expenditure, 
was eventually paid off by the municipality (Interview, U1). Finally, the 
development corporation of Songjiang District Government, SUTDC, was unable 
to pay back the 1 billion Yuan bank loan. Nevertheless, this by no means indicates 
that the university town was a loss-making investment for the district government. 
One important reason is that some pieces of land in the hands of SUTDC were 





preserved for future sale by the government (Interview G1; D3). In 2006, SUTDC 
was merged with another of the government’s development corporations, New 
Town Construction and Development Co., Ltd. (SNTDC), who paid off all its debt 
and meanwhile acquired all the reserved land. In short, the university town project 
did not make a profit for the municipal and district government itself.  
The second issue concerns the overall economic impact of the project on 
Songjiang as a whole, whereby the governments obtained substantial returns. The 
project indeed initiated the shift of local development towards an urban economy. 
Universities not only brought about an immediate influx of population, but also a 
range of commercial services and developments.  In the south of the town, the 
planned central business district of the new town attracted a number of businesses 
due to the high expectations of population growth. Constructed by a private real 
estate company based in Zhejiang province, Kaiyuan Mediterranean Square, a 
mixed-use complex encompassing office, retail, entertainment, hotel and 
residential spaces, opened in 2006. Most importantly, the project had a favourable 
impact on demand for local housing and helped significantly to raise land prices 
in Songjiang New Town.  
In terms of the impact of the universities on local industrial growth and 
upgrading, however, knowledge spill-over effects were at a much lower level. As 
most universities specialise in business, humanities and social sciences, they can 
hardly interact with and contribute to Songjiang’s manufacturing industries. 
Moreover, the university town functions more like a self-contained enclave with 
few locally embedded activities. For example, only around 1,000 graduates 
acquire local jobs and settle down in Songjiang per annum. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to describe the role of these universities as an infrastructure for real 










Functionally, the introduction of the university town indicates that the focus 
of Songjiang’s entrepreneurial strategies went beyond merely supporting 
manufacturing industries and was actually targeted at the development of an urban 
economy. The presence of universities, and the large increase in population they 
brought about, helped foster the development of service sectors and increase 
demand for local housing.  In a similar way, Songjiang also attracted other public 
institutions to move from the central city or set branches, including four 
top-ranking university-affiliated middle schools and a top-ranking hospital
17
. The 
suburbanisation process in Western countries often brings about tension caused by 
rapid growth and provision for collective consumption (Phelps et al., 2010). In the 
case of Songjiang New Town, however, because growth was greatly associated 
with the exchange of land, these service sectors actually acted as a vehicle for 
growth.  
In political terms, the local government involved the MEC and the seven 
universities, or other similar public-service sectors, in the development process to 
form pro-growth coalitions. Since market-oriented reform, these public-service 
sectors have increasingly begun to operate in a way that is usually distinctive to 
enterprises which seek profits on their own terms. They were drawn to Songjiang 
by cheap land and low development costs in order to expand their businesses. They 
played a principle role in development, investing capital and taking charge of their 
projects. On the other hand, the local government, as the de factor land owner, 
welcomed their arrival by providing direct support such as offering free serviced 
land. Although the local government did not benefit from this project directly, these 
sectors serve its interests by raising local land and property values. However, the 
manipulation of the municipal government influenced these two parties. The 
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municipal government encouraged and sponsored the relocation, or expansion, of 
public-service sectors from the central city to the suburbs on the one hand, and 
launched institutional changes and policies to mobilise local initiatives on the other 
hand. In short, the university town and the like functioned as a typical type of 
Chinese suburban growth machine which was facilitated by a 
municipality-manipulated coalition between the local government and 
public-service sectors.  
 
5.5 No.9 Metro Line: harnessing resources from the 
municipality 
5.5.1 Bidding for the project 
Accessibility is of particular importance when bringing about suburbanisation.  
While the new town aimed to create a decentralised settlement, its development 
was dependent on the city. This is because the city is still the place where the bulk 
of jobs, living facilities and hot spots for consumption are located. Considering 
the fact that the level of car ownership in Shanghai and China is still relatively low, 
mass transit, rather than a high speed system, helped transport as many people as 
possible. Therefore, an integral part of the municipality’s metropolitan 
development project was the construction of a mass transit system. According to 
its long-term plan, all the eight suburban districts and one county would be linked 
to the central city
18
.  
Apparently, being the first district to have a metro line linked to Shanghai 
proved to be a significant competitive advantage for the suburb. Almost in parallel 
with winning the university town, Songjiang District Government began to lobby 
the municipality to give priority to the No.9 Metro Line that would connect 
Songjiang to Shanghai. The government made very ‘hard’ efforts to obtain the 
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project (Interview D3). In the process, the university town proved to be a 
significant bargaining chip in acquiring support from the municipality. Because 
half of the total population of the university town, i.e. about 50,000 students and 
staff, needed to go back home to Shanghai at the weekend, it imposed extreme 
traffic pressure on the bus-based transport system. A metro link to the city was 
urgently needed to solve the problem. Thus Songjiang became the first outer 
suburb to have a metro link to Shanghai.  
 
5.5.2 Development process 
No.9 Metro Line was one of four metropolitan rail lines proposed in the 1986 
Shanghai Master Plan.  It was designed to be a major line running through the 
city, from the southwest end of Songjiang New Town, via a number of major hubs 
in central Shanghai, to the northeast end of Caolu town in Pudong district, another 
newly-planned suburban site for affordable housing development. The first phase 
was a 30.5km
 
line from Songjiang New Town to Yishan Road, where it was joined 
to the established central metro network.  In effect, it connected the urban core 
with all the peripheral settlements along the line.  
The project was mainly led and organised by the municipal government. 
Shanghai Shentong Metro Co. Ltd. (SSMC), the listed company set up by the 
municipality to finance, construct and operate the city’s rail transit, took charge of 
its construction as well as its operation after completion. However, although the 
segments passing through central districts were exclusively funded by SSMC, 
segments in suburban districts were co-funded by SSMC and the suburban district 
governments. It was proposed that, as suburban district governments would 
benefit greatly from this metro extension, they should share the construction costs. 
Therefore, because the line passed through Songjiang and Minhang, these two 
suburban districts had to contribute to the investment of the segments in their 
jurisdictions and stations along the line. Moreover, they were required to finance 
and undertake primary land development on their own.  





Songjiang was in charge of building a 22.4 km
2 
segment and five 
intermediate stations. The total investment was 4.5 billion Yuan, two thirds of 
which was raised by the local authority itself. A development company, 
Chengtong Rail Transit Investment and Construction Corporation (CRTICC), was 
established by the district government to carry out relevant tasks on Songjiang’s 
behalf. Songjiang Chengtou Corporation (SCC), another government subsidiary 
specialising in financing and operating government-led infrastructure projects, 
helped with borrowing money from banks for the project. Using some of its fixed 
assets such as roads and bridges as collateral, SCC obtained a 3 billion Yuan 
syndicated loan from eight banks in 2000. With this amount of money, CRTICC 
was able to complete the pre-construction work. Meanwhile, in order to cover the 
cost, various pieces of land near each station were given to CRTICC. After 
primary development, the land could be leased out for real estate development, 
while CRTICC could keep 70% of the total lease fee as their profits.  
In this way, the first phase of the No.9 Metro Line project was completed by 
the municipal subsidiary SSMC and two district subsidiary development 
companies from Minhang and Songjiang. The line began operation on December 
29, 2007, and its last section connected to the Yishan Road station was opened on 
December 28, 2008. The management and operation of the line was then 
transferred to SSMC. Passenger numbers have been increasing since its 
inauguration and comprised approximately 500,000 per day in 2011. However, 
ticket prices are fixed to remain at a low level by the municipal government. Like 
many other metro lines in Shanghai, the No.9 Metro Line actually runs at a loss 
for SSMC, which is largely subsidised by the municipality every year.  
 
5.5.3 Local economic impact 
The non-profitability of the line is not a problem for CRTICC and Songjiang. 
The district grasped the essence of suburban transportation, that is, the value of 
suburban transportation does not lie in moving people, but in raising the price of 





the land it passes (Fishman, 1987: 143). The debt of 3 billion Yuan was the largest 
sum ever borrowed by the government and was not without risk at the time. 
However, as expected, the announcement of the No.9 Metro Line immediately 
resulted in a rise in the price of land along the line. During the periods of 
construction, by gradually leasing the land out, CRTICC maintained balance 
between capital returns and next-stage investment. Along with the maturity of the 
area in the following years, CRTICC saw the land in its possession dramatically 
go up in value year after year. When it leased out the last two pieces of land in 
2010, the price reached as high as approximately 10 million per mu
19
. After a land 
sale of about 320 mu in total, the company easily paid off its debt.  
When its overall impact on the growth of Songjiang is evaluated, the No.9 
Metro Line is vividly depicted as ‘the lifeline’ of Songjiang. The travel distance 
between Shanghai and Songjiang was greatly shortened and the sites in the 
northeast of the district are within a one hour commute of the centre of Shanghai. 
It has become possible to work in the central or inner suburban districts and live 
in Songjiang.  The route has consequently activated a housing market in 
Songjiang and has turned the suburb into a true settlement. Townships along the 
line such as Jiuting and Sijing have begun to witness massive property 
development and an influx of residents since 2000. According to the most recent 
2010 census, Jiuting, the first stop when entering Songjiang from Shanghai, has 
become the most populous township in the district. Its population density has 





Transport infrastructure has always played a crucial role in suburban growth. 
Different from Western cities where massive suburbanisation has been facilitated 
by intensive highway development and private car usage, Songjiang New Town 
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depended on the development of mass transit. As a part of the government’s 
entrepreneurial efforts, the development of the No.9 Metro Line project reinforced 
Songjiang’s connectivity and thus strengthened its competitiveness in terms of 
attracting both property investment and residents. Meanwhile, in terms of 
development process, the metro line illustrates a case in which the municipal and 
local governments co-invested in infrastructure to facilitate growth. On the one 
hand, the municipal government motivated the local government to join in the 
development and share its financing burden. On the other hand, Songjiang District 
Government beat other suburban districts and managed to harness municipal 
resources to fuel local growth. Afterwards, by creatively linking land sales, 
housing development and infrastructure funding, the local government overcame 
the initial capital constraint in infrastructure development, which supported the 
emergence of a prosperous housing market. 
 
5.6 Thames Town: engaging the capital of private 
developers 
5.6.1 Thames Town as a flagship project 
Thames Town was developed in the western quarter of Songjiang New Town 
as its flagship master-planned community to promote the image of the new town as 
a good place to live. It was initiated when the municipal government launched its 
suburban development project of ‘One-city-nine-towns’ in 2001. As Songjiang was 
selected to be the key site of the project, the district government was required to 
construct a master-planned community with a distinctive British building style. 
Like master-planned developments found in the US, Thames Town is built as a 
rounded city-like settlement. It is composed of a cluster of gated communities 
populated with detached single-family houses and low-rise apartments for 1,100 
households. Public facilities, including a commercial street, a sports centre, an 





international school and other recreational facilities are packaged to form a 
self-contained settlement. The most distinctive characteristic of the town is its 
design which features an ‘authentic’ English town flavour (Figure 5.6). The public 
areas include buildings of Tudor, Victorian and Georgian styles, with a neo-Gothic 
church surrounded by lawns, a fake turreted castle by an artificial lake and a dock 
plaza with red-brick warehouses on the waterfront, as well as bronze statues of 
Winston Churchill, Florence Nightingale, William Shakespeare and Princess 
Diana. Typical British businesses and lifestyles have also been cloned, with an 
English pub selling real ale, a fish & chips shop, a Costa Café, an open market 
with echoes of Covent Garden, and even European-style wedding services (Figure 
5.7). The orchestrated and controlled landscapes and the simulated and unreal 
experiences are reminiscent of Disneyland.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Traditional timber-framed houses and an English café on the High 
Street in Thames Town 
Source: Photo by author 






Figure 5.7 Western style wedding services and the Gothic-style church in 
Thames Town 
Source: Photo by author 
 
Thames Town was positioned as a high-end prestige neighbourhood. Its 
distinctive landscape and exotic town atmosphere include scarce amenities that 
can only be enjoyed by a few people. All single-family houses in the town were 
built as gated communities. With luxurious, spacious and elegant building styles 
and identifiable English names like Windsor Peninsula, Leeds Garden, and 
Nottingham Greenland, these communities are reminiscent of Western suburbia 
and attempt to present a sophisticated way of life. For example, Windsor Peninsula, 
occupying 99,000 m
2
 in total on the northeast of the town, has 69 single-family 
houses in 28,638 m
2
. The project sells a ‘gracious English life with a total 
environment.’ Within ornamental fences are English-style houses characterised by 
a mansard roof, sloping cornices, timber framing, red terracotta and hand-made 
tracery; each unit has its own garden, basement, garage and a small swimming 
pool.  





However, Thames Town was also positioned to be a tourist attraction of 
Songjiang New Town. The project was intended to take the lead in improving the 
quality of the urban environment and further promote the development of the 
surrounding areas
20
 . There is no rigid access control into the town, despite a 
magnificent entrance. The shared public space and living facilities, according to 
the original plan, are expected to serve the whole residential district of the western 
quarter of Songjiang. Some public buildings such as Songjiang Art Gallery and 
Songjiang Urban Planning Exhibition Centre are also built within the area. Even a 
sightseeing cruise along the river of Shenjing Tang is incorporated. Indeed, 
Thames Town functions as a window to showcase Songjiang’s competitiveness. 
 
5.6.2 Development process 
The development of Thames town was undertaken by Songjiang New Town 
Development Co. Ltd. (SNTDC). It is a joint stock company held by the district 
government and three affiliated development companies of the municipal 
government
21
: Shanghai Properties Group, Shanghai Star Group, and Shanghai 
International Group. While the three municipal companies contributed a total 
investment of 1 billion Yuan, the district government used the land in the western 
quarter as its contribution and has taken charge of daily management. SNTDC 
was established to construct the planned 7.36 km
2
 residential district in the 
western quarter, including Thames Town. The company did not directly take part 
in detailed design and construction once the land has been leased out; but because 
Thames Town was the government’s flagship project, the company took a hand in 
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the work and managed the town’s development personally. With regard to 
SNTDC’s own interests, it expected that Thames Town would give the whole 
western quarter a good reputation and thus raise land prices. After earlier 
preparation such as detailed planning and design, land acquisition and the 
construction of major infrastructure, blocks of land in Thames Town were leased 
out to private developers, including several commodity housing subdivisions and 
the commercial area. SNTDC itself constructed other public facilities such as 
schools, supermarkets, a sports centre, Songjiang Art Gallery and Songjiang 
Urban Planning Exhibition Centre.  
The project was an attractive opportunity for private developers because it 
was well-planed and sponsored by the government. Many investors expressed 
their interest during the period of recruitment; SNTDC finally made deals with 
four of them. Three well-established real estate companies, namely Sansheng 
Hongye, Shanghai Hengshi, Xuhui Shangjian, were commissioned to construct 
one villa-style residential subdivision each. A newly-founded company, Henghe 
Property originating from Zhejiang province, was in charge of the commercial 
area and three surrounding residential subdivisions. This company became the 
primary partner with SNTDC. In total it purchased an area representing one-fifth 
of the town, including the commercial district in the town centre.  The company 
worked closely with SNTDC in order to attract businesses to rent properties and 
together they made great efforts to market Thames Town.  
The role of SNTDC was quite subtle in the public-private partnership. On the 
one hand, SNTDC actually acted on behalf of the governments. According to one 
of its department managers, the company performed many government functions 
and was de facto a ‘quasi-public sector’ (Interview D2). SNTDC committed itself 
to building those unprofitable public facilities which are not interesting to private 
developers. Moreover, SNTDC directly coordinated with private developers on 
the governments’ behalf and supervised the construction progress according to the 
governments’ requirements. Any modification to the original detailed plan had to 





be reviewed and approved by SNTDC. All private developers acquired the land 
development rights from SNTDC on the condition that they must complete the 
construction within three years.  
On the other hand, the SNTDC is a corporate body which independently 
manages land development to generate profit. Thames Town was not developed 
for profit (Interview D1). The company has invested more than 1.4 billion in 
Thames Town so far and there are two main sources of return. Firstly, land was 
leased out to private developers through negotiation at the price of about 420, 000 
Yuan per mu (a mu is one-fifteenth of a ha) in 2002. The four developers paid 
about 270 million Yuan in total for land leasing fees. After 40%-50% was passed 
to the local governments, SNTDC kept the remainder of the fees as its profits. 
Secondly, although the company is technically not allowed to undertake real estate 
development, it developed one gated residential subdivision on its own for extra 
profit, which generated earnings of about 200 million Yuan. Therefore, its total 
income of about 360 million Yuan from this project was far less than its input. Yet, 
land leasing fees for the western quarter are its major source of income. By 
building Thames Town, the company’s strategy was to promote the image of the 
whole area as a high-end residential district and thus raise land values. This tactic 
has proved to be successful. When all developments in the western quarter were 
completed in 2006, SNTDC reaped a very good return on the whole.  
 
5.6.3 Local economic impact 
Thames Town was a successful property project in its own terms. When 
finished in 2006, apartments in Thames Town of 50-200 m
2
 were sold at prices 
ranging from 4,000 to 6,500 Yuan/m
2
, while villa-style houses of 300-600 m
2 
went 
for 6,000 to 9,000 Yuan/m
2
. The average prices for apartments and villa-style 
houses have reached as high as 12,000 to 18,000 Yuan/m
2
 and 25,000 to 40,000 







 respectively over the last five years
22
. These prices are very high 
considering that the location is far beyond the outer ring of Shanghai; they have 
almost reached the average level of the central districts (Table 5.2). Nevertheless, 
sales have been quite buoyant. All the properties in Thames Town were sold 
immediately upon completion. All actors involved made money from the project. 
As mentioned above, although SNTDC did not earn profit directly from this 
project, by leasing other land in its possession at high prices, the company 
managed to make large sums of money.  
Thames Town was initiated to promote the image of Songjiang and create the 
brand identity of Songjiang New Town. Since the launch of the project, Thames 
Town has received extensive attention. With its fantasy landscapes and appearance 
as a little slice of Britain in China, it was widely reported by both local and 
international media, although sometimes controversially, as a novel model of 
housing development. It garnered multiple awards and accolades from national and 
local government and other organisations in the building industry, architecture and 
the environment
23
. Besides, Thames Town also helped place promotion by 
frequently hosting various public events and cultural activities. Through a series of 
marketing activities, Thames Town successfully set up Songjiang New Town’s 
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 Prices for second-hand houses in Thames Town were taken from two property agencies, 
Wonderland Property and Xinhong Property, in August, 2010.  
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 The awards won by Thames Town include: ‘Top Ten Property Investment for 2004,’ ‘Top Ten 
Best Selling Garden Residence for 2004,’ ‘Shanghai Commercial Innovation Prize for 2004,’ 
‘Golden Nest Prize for Best Waterscape Residence for 2005,’ ‘National Top Ten Brand Value in 
Building Industry,’ and the title of ‘Excellent Green Architecture,’ and ‘Four High Estate of 
Shanghai for 2006 (high level of planning, design, construction and management).’ 





Table 5.2 Average housing price of Shanghai’s districts from 2002 to 2008 
 
 
2002 2005 2008 
Within the Inner Ring    
Huangpu 5,311 8,067 23,375 
Luwan 5,741 8,500 15,771 
Jing'an 5,902 7,108 12,738 
Hongkou 4,126 8,637 15,367 
Within the Outer Ring    
Changning 5,502 7,884 19,283 
Xuhui 5,791 7,451 9,226 
Putuo 4,416 7,231 11,152 
Zhabei 4,410 7,850 7,883 
Yangpu 4,316 7,477 8,030 
Straddling the Inner and Outer Ring    
Pudong 3,944 7,186 9,992 
Baoshan 3,484 7,181 7,526 
Minhang 2,977 6,191 8,527 
Beyond the Outer Ring    
Jiading 2,739 6,050 7,341 
Jinshan 1,921 6,677 5,367 
Songjiang 3,327 5,682 8,317 
Qingpu 2,588 5,304 8,307 
Nanhui 3,437 5,991 6,204 
Fengxian 2,049 5,662 6,592 
Chongming 3,514 2,730 7,429 
Average for the Whole City 4,007 6,698 8,182 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2003, 2006, and 2009. 
 
5.6.4 Summary 
Thames Town perfectly illustrates the manipulation of flagship projects to 
build the new identity of Songjiang. Specifically, by developing Thames Towns as 
a high-end residence with distinctive landscapes which, interestingly, mimic those 
of Western suburbia, the governments’ attempted to promote Songjiang as an 












appealing place to live. Central to the new image was the embracing of 
consumption and lifestyles. This is a clear break from previous place marketing 
which mainly focused on promoting attributes of a good business climate such as 
tax breaks, competitive labour costs and favourable institutional arrangements. 
Songjiang New Town is no longer merely underpinned by industrial production, 
but has witnessed the rise of a consumption-oriented economy.  
The development of Thames Towns further illustrates another type of 
entrepreneurial governance characterised as a private-public partnership. The state 
set up quasi-public development corporations to act on its behalf to cooperate with 
private developers. However, unlike the arrangements found in mega-projects in 
Western countries which are often dominated by private interest groups, the 
governments’ agency played a leading role. This is because, in the case of China, 
the government monopolises land and other political resources to achieve its own 
goals. Another notable feature of the Thames Town project was that the 
municipality had a more direct influence. The municipal government’s three 
subsidiary development companies acted as shareholders and contributed part of 
the funds to support the project. As a result, unlike the other three local 
development companies, the district government did not have absolute control 
over the development company, SNTDC (Interview D3; G1). Therefore, Thames 
Town resulted from a pro-growth coalition between the municipality, Songjiang 
District Government and private sectors.  
 
5.7 Growth machine in action 
The erection of Songjiang New Town and its new image as a great place to 
live marked a significant change in the way suburbs act as a place for capital 
accumulation. The transformation was often justified as the imperative of 
economic restructuring from low-end manufacturing to high-level tertiary sectors. 
According to the head of the district government, ‘We don’t merely rely on 
low-cost land any more, but aim at attracting investment by high-quality lifestyle 





and first-rate service; we are creating heaven for our investors’ (International 
Finance News, 2003). Nevertheless, growth was actually underpinned by other 
mechanisms. As explained in section 2.2, the reality was that the manufacturing 
industry remained the pillar of Songjiang’s economic growth. The real rationale of 
new town development was to use urban development to generate revenue, which 
was in turn invested to attract industrial capital. In this section, it is demonstrated 
that, through a range of entrepreneurial efforts supported by a wide range of actors, 
the growth machine started to activate in Songjiang. 
 
5.7.1 Property development 
By investing in prestige projects, governments managed to raise the land and 
property values of the whole area. As one local official pointed out, ‘the building 
of Songjiang New Town just rests on successful urban entrepreneurialism…the 
key to success is to adopt overall strategies, which means to build growth poles 
for the whole region’ (Wang, 2002). The new town was regarded as an entire 
property development project, and all the flagship projects served as such growth 
poles to enhance the exchange value of land and buildings in Songjiang. All the 
investments proved to be worthwhile. The average land price in Songjiang was 
about 18 thousand Yuan per mu in 1999; after the announcement of the university 
town project in 2000, the bid price of nearby parcels instantly increased by more 
than 38 thousand Yuan per mu. Songjiang has built its name on various 
property-led projects over the past ten years; in 2010, when a land area of 94, 
476m
2
 was leased out by public auction, the bid price reached 1.25 billion Yuan. 
This meant the price of one mu of land was nearly 9 million, and the cost per 
square meter for a house to be built would be more than 16, 000 Yuan
24
. 
Furthermore, the development of mega-projects and infrastructure also stimulated 
a voracious appetite for real estate development and property investment. From 
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 See http://news.dichan.sina.com.cn/sh/2010/09/02/207597.html 





2001 to 2008, the annual growth rate of construction and real estate sectors rose by 
22.6% and 27.2% respectively (Table 5.3). The total number of real estate 
development companies and property agencies registered in Songjiang increased 


























2001 15.11 8.86 58.6% 0.52 3.4% 0.57 3.8% 
2002 18.01 10.86 60.3% 0.59 3.3% 0.70 3.9% 
2003 25.25 16.12 63.8% 1.00 4.0% 1.20 4.8% 
2004 34.35 22.77 66.3% 1.36 4.0% 1.63 4.7% 
2005 45.64 30.73 67.3% 1.74 3.8% 2.53 5.5% 
2006 53.54 35.90 67.1% 1.92 3.6% 2.69 5.0% 
2007 64.21 42.99 67.0% 2.12 3.3% 3.71 5.8% 
2008 73.45 48.92 66.6% 2.23 3.0% 3.26 4.4% 
2009 75.70 47.86 63.2% 2.55 3.4% 4.35 5.8% 
2010 90.05 58.40 64.9% 2.95 3.3% 4.06 4.5% 
Annual growth rate     
 20.2% 24.2% - 22.6% - 27.2% - 
Source: Shanghai Songjiang Statistical Bureau, 2002-2011 
 
5.7.2 Industrial growth 
In parallel with building Songjiang New Town, the local government 
continued to attract industrial investment and build its economic growth on 
manufacturing. In 2000 and 2003, it developed two Export Processing Zones, 
granted by the State Council, covering 1.98 km
2
 and 2.9 km
2
 of land in the east and 
west of the new town respectively.  Meanwhile, Songjiang Industrial Zone was 
further extended. About 30 km
2
 of land was newly developed to accommodate 
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 In order to increase the local tax base, all companies with projects and a business presence in 
Songjiang are required to establish their locally-registered branches there.   





industries in 2003. As a result, Songjiang continued to be an important production 
node of the metropolis. While Shanghai has successfully relocated industrial 
development out of the central city and enhanced its tertiary industry proportion of 
GDP from 30.8% in 1990 to 59.8% in 2008, the manufacturing industry itself 
contributed 66.6% of Songjiang’s total GDP (Table 5.4). Compared with Shanghai, 
on average, the proportion of industries like finance, tourism, and transportation, 
post and information transmission are still much lower.   
 
Table 5.4 Economic structure of Shanghai and Songjiang (2008) 
 
Indicators Shanghai Songjiang 
GDP (100 million Yuan) 13698.15 734.48 
   
Contribution Rate of Economic Growth (%)   
      Primary Industry 0.1 1.0 
      Secondary Industry 40.1 69.6 
      Tertiary Industry 59.8 29.4 
   
Proportion of main industries in GDP (%)   
      Agriculture 0.8  1.0 
      Industry 42.2  66.6 
      Construction 3.3  3.0 
      Transportation, post and information transmission 5.6  1.2 
      Wholesale and Retail 9.2  7.7 
      Finance and Insurance 10.5  2.7 
      Real Estate 5.5  4.4 
      Tourism 7.0  3.5 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2009. 
 
5.7.3 Growth mechanism 
The key to Songjiang’s rapid growth is the district government’s success in 
kicking off a positive chain reaction of capital accumulation through a land-centred 
growth mechanism in which urban development and industrial growth reinforced 
each other. On the one hand, the rise of the real estate industry helped raise land 
prices and contributed to the increase of local revenue. Figure 5.8 shows that, under 





the new Tax Sharing System, the local government only shared a smaller portion of 
the total tax. But after turning over the capital belonging to the higher governments, 
it is real-estate-related taxes (including land leasing fees) that account for the 
greatest proportion of local public revenue. In 2010, the figure reached as high as 
58.6%. Yet, the construction and real estate industries made only a small 
contribution to total GDP growth (Figure 5.9). On the other hand, thanks to the 
money collected by urban development, the government was able to invest in 
infrastructure development and provide various preferential policies to attract 
industrial capital. Rapid industrial development then stimulated Songjiang’s overall 
economic growth and brought about employment and an increased population, 
which, in turn, helped to promote urban development. Consequently, rather than 
decrease, the contribution of manufacturing industries to GDP has risen, from 
58.65% in 2001 to 64.86% in 2010 (Figure 5.9). Therefore, both GDP and local 






















Figure 5.8 Revenue structure of Songjiang District Government 2001-2010 
Source: Shanghai Songjiang Statistical Bureau, 2002-2011 
 
 

































Figure 5.9 Economic structure of Songjiang 2001-2010 
Source: Shanghai Songjiang Statistical Bureau, 2002-2011 
 
This mechanism, i.e. using new town development to collect funds first and 
then invest the money to boost economic growth, can also be further demonstrated 
by examining capital switching over the past ten years. This was carried out by 
comparing the ratios of infrastructure, real estate and industrial fixed-asset 
investment to all economic activity, which reflects how capital investment was 
distributed among these sectors. The result shows that the ratios of investment in 
real estate and industry rose and fell alternately. In other words, there was a 
countercyclical relationship between the two (Figure 5.10). There were two 
distinctive development periods in the past ten years. From 2000 to 2005, when the 
new town project was under construction, there emerged an upward trend of 
infrastructure investment, which reached a peak in 2003. This clearly reflects that 
the government invested heavily in infrastructure in the earlier years to initiate 
new town development. In the meantime, the period saw rapid growth in real 
estate investment with a decline of industrial investment relative to other types. 
From 2005 to 2008, after the building boom, investment in both infrastructure and 
the real estate sector largely decreased. Yet industrial investment saw a relative 
increase. In short, before 2005, the main focus was on new town development and 
raised land prices. After that, infrastructure and real estate development began to 
reduce to a lower level. Because land prices were propped up after the completion 





of the new town, the government was able to collect sufficient revenue merely by 
leasing small amounts of land. Meanwhile, investment in manufacturing and other 


















Figure 5.10 Changing ratios of investment in real estate, infrastructure, and 
industry to GDP in Songjiang 2000-2010  
Source: Shanghai Songjiang Statistical Bureau, 2002-2011 
 
Therefore, new town development in Songjiang was by no means similar to 
the shift of capital into the built environment that characterises the 
(sub)urbanisation process in Western countries. According to Harvey (1985), 
massive investment in property development is the outlet for surplus capital in the 
sphere of production, which is termed capital switching from the primary circuit 
to the second circuit. Recent studies have emphasised that the built environment is 
not conditional to the primary circuit, but real estate industry follows its own 
agenda, which often involves speculation (Beauregard, 1995; Charney, 2001; 
Gothman, 2006). In the case of Songjiang, there is no evidence that the building 
boom resulted from the decline of manufacturing industries. On the contrary, they 
promoted each other. If the changes to total investment in real estate and industry 
since 2000 are examined (Figure 5.11), it is found that, at least prior to 2008, 
investment in the two sectors exhibited similar cyclical behaviour. Both 
experienced rapid expansion in the first few years and later began to show a 
downturn after 2005. Nevertheless, it is notable that the recent building boom 





which reflected speculative profits in real estate began to draw capital away from 
industrial production. An important background detail is that, in order to stimulate 
economic growth after the financial crisis of 2008, the central state adopted a 4 
trillion-Yuan stimulus plan to spur domestic investment and consumption. It 
turned out that at least half of the money was not invested in ‘real’ industrial 
production, but was diverted to stock and the property market (The Telegraph, 
2009). Correspondingly, since 2008, the new cycle of investment growth in 
Songjiang saw a rapid increase in real estate development, a relative falloff in 
industrial investment and a non-significant increase in infrastructure construction. 
Under such circumstances, the role of new town development as part of the 

































Figure 5.11 Changing total investment in real estate, infrastructure and the 
manufacturing industry in Songjiang, 2000-2010  
Source: Shanghai Songjiang Statistical Bureau, 2002-2011 
 
To sum up, Songjiang’s growth machine involves two capital circuits, i.e. the 
primary circuit based on manufacturing industries, and the secondary circuit 
centred on property development; however, their functions were different. On the 
one hand, the local government managed to attract massive industrial capital to 
stimulate GDP growth. On the other hand, it used new town development to boost 
land and property development and collect enough funds to undertake 
infrastructure construction and make up the gap in local revenue. The growth of 





Songjiang, therefore, was realised through a mechanism in which industrial 
production and property development were mutually reinforced.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
For a long time, viewed either as an industrial satellite town or a rapidly 
growing industrial zone, Songjiang was an outer-suburban place for 
industrialisation. In less than ten years, the district has evolved into a 
multi-functional suburban settlement and become a significant growth pole in 
Shanghai metropolitan area. This chapter recognised that the rise of Songjiang 
functioned as a growth machine as seen in many Western countries. However, 
unlike typical US urban regimes where business groups often play the most 
influential role in organising pro-growth coalitions (Logan and Molotch, 1987), 
with both greater incentives and capacities, the local government’s 
entrepreneurialism has played a leading role in the process. Moreover, while the 
‘suburban entrepreneurialism’ of suburban localities is also documented in US and 
European countries (Althubaity and Jonas, 1998; Phelps et al., 2006), some 
aspects of Songjiang are found to be unique in the case of China, namely 
governance capacities, entrepreneurial strategies and development methods.  
An analysis of the institutional context reveals that Songjiang’s 
entrepreneurialism resulted from the municipality’s rescaling of urban governance. 
With the launch of the municipality’s suburban development project, an 
adjustment to fiscal and administrative relationships between the municipal and 
district governments generated great local initiatives. In this sense, Songjiang did 
not act in exactly the same way as those suburban localities in the US which are 
able to fully exert their autonomy, or sometimes even manage to secede from the 
municipality in the pursuit of local growth (Keil, 2000). Nevertheless, by 
comparison with the urban edge governments in most European cities, where 
localism is also constrained by their high-level of governments to a greater degree 
(Harding, 1991), Songjiang District Government and other suburban districts were 





given both greater incentives and capacities to organise their entrepreneurial 
activities. Under such circumstances, to a large extent Songjiang’s 
entrepreneurialism rests on its ability to beat other suburban rivals in bidding for 
the municipality’s strategic support.  
Like suburban entrepreneurialism found in Western cities, Songjiang’s 
entrepreneurialism is derived from the local government’s need to collect funds 
and taxes similar to many (post)-suburban places, but in this case it is realised 
through a different and more sophisticated strategy. With only land as the main 
resource in their possession, local governments tactically mixed industrial and 
residential development and created a growth machine in which urbanisation and 
industrialisation mutually reinforced each other to stimulate local growth. Money 
collected through land and property development was invested to support the 
attraction of industrial capital. Consequently, a key element to its entrepreneurial 
efforts to initiate growth was a method of boosting the local housing market. This 
was facilitated by intensive investment in infrastructure and public facilities. 
Through building high-profile mega-projects, Songjiang New Town established its 
new identity as an ideal suburban place to live. In this way, despite non-residential 
development and traditional suburban living ideals often causing political tension 
in (post)-suburban governance (Teaford, 1997), suburban developments in 
Songjiang effectively achieved a balanced approach between economic 
development and the provision of collective consumption.  
In the end, the development of Songjiang New Town witnessed the 
emergence of pro-growth coalitions among a wide variety of actors. Unlike the 
situation in Western countries, however, as the de facto owner of the land, the 
state has great political and financial capacities. Coalitions were organised around 
land development at the local level. The local government set up its development 
corporations to manage land development and make money from leasing land on 
its behalf. As the development of the mega-projects illustrates, these corporations 
engaged in and formed coalitions with various actors to construct mega-projects 





and promote land prices, thus attracting public service sectors by offering free 
serviced land, co-investing in transport infrastructure with the municipality, 
developing partnerships with private real estate capital, and in the process, 
acquiring bank loans involving various financial institutions. The increase in land 
prices not only created a rent gap and produced large amounts of local revenue, 
but also helped the government to access more capital and obtain more loans. 
Beyond the district level, however, the municipality manipulated the entire 
process. It strategically selected Songjiang as the key site for its suburban project, 
made favourable institutional arrangements and also directly invested in the 
development of mega-projects. The suburban regime of China is thus built around 
a local growth coalition manipulated by the municipality.  
All in all, the entrepreneurial governments successfully initiated unparalleled 
growth in Songjiang. On the one hand, land development opens another conduit 
for capital accumulation. On the other hand, the manufacturing sector continues to 
contribute substantially to local growth. This growth pattern, however, determined 
a heterogeneous composition of Songjiang’s population. On the one hand, the 
manufacturing-based production system relied on a stable, low-cost labour force 
that was unable to afford the increasingly expensive properties. On the other hand, 
the land- and consumption-based capital accumulation aims to attract capital elites 
and the urban affluent. These two newly-arrived populations joined with the local 
natives to constitute the main groups of residents in Songjiang. The next chapter 
will focus on how these groups and their residential choices drove and affected the 
growth of Songjiang.  






MOVING TO THE SUBURBS: DEMAND-SIDE 
DRIVING FORCES OF SUBURBAN GROWTH 
6.1 Introduction 
No individual factor brought about China’s rapid suburban growth. 
Institutional changes, particularly the introduction of a land leasing system and 
fiscal decentralisation, have together offered great incentives for the local 
governments and various agents to undertake large-scale suburban development. 
Without pent-up demand for new housing on the urban edge, however, recent 
suburban expansion would not occur on such a mass scale. The newly-arrived 
residents and their preferences are also significant influences shaping the suburbs.  
Demand-led forces, if there were any, used to be very weak. In the 
pre-reform era, a set of rigid institutions, including the work-unit system (danwei) 
and household registration system (hukou), had greatly prevented suburban 
growth. There was therefore little urban–rural interaction in the suburban and 
peri-urban areas. On the other hand, urban-biased policies made central cities the 
more favourable place to live. Living in the city with an urban registration status 
meant a steady job, higher wages and better benefits, as well as a full range of 
living facilities and services provided by work units.  Later, although the launch 
of land reform had greatly promoted urban development and city rebuilding, it did 
little to improve the attractiveness of the suburbs. Earlier suburbanisation was by 
and large a government-led process, characterised by government-subsidised 
residential development and industrial relocation (Zhou and Ma, 2000). The 





image of the periphery remained as acres of farmland lacking infrastructure and 
other living facilities for urban life. Consequently, urban residents were unwilling 
to move out.  The common saying in Shanghai was ‘preferring a bed in Puxi (the 
central city) to a house in Pudong (the suburbs)’ (Wang and Zhou, 1999).  
Since 2000, three important factors have made the idea of living in the 
suburbs possible, appropriate, or even desirable: a) the relaxation of urban 
population control and the abandonment of the welfare housing allocation system; 
b) the rise of consumer culture; c) changes in the suburbs themselves. First and 
foremost, people are now free to choose where they live and how to live. While 
millions of migrants have flocked to large cities for opportunities, an increasing 
number of better-off families have moved to and live in their dream houses in the 
suburbs. In the meantime, urban residents are experiencing a consumer revolution 
with an overall improvement of disposable personal incomes and living standards 
(Davis, 2000). In search of their dream home, people begin to consider elements 
beyond mere basic housing needs, including comfort, privacy, safety, and 
symbolic significance. Finally, the suburbs themselves have been turned into 
better place to live by massive investment in housing and infrastructure 
construction on the periphery. The burden of commuting to jobs in the central city 
has been greatly eased by newly-built highways and metro links. Other obstacles 
such as a lack of living facilities and other services are being progressively 
mitigated. Added to this are the great marketing efforts made by the governments 
and developers.  Moving to the suburbs now means lower house prices, a larger 
living space and a better environment. Many suburban gated communities are 
even packaged as Western suburbia to meet homebuyers’ demands for a good life 
(Wu, 2010).  
Housing consumption and residential preferences are regarded as a 
significant driving force for suburbanisation in Western countries. Existing studies 
now indicate that, alongside the increase in housing reform, some of these 
elements have become increasingly apparent in current suburban development in 





China. Nevertheless, there has long been a perception that suburbanisation in 
China can by no means be based primarily on lifestyle choices by more affluent 
people (Zhou and Logan, 2008: 156). The heterogeneity of the Chinese suburbs 
has been widely noted. For example, Zhou and Logan (2008) state that high-end 
gated communities, apartment developments for working class people and migrant 
villages coexist in the suburbs. However, the driving forces of demand underlying 
such spatial heterogeneity are still not clear and there is a lack of empirical studies 
on this topic. Several questions need to be answered: who are the suburbanites, 
what has driven them to move to the suburbs, and what are the mechanisms 
leading to spatial differentiation? Drawing upon a survey undertaken in Songjiang, 
this chapter addresses this gap of knowledge.  
 
6.2 An overview of growth dynamics 
6.2.1 Population growth, booming housing market and structural 
change 
Songjiang enjoyed the largest population growth among all the districts in 
Shanghai during 2000 to 2010, as its population rose by 146.8% from 0.64 million 
to 1.58 million. Moreover, the growth reflects an intensive urbanisation. By the 
end of 2010, more than 1.34 million residents, representing 85.0% of the total, 
were living in urban settlements. Accompanying this unparalleled growth was an 
ever booming housing market. Since the launch of the new town project, 
Songjiang has not only witnessed continuous hikes in real estate investment, but 
also continuous increases in housing prices in both primary and second housing 
markets (Table 6.1). For example, despite ups and downs during the last ten years, 
capital investment in the real estate industry, and sales in both primary and second 
housing markets, have all maintained very high average annual growth rates of 
30.64%, 38.73% and 44.15% respectively.  
 


























































2001 1.846 643,400 341,400 - - - - 0.569 - - 
2002 3.732 995,900 993,800 4.247 4,273 250,900 - 0.698 194,000 - 
2003 5.945 2,145,800 2,876,500 10.494 3,648 485,400 2.831 1.202 112,300 2.97% 
2004 7.99 1,469,100 2,620,700 13.55 5,170 873,000 4.33 1.63 162,400 3.52% 
2005 12.535 3,003,700 2,428,500 12.642 5,205 1,127,000 4.66 2.527 237,300 3.59% 
2006 11.6 3,525,000 2,937,100 16.879 5,746 1,146,000 2.936 2.687 976,100 12.20% 
2007 10.06 3,353,000 4,423,200 10.609 2,398 563,600 6.311 3.711 1,116,100 11.29% 
2008 10.9 1,658,000 1,668,100 16.226 9,727 1,011,000 5.837 3.262 851,300 9.97% 
2009 12.859 2,300,000 3,210,800 36.411 11,340 754,000 16.191 4.354 741,000 10.14% 
2010 15.111 2,036,700 1,821,100 24.259 13,321 2,018,000 16.296 4.062 710,800 11.86% 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate 
30.64% 25.81% 46.97% 38.73% 39.95% 46.86% 44.15% 27.18% - - 
* Vacancy rate = total vacant floor area of each year/total completed floor area in the last three years 
Source: compiled from Songjiang District Statistical Bulletin of National Economic and Social Development 2001-2010, Shanghai Songjiang 
Statistical Bureau; Analysis of Real Estate Market during the Eleventh-Five-Year-Plan period and Reflection on its development for the 
Twelfth-Five-Year-Plan  period, Internal report of Songjiang Housing Support and Management Bureau, December, 2009





Rapid population growth and a prosperous property market were by no 
means driven by a single force.  As Chapter 5 analysed, the local state has 
managed to build Songjiang based on two mutually-reinforcing accumulation 
systems, one based on manufacturing and the other based on land-development. 
Correspondingly, the development of Songjiang involves four interwoven 
processes: industrial restructuring,  outwards-migration, urbanisation, and 
capitalisation. Each results from both institutional change as well as individual 
choice, creating a prosperous yet heterogeneous suburban landscape.  
 
6.2.2 Industrial restructuring 
The first process is the economic growth of the whole metropolitan area, 
which has brought about a massive surge in jobs and attracted an influx of 
migrants. In Songjiang a total of 802,179 new migrants arrived between 2000 and 
2010, representing 85.23% of the total population growth during this period
12
. 
Two dynamic processes are included; the first is the self-sustaining rise of 
Songjiang itself based on industrial growth, while the other is underpinned by 
overspill effects of the service economy in the central city. On the one hand, an 
extensive establishment of labour-intensive industries has created large numbers 
of manufacturing jobs, which in turn have brought about an influx of migrant 
workers. In 2010, the contribution of the manufacturing industry to the growth 
rate of Songjiang’s GDP climbed as high as 73.4%3. By July 2011, there were a 
total of 1,362 manufacturing enterprises above a designated size in Songjiang
4
, of 
which 693 were in the five flagships of the local economy, namely electrical and 
                                                          
1
 It is notable that not all migrant workers living in Songjiang work there as well, as many go to 
work in nearby suburban districts.  
2
 Interpretation Series of 2010 Census Data of Songjiang, 11
st 
May 2011, see 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/, accessed on 21
st
, September, 2011 
3
 Analysis of Songjiang’s industrial economy in 2010, 3rd March 2011, see 
www.tjj.songjiang.gov.cn, accessed on 21
st
 September 2011 
4
 Since 2011, enterprises above a designated size are defined as all state-owned enterprises and 
those non-state-owned enterprises with a sales volume above 20 million Yuan.  





electronics, machine building, new materials, the biomedical industry and the 
chemical industry. In total, all of the manufacturing enterprises provided 202, 828 
jobs, about 85% of the total employees in the district
5
. For example, the largest 
employee in Songjiang is Quanta Computer Incorporated (QCI), which is a 
Taiwan-based manufacturer of notebook computers and other electronic hardware, 
and the worlds’ largest laptop OEM/ODM manufacturer. In 2010, QCI alone 
contributed half of the total industrial output in Songjiang and provided more than 
40,000 manufacturing jobs
6
. Most of these workers were migrants from inland 
rural areas. In general, migrant workers in Songjiang have been denied access to 
homeownership. New commodity houses are priced out of their affordability 
range. They either reside in dormitories built by the factories, or find low-rent 
homes in nearby old towns and villages. The result was an ever high demand in 
the rental market.  
On the other hand, a booming service economy in the central city has not 
only provided numerous opportunities, but also created great housing demand in 
peripheral areas where rapid access to the centre is available. Unlike the 
rural-to-urban migrant workers, this group of new arrivals to the city are often 
upwardly-mobile, young university graduates who have an advantageous position 
in the labour market and have managed to acquire a decent job in professional 
services or government agencies. They are forming the so-called ‘new 
Shanghainese’ by buying into one housing unit of their own. Furthermore, there 
are also many institutions making homeownership necessary. For example, 
migrants’ children will not be enrolled in public schools unless they have a family 
hukou, tied with the address of their own houses. In terms of residential choices, 
however, due to a severe housing shortage and ever-climbing prices in the centre, 
their opportunities to own desirable apartments in the city are limited. It is much 
easier for them to purchase properties in the suburbs.  
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 Statistic Analysis of Songjiang’s Labour Wage in 2010, 8th March 2011, See 
www.tjj.songjiang.gov.cn, accessed on 21
st
 September  2011 
6
 See the official site of Quanta East Manufacturing City www.quantacn.com 






Since intensive infrastructure construction and marketing by the state has 
successfully shifted the suburbs into a better place to live (see Chapter five), the 
second driver of Songjiang’s growth is housing demand that is led by better-off 
families’ consumption demands. This is an opposite effect from the first. Whereas 
migrants are drawn by the glory and opportunities of the big city, some urban 
residents are attempting to escape from its negative aspects. Although suburbs as 
a desirable living environment lacks roots in China, in order to accommodate the 
style of consumption, the government and real estate developers have successfully 
changed people’s perception through intensive marketing and advertising 
campaigns. Suburban housing estates are now heavily invested with a new 
mainstream standard of aesthetic and domestic consumption.  
Notably, Songjiang New Town is built to represent such a 
consumption-centred lifestyle. In effect, its attraction draws out both local 
residents from the old downtown of Songjiang and those from central Shanghai. 
On the one hand, it is interesting that the local middle class such as civil servants 
constitute the major market for the estates in the new town, which has often been 
regarded as a key factor for the success of the whole project. For instance some 
developers originally targeted residents in inner areas such as Minhang and Xuhui 
and intensively advertised their estates in those districts. But it turned out that the 
local market itself was large enough (Interview D4, D5 and D6). On the other 
hand, the 2011 census data shows that 69,801 people in Songjiang are residents 
from the central city, of which 55,250 arrived in the last ten years. Some were 
displaced by inner-city redevelopment projects. Yet, at the same time, many 
middle- to upper-class families bought high-end estates in the suburbs as their 
second home where they spend their holidays. For these people, it is precisely the 
ideal of a quiet and green life only found in suburbs that has drawn them to 
Songjiang.  






Moreover, the new arrivals mentioned above were joined by local landless 
farmers. Urbanisation releases land and labour for industrial and property 
development, providing preconditions for both accumulation systems. It is a 
process in which state intervention is significant. Land expropriation and a policy 
package of ‘nong zhuan fei’ (literally, turning agricultural to non-agricultural 
status) provided the tools to urbanise the rural areas. In most cases, the district 
government could acquire the collectively-owned land by offering compensation 
packages to the collective authorities and landless farmers. For example, as 
compensation for the loss of their land, each household could either receive a 
one-off lump sum payment or buy one or two apartments in central villages at a 
price lower than the market value. Afterwards, landless farmers would not only be 
registered as urban residents, but also obtain a social security account contributed 
by the government. With their compensation payments, many families bought into 
new commodity houses in the new town or nearby townships. Meanwhile, young 
people found new means of livelihood there. In this way, vast areas of land were 
cleared to allow industry and urban development. Over the last ten years, the 
proportion of local non-agricultural population to the total local population has 
increased from 30.58% to 80.59%
7
. Willing or not, many rural families have 
moved to urban settlements and started living an urban life.  
 
6.2.5 Capitalisation 
Rather than consumer demand, the fourth factor for the growth of the 
housing market in Songjiang is the demand of capital investment, which is often 
ignored and has been less examined. Featuring specific qualities, the sale price 
and rent level of a particular property are not only determined by the relationship 
between supply and demand in the market, but also greatly influenced by the 
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 2011 census data.  





comparative advantages of its locality. Therefore, expectations around the future 
changes which may take place in a location, and may hence expedite an increase 
in property price, attract investment capital into the market and lead to speculation. 
As Songjiang is a government-led project with continuous investment in 
transportation, this is sufficient cause to ensure a rise in anticipation. The 
statement by one developer significantly reflects the thought of the investors who 
bet their money on Songjiang, ‘when coming to invest in Songjiang, we didn’t 
worry much about risks. It was supported by the government and all 
infrastructures had been fully equipped.  We did not even put much effort into 
marketing and sales as we felt all would be easily sold’ (interview D5).  
Nevertheless, there were several other conditions on the demand side that 
made Songjiang’s estates a hot investment choice; the first was the developers’ 
aspirations. Before 2005, the minimum capital requirements for entering the real 
estate market were quite low. Not only were developers able to easily access large 
sums of money at low interest rates, but homebuyers could also purchase 
commodity housing with a deposit of only 20-30% or even 0%
8
. Real estate 
became a key rising industry, giving rise to the emergence of a large number of 
new private development enterprises. Nevertheless, potential and opportunities 
were not evenly distributed. For one thing, ever-increasing land prices made 
building in the centre a high-cost investment. For another, because redevelopment 
projects were often proprietary to state-owned or large-scale developers with good 
connections to the government, small-scale developers had limited access to land 
in advantageous locations. For these reasons, minor developers were pushed out 
to the periphery, spurring an upsurge in suburban real estate development.  
The second wave of intensive investment started up when the central state 
input four trillion Yuan to sustain economic growth in response to the global 
financial crisis in 2009. This time, housing developers were joined by many 
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 See ‘zero down payments opened in Shanghai construction bank’, Liberation Daily, 28th July, 
2000.  





private industrial owners and middle-class families. In the face of an increasingly 
difficult situation in the export market, many owners of private manufacturing 
factories found Shanghai’s booming property market to be a low-risk way of 
making profits and preserving the value of their assets. For example, the average 
transaction price of housing in Shanghai jumped by 108.35% from 10,079 
yuan/m
2
 to 21,000 yuan/m
2
 in two years
9
. This means if a buyer bought an 
apartment of 100m
2 
with a down payment of 300,000 in early 2009, he/she could 
have sold the house for 2,000,000 Yuan by the end of 2010. Even after paying off 
the mortgage and extra interest to the bank, it is a more reliable and profitable 
business than manufacturing production. Therefore, many manufacturing 
enterprises in the surrounding provinces obtained bank loans in the name of 
boosting production, but then spent the money on properties in Shanghai. The 4 
trillion credit plan was thus widely blamed as the main factor for the dramatic 
increase of property values throughout 2009 to 2010. Almost around the same 
time, the overheating economy resulted in high inflationary pressures in the 
country. With few investment options, property has become a primary store of 
wealth. Millions of middle class families rushed to purchase their second or third 
houses as a hedge against inflation. As non-professional investors without large 
amounts of money, both groups are drawn to the suburban housing market. 
Compared with investment in expensive apartments in the centre, the threshold of 
entry is relatively low, the return is quicker, and the capacity for price increase is 
larger. Some investors bought small units to rent out, others just left their houses 
empty for a while and then soon sold them on at a better price.   
Based on all the analysis above, three groups are identified as being 
connected to Songjiang’s prosperity:  migrants from other places, residents from 
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 See ‘Shanghai’s Housing market in 2009: retrospect and prospect’, published report of Chinese 
Index Research Institute, 18
th
 January, 2010 (http://esf.soufun.com/loan/newsdetail/3034309.htm, 
accessed on 1
st, October, 2010); ‘Shanghai’s Housing market in 2009: retrospect and outlook’, 
published report of DTZ (a global real estate advisor), 27
th
 December, 2010 
(http://wenku.baidu.com/view/017f12e69b89680203d825e2.html, accessed on 1
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the central city and local Songjiangnese. Additionally, there is the demand of 
middle-class investment capital which directly results from a depressed export 
market and unmanageable inflation. Properties as pure investment, however, 
rightly provide a private rental market for migrants. In spatial terms, the 
multiple-dimension of structural changes and a growing and diverse population 
have created an increasingly crowded, yet heterogeneous Songjiang. It is 
established that, in order to satisfy their unique housing needs and preferences, 
different groups tend to gravitate towards different types of housing and locations. 
Suburban communities are hence developed with different features, and the next 
section goes on to explain how. 
 
6.3 Spatial differentiation 
6.3.1 Housing types: villas versus apartments 
As a formal development, Songjiang New Town is deliberately designed as a 
packaged suburbia featuring aesthetic landscapes, all-around amenities and a 
high-quality environment. Self-led informal development, known as urban 
villages and widely found in peri-urban areas, is almost absent here. Housing 
development in Jiuting and Sijing is less guided and controlled by government-led 
master plans. Urban villages coexist with formally-developed commodity houses. 
However, for the purpose of comparison, only formally-developed estates built 
after the year of 2000 are considered. Therefore, two major types of housing are 
identified, which contrast with each other in both spatial forms and social groups 
(Figure 6.1).  
Firstly, single-family houses have emerged to distinguish the suburbs from 
the central city. Most villas were built into gated communities, featuring spacious 
rooms and decorative styles; but while single-family homes are accessible to the 
middle-class in Western countries, villas in Songjiang are solely an upscale 
market for the elite. To cater to their tastes, most villa estates are located far from 





crowded urban areas and mass transit, hidden in fields where idyllic scenery is 
still well preserved for their privilege and status. However, these communities do 
not have many permanent residents. This is firstly because elites still have 
businesses in the city and are urban-based, so many villas merely serve as second 
homes or holiday resorts. Moreover, a large proportion of buyers have bought 
villas purely as investments. As there is a limited rental market for these luxurious 
and spacious houses, most houses remain vacant for a long time. Led by a number 
of flagship master-planned communities, Songjiang’s villa development stands 
out among others in Shanghai (Table 6.2). Since 2001, the total floor areas of 
villas have always occupied more than 20% of the total estates in Songjiang. The 
location quotients of villa development in Songjiang have remained above at least 
5.0, indicating the quantity of villas here were far greater than the average level of 
Shanghai. By the end of 2009, the total floor area of villas still accounted for 
about 18.87% of total houses in Songjiang.  
 
 









Total Villa Percentage Total Villa Percentage 
2001 234,750 4,430 1.89% 5,050 1,220 24.16% 12.80 
2002 269,060 5,800 2.16% 6,300 1,220 19.37% 8.98 
2003 305,600 9,410 3.08% 18,150 3,660 20.17% 6.55 
2004 352,112 12,959 3.68% 23,564 5,474 23.23% 6.31 
2005 379,970 13,800 3.63% 26,110 6,050 23.17% 6.38 
2006 408,565 14,640 3.58% 24,761 4,689 18.94% 5.28 
2007 432,840 16,390 3.79% 28,420 5,510 19.39% 5.12 
2008 471,955 18,011 3.82% 30,718 6,045 19.68% 5.16 
2009 502,106 19,352 3.85% 33,964 6,411 18.87% 4.90 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2001-2010 
 








Figure 6.1 Low-density villa and high-density apartment developments in 
Songjiang.  









Furthermore, middle- to high-rise apartments, which are not common in 
Western suburbs, are widely spread. Guided by the one-city-nine-towns project, 
earlier development in Songjiang was dominated by low-density villa and 
high-end estates, which, however, were widely criticised for their incorrect market 
orientation and ignorance of genuine local demand. Alongside restrictions on 
detached villa development introduced by the government in 2003, apartment 
projects began to increase and became the dominant form. By the end of 2010, 
among all the houses under construction, the units of high-rise buildings, 
middle-rise buildings and villas accounted for 45%, 26.7% and 11.05% of total 
construction respectively, so it is noticeable that the proportion of apartments had 
greatly increased
10
. Unlike villas, apartment developments are not dissimilar to 
those already existing in the central areas. Moreover, while villa developments 
target the extremely rich, the apartment market shows greater diversity and 
emphasises product differentiation. In general, whereas high-rise small-unit 
apartments are clustered along the metro line to attract those employed in the 
centre, middle-rise estates are often seated near parks and amenities and are 
targeted at better-off families. Some projects deliberately mix apartments and 
townhouses together, aiming to capture niche markets of middle-income families.  
Besides, more commonly than villas, many apartments that were bought as 
property investments have been rented out, fitting perfectly with migrants’ high 
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  Analysis of Real Estate Market during the Eleventh-Five-Year-Plan period and a Reflection on 
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6.3.2 Differentiation within the district: whiter-collar commuter 
suburb, migrant worker suburb and suburban new town  
On a larger scale, spatial unevenness is evidenced by the differences between 
three main urban areas in the district
11
. Table 6.3 compares their developments. In 
the north-eastern corner of Songjiang, Jiuting is nearest to the central city and is 
also the first stop of No. 9 Metro Line entering Songjiang from Shanghai. It was 
once merely a small township until it was formally promoted as an administrative 
town in 1993. However, Jiuting grew most rapidly in the last ten years, with its 
population increasing from 50,507 in 2000 to 253,110 in 2010. Being the closest 
site to Shanghai city, it became one of the hottest real estates in Shanghai as early 
as the late 1990s.  This first wave of the building boom was largely spurred by 
the arrival of residents from the central city, who were displaced by downtown 
redevelopment projects. From then on, big real estate developers from Shanghai, 
one after another, came to Jiuting, turning large tracts of land into middle- to 
high-rise housing blocks. At the time, the town’s government could not afford 
large-scale investment in infrastructure, but the developers were willing to 
construct all supporting facilities themselves. Therefore, housing development in 
Jiuting was less regulated by the government. Private developers exerted 
considerable influence. Although the local government originally planned to 
develop low-density villas, the site was soon occupied by high-rise buildings. 
Today, Jiuting is notable as a dormitory for young, migrant professionals and their 
families. Nevertheless, as its growth is more of a chaotic expansion of the central 
area, Jiuting now suffers greatly from under-provision of amenities and services, 
and problems of congestion.  
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 According to 2005 Songjiang New Town Readjustment Master Plan, Songjiang New Town 
comprises one major urban area and two other large urban clusters Jiuting and Sijing. In the 
revised version published in 2011, it is admitted that the other two towns should not be included, 
as they are hardly an integral part of the main area in terms of function. Nevertheless, because the 
three do indeed represent one of the largest urban areas in Songjiang, this research continues to 
focus on all of the three as main study areas.  





Table 6.3 Comparison between three main urban areas in Songjiang 
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Unlike Jiuting, Sijing was a traditional watery town with a history of more 
than 1,000 years, but it has only started growing in the last six or seven years. 
Being farther away from Shanghai and in the middle of No.9 Metro Line, the 
town has been less affected by overspill either from the central city or the 
Songjiang New Town. Its development has relatively lagged behind. 
Underdevelopment, however, made it suitable for luxury villa developments. The 
first commodity housing project in Sijing, ‘Liyin Villa’, was funded by a locally 
based real estate developer in 2004. This was then followed by the construction of 
‘Beyond the Clouds’, ‘Silver-lake Villa’, ‘Jewel Villa’, all of which were 
high-end, single-family villa developments. Things changed soon after the 
opening of No.9 Metro Line. Firstly, thanks to local convenient transportation and 
relatively cheap land, the municipality placed one of its resettlement and 
affordable housing projects in the town. Secondly, real estate developers began to 
discover the new market potential of Sijing. Plots along the new metro line were 
soon developed into high-rise buildings with small unit apartments. Although the 
local government disapproved of these changes, it seemed incapable of 
controlling the trend. As the Deputy Mayor of Sijing commented,  
Sijing should be only for villa development, and for the rich. But it is all 
out of our control, you know. For the affordable housing project, it is 
politics. The municipality took our land almost for free, but sent us only 
the poor and the elderly.  For those newly-built-up apartments, it 
follows totally market logic. Mass transit comes and then the population 
spills over here (Interview G5). 
High-density developments have soon led to a rapid increase of population in 
Sijing. By the end of 2010, the town had already received 94,279 inhabitants, an 
increase of more than 222% from the number in 2000. It is widely predicted that 
Sijing will soon become another Jiuting in the next few years. Spurred by this 
anticipation, newly-built apartments have also drawn large amounts of private 
investment. However, at present, many of these properties are rented to migrants 





working nearby. As a result, the town has witnessed an influx of migrants, 
particular unskilled workers or odd-job people, which make up more than 80% of 
its current total population.  
Lastly, Fangsong represents precisely where the new town project is located. 
Bordering the north end of the old town of Songjiang, the area in which it now sits 
was once under the jurisdiction of three different town governments. The three 
governments were closed down and replaced by a street office under direct control 
of the district government. As elaborated in Chapter five, the whole urban area 
was master-planned and built up with a nice living environment and aesthetic 
landscapes. By 2010, there were a total of 161,438 inhabitants distributed 
throughout more than 70 real estates and one administrative village. In terms of 
incoming residents, a large proportion of its residents are native Songjiangnese, 
either from the old downtown or from surrounding small towns and rural areas. 
Compared with Jiuting and Sijing, Fangsong’s housing market involves more 
speculative investment. As explained by a real estate consultant, a range of 
favourable factors such as the university town project, No.9 Metro Line and 
intensive marketing campaigns gave rise to an overly optimistic anticipation of 
increased housing demand. Although houses were sold quickly after completion, 
most were bought for the purpose of speculation. However, the second housing 
market did not flourish as expected afterwards. It was not until 2007-2008 that 
permanent residents gradually began to increase (interview E4).  
 
6.4 Heterogeneous Songjiang: empirical evidence 
Based on the above observation and analysis, it is clear that the 
demand-based growth dynamics of Songjiang are multidimensional. There are 
three major groups that have come to reside in Songjiang: local natives, residents 
from the central city and migrants from other places. They appear to have 
different housing needs and preferences, and hence choose to live in different 
types of communities and districts, which in turn lead to a heterogeneous spatial 





pattern. Based on a questionnaire survey conducted with residents in Songjiang, 
this section empirically examines these assumptions, further explaining the factors 
driving people to Songjiang and the forms of spatial differentiation.  
 
6.4.1 Data and method 
The survey covered all three main urban areas in Songjiang and has 
generated a random cluster sample of 393 face-to-face questionnaires in total. The 
sampling method was explained in Chapter three (see section 3.3.3). For the 
purpose of the research, rather than their current Hukou location, all households 
are categorised into three groups according to their origin before they moved to 
Songjiang. Firstly, overall comparisons of the three groups are conducted through 
ANOVA analysis or Pearson’s Chi-square test. Secondly, multinomial logistic 
regression analysis is applied to test spatial sorting of the three groups and the 
resultant spatial differentiations. In the models, the outcome variables are 
categorical variables, and the model is used to test to which of the categories a 
household is likely to belong, given certain other information. Specifically, the 
outcome variable of the first model is the place of origin, examining whether the 
identity of a household to a certain group is associated with the housing type and 
the place they live. The second model uses the housing type as its outcome 
variable, testing the probability of a household presenting in villas versus 
apartments, and hence identifying the differences between the households in 
different housing types. In the third model, the outcome variable is the district. It 
addresses how different attributes of a household would influence the chance of 
the family living in different districts. For each model, there are three sets of 
variables in total. The first set is socio-demographic variables, including age, 
educational attainment and income, origin of place, Hukou classification, housing 
tenure and car ownership. The second set is variables concerning residential 
mobility. One is related to push factors affecting the residential moves, whereas 
the other is the pull factor that has attracted the residents to their present houses. 





And the last includes spatial-related variables, namely housing types and districts. 
Furthermore, qualitative analysis based on interviews with realtors and staff in 
residential committees, as well as different types of residents is also used to help 
explain the quantitative results and uncover residents’ housing demands and 
residential choices.  
 
6.4.2 Socioeconomic profiles 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the socioeconomic profiles of the three groups. The 
latter is the result of a one-way ANOVA analysis on age, and the former is the 
result of Pearson’s chi-square test on other categorical socioeconomic variables. 
Overall, except for monthly family income and car ownership, all other aspects 
are disproportionately distributed among the three. Migrant people are essentially 
different from the other two groups. This group, as expected, are more likely to be 
young and single or married, but separated from their spouses. About 30% are still 
registered as agricultural hukou, while the percentages of local natives and those 
from Shanghai total no more than 5%. In terms of educational attainment, the 
proportion of people with higher education within the migrant group is only 
23.8%, in contrast to the local group’s 39.9% and Shanghainese group’s 41.4%. 
From an economic viewpoint, it would appear to be more difficult for migrants to 
enter into public sector and state-owned enterprises. Moreover, their access to 
homeownership seems to be limited. About two-fifth of migrants lived in rental 
housing, while about 96% of the local natives and 98.6% of residents from central 
Shanghai were homeowners. Nevertheless, it is notable that the proportion of 
high-income families in the migrant group is no less than in the other groups. This 
is because not all migrants are unskilled workers. This group also includes 
well-educated migrant professionals and wealthy investors running businesses in 
Shanghai.  
Local natives and those from Shanghai are similar in many aspects. Both 
groups are dominated by people with urban Hukou registration. About half have 





formal jobs in public sectors and state-owned enterprises and most are 
homeowners. Notably, however, a large number of local natives were originally 
farmers. Although they have their own houses in urban areas, with limited 
education attainment and skills it might not be easy for them to find new 
livelihoods. Therefore, local natives have the highest proportion of low-level 
educational attainment and low-income households.  
 











Single 4.7 4.3 20.2 11.4 
χ2  =26.040 
p<0.001 
Married and living 
together 
91.2 92.9 73.2 83.7 
Married but 
separated 
4.1 2.9 6.5 4.9 
Educational 
attainment 
Primary and below 22.3 4.3 19.6 17.9 
χ2  =23.143 
p<0.001 
Secondary 37.8 54.3 56.5 49 
Tertiary 39.9 41.4 23.8 33.2 
Hukou 
classification 
Non-agricultural 94.6 97.2 70.2 84.5 χ2  =46.315 
p<0.001 Agricultural 5.4 2.8 29.8 15.5 
Employer 
type 
Public sector 29.8 28.4 7.9 19.8 
χ2  =59.237 
p<0.001 
SOE/COE 25.5 32.8 12.1 20.9 
Private/Foreign/Joint 
venture  enterprise 
28.4 28.4 46.1 36.2 
Private business 
owner 
5.0 7.5 12.7 8.8 
Others 11.3 3.0 21.2 14.2 
Monthly 
income 
<5,000 47.0 37.9 38.0 41.5 
--- 
5,000-9,000 30.2 30.3 36.7 33.1 
10,000-19,999 13.4 16.7 13.3 13.9 
20,000 9.4 15.2 12.0 11.5 
Housing 
tenure 
Own 96.0 98.6 59.6 80.8 χ2  =84.209 
p<0.001 Rent 4.0 1.4 40.4 19.2 
Car 
ownership 
Yes 49.1 47.1 38.3 44.0 
--- 
No 51.0 52.9 61.7 56.0 
 
 





Table 6.5 Mean age by groups  
 Group (year) Total 
Local Shanghai Other places 
Age 44.73 49.55 37.64 42.55 
 
One-way ANOVA   (Levene=3.068, p<0.5) 
Overall effects: Welch F=22.019, p<0.000 
Contrasts T-value Significance (two-tailed) 
(Local and Shanghai) Vs Other places 6.648 p<0.001 
Local Vs Shanghai 2.281 p<0.05 
 
 
6.4.3 Residential mobility 
Residential moves are usually driven by two kinds of factors: push and pull.  
Push factors refer to those giving rise to the imperative for a move. In China, 
many involuntary moves are not motivated by residents’ own will. For example, 
when farmers are forced to give up their land or inner-city residents have to leave 
their previous houses when the place they used to stay is selected to undergo 
(re)development projects. Meanwhile, with the establishment of the housing 
market, voluntary moves are increasingly dominant. There are two common push 
factors driving these moves. One is related to important events in a person’s life 
history, i.e. marriage or a change in job. The other is housing consumption factors 
that are often associated with people’s aspirations to improve their living 
conditions.  
Table 6.6 displays the cross-tabulation between push factors and the three 
groups of residents. Accordingly, push factors are categorised into four groups, 
namely involuntary, life-related, housing-consumption and other voluntary factors. 
The results suggest that, with regard to both local natives and central 
Shanghainese, although voluntary moves dominate there are still a fair number of 
involuntary moves. However, both local natives and those from central Shanghai 
were more likely to move to achieve better living conditions. On the contrary, the 





migrant group are less concerned with housing consumption factors, and their 
moves are more likely to be triggered by life-related changes.  
 
Table 6.6 Push factors for residential mobility for three groups 
Push factors Group (%) Total 
(%) 
χ2 
significance Local Shanghai Other 
places 
Involuntary 12.8 18.6 4.3 10.2 
χ2  =54.171 
p<0.001 
Life-related 31.8 24.3 65.0 44.6 
Housing-consumption 51.4 50.0 25.8 40.2 
Other voluntary 
factors 
4.1 7.1 4.9 5.0 
 
Pull factors are the particular attractions of a certain locality or estate. 
Respondents were asked to report the most important factor that pulled or 
attracted them to where they live now. Specific attributes are grouped into six 
categories: 1) a good environment; 2) rapid access; 3) employment opportunities; 
4) cheap housing prices; 5) high-quality estate; 6) others. Among these, the first 
four are attractions of Songjiang, whereas number 5 is an attribute of particular 
houses and neighbourhoods. Table 6.7 shows the frequencies of these factors by 
groups.  
Firstly, local natives and those from Shanghai are more 
consumption-oriented. Among respondents in the two groups, those who said they 
moved to Songjiang mainly because of consumption related factors make up the 
largest group. This reflects a transformation of Songjiang itself from a traditional 
industrial suburb into a multifunctional urban settlement. All the endeavours by 
the state and developers have paid off. On the other hand, and importantly, the 
result pinpoints the important role of consumption in bolstering the suburban 
housing market. For many residents, the advantages of the suburbs are space, 
comfort and being close to nature. Many interviewees, not limited to those living 
in high-end villas, talked about the negative features of the centre. ‘Environmental 
degradation in the city is increasingly intolerable. I once counted the total number 





of air conditioning units in a twenty-floor building near where I work, and it 
turned out there were 1,100 in total. So how could air quality be good in a place 
like that!’ (Interview R_S2). ‘The city is noisy and disordered. Sometimes, I even 
feel the ground is shaking which I think should be attributed to excessive 
high-density development, both overground and underground’(Interview R_J1). ‘I 
think that people here could live longer than those in central Shanghai’ (interview 
R_J3). Alternatively, they praised the suburbs for ‘brand new houses suitable for 
modern life’ (Interview R_S2), ‘low-density’ (interview R_F3), as well as the 
natural environment featuring ‘fresh air, green space, singing birds and fragrant 
flowers, just like you were living in a park’ (Interview R_F6).  
 
Table 6.7 Pull factors for residential mobility for three groups 
Pull factors Group (%) Total (%) 
Local Shanghai Other places 
Suburb with a good environment     
A good city plan 7.5 0.0 2.4 3.9 
University Town 1.4 0.0 1.2 1.0 
A good living environment 13.6 14.3 6.1 10.5 
All-around facilities and services 15.7 7.2 6.7 10.2 
Total 38.2 21.5 16.4 25.6 
Rapid access     
No.9 Metro Line 13.6 24.3 15.2 16.3 
Highways 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.8 
Total 15 24.3 15.8 17.1 
Employment opportunities 8.2 11.4 39.0 22.0 
Cheap rent/housing prices 25.2 20.0 18.9 21.5 
high-quality estate     
Distinctive building style 2.7 5.7 1.2 2.6 
A good internal layout 3.4 4.3 0.6 2.4 
Well-known devt company 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.0 
A good investment 1.4 2.9 .6 1.3 
Good privacy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
High status neighbours 3.4 7.1 4.3 4.4 
Total 10.9 20 9.1 11.7 
Others 2.7 2.9 0.6 1.8 
 
 





Migrant people are less likely to be attracted by consumption-oriented factors. 
Instead, work-related factors are of primary importance. The survey data shows 
that 39% of the total number of migrant people reported that they made their 
move mainly for employment opportunities or proximity to their workplace, a far 
greater percentage than that for local natives and central Shanghainese. In many 
cases, a move into homeownership has become the means through which young 
migrants can settle down, further their career and organise their home in Shanghai. 
The statements were revealing: ‘You have to buy a house of your own for the 
purpose of stabilisation and reassurance’ (Interview R_S3). ‘We are different from 
those born in Shanghai. We don’t have others to depend on. Moreover, think 
about the ever increasing housing prices, you would never be able to enjoy a good 
life here if you missed your chance of being a homeowner’ (Interview R_J5). 
Therefore, migrants were more concerned about use value when making 
residential choices. ‘We didn’t consider either living environments or proximity to 
retail and other amenities at all. We merely wanted to find a place to stay in the 
city, and any place would be fine’ (Interview R_S3).  ‘Both my husband and I 
are not that kind of person who care much about face. We don’t care about brand 
or quality either. Practicality is all for us’ (Interview R_J5). For the people 
employed in the central city, living in Songjiang was largely a trade off between a 
good living environment and long commutes, where the former was favoured. ‘No 
matter how tired and depressed after a busy day, when you arrive at your 
comfortable home, it's all worth it!’ (Interview R_J5). 
Rapid access has proven to be another attraction of Songjiang. While mass 
suburbanisation in Western countries was largely facilitated by heavy investment 
in highways and the widespread use of automobiles, in the case of Shanghai it is 
mass transit that has paved the way for massive suburban development. Links to 
the central areas are particularly important to those from central Shanghai. About 
a quarter of this group mentioned No.9 Metro Line as the determinant for their 
residential moves to Songjiang. This indicates their strong connections to the 





centre. For example, interviewees mentioned their strong sense of belonging to 
the place where they used to live. ‘I still go shopping to the markets and stores in 
the city where I used to go. Even vegetables there appear much cleaner and 
fresher’ (Interview R_J1). ‘Too many things are not as good and convenient as 
that of our Shanghai’ (Interview R_J3). In addition, many still had relatives and 
friends in the city and needed to visit the central districts from time to time.  
Finally, for all three groups, about a fifth of people made their moves 
because of cheaper housing/rent prices. Many people are reluctant to leave the 
centre; by large, their contemporary homes are a comprise choice.  When asked 
why they did not choose to live in the city, many interviewees expressed their 
frustration about moving to the periphery. ‘We had no alternative as we could 
afford a decent house in the city at all.’ ‘When I was looking for a property, I even 
dared not to see any unit in the central area. Living in the city is too far beyond 
my reach’ (Interview R_S3).  
 
6.4.4 A model of spatial sorting 
Driven by different motives that cut across a range of socio-economic 
attributes, do suburban inhabitants self-select into particular neighbourhoods and 
places and make up a heterogeneous spatial pattern? Table 6.8 shows the 
distribution of samples among different groups and the housing types they chose, 
as well as the districts in which they settled. A Chi-square test reveals that spatial 
concentrations of three groups are statistically significant. First, compared with 
the other two groups, those from central Shanghai are more likely to live in villas. 
Second, in terms of district concentration, local natives are more concentrated in 










Table 6.8   Distribution of sample by reason to move to Songjiang, 
neighbourhood type and district 





  Local Shanghai Other 
places 
Neighbourhood Villa 3.4 21.1 5.4 21.3 χ
2  
=46.777 
p<0.001 Apartment 96.6 78.9 94.6 78.7 
District Fangsong 47.7 21.1 27.4 34.0 
χ2  =23.663 
p<0.001 
Sijing 26.2 33.8 41.1 32.0 
Jiuting 26.2 45.1 31.5 34.0 
The results of the logistic regression analysis suggest that, when the effects 
of other variables are considered, educational attainment and housing tenure are 
the two variables that have the most significant effects on which group a 
household falls within. Moreover, and importantly, after controlling for these 
attributes, both motivation-related variables and spatial-related variables are 
significant, indicating unique relationships between the household’s place of 
origin and the factors leading to their residential moves, the types of housing in 
which they live and the districts in which they stay (see Table 6.9).  
 
Table 6.9 Spatial sorting of the three groups in Songjiang  
(logistic regression results; outcome variable =place of origin: local; 
Shanghai; other places) 
 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df 
Constant 479.108 0.000 0 
Age 481.916 2.808 2 
Marital status 482.827 3.719 2 
Educational attainment 492.857 13.749** 4 
Hukou classification 484.706 5.598 2 
Employer type 487.257 8.149 8 
Monthly family income 489.949 10.841 6 
Housing tenure 503.069 23.961*** 2 
Car ownership 481.855 2.747 2 
Push factors 498.507 19.399** 6 
Pull factors 489.680 10.572 8 
Housing type 486.617 7.509* 2 
District 502.210 23.102*** 4 





Table 6.10 details the specific effects of each variable on different groups. In 
terms of socio-economic attributes, the three are statistically different in terms of 
educational attainment, monthly family income and housing tenure.  Compared 
to migrant people, both local natives and those from central Shanghai are more 
likely to acquire tertiary education or higher than secondary education. Meanwhile, 
both are more likely to be homeowners, by factors of approximately 9 and 11 
respectively. However, compared to migrants, local natives are more likely to 
have the lowest level of family income; compared to those from central Shanghai, 
their educational attainment is more likely to be only at primary level or below. 
These results confirm our earlier analysis that, of the local natives who bought 
into the new commodity houses, a large number are former farmers. Although 
they have recently become urban residents, they do not have the advantage in the 
labour market of non-agricultural sectors. In contrast, migrant workers with 
secondary education provided the main labour force for industrial production, and 
their income is not necessarily low.   
The three groups are not significantly different from each other when 
life-related cause is compared to housing-consumption as push factors for their 
recent residential moves, although the signs of coefficients imply that migrant 
people are less concerned about housing consumption than the other groups. The 
likelihood of those from central Shanghai being passively displaced, rather than 
actively searching for better living conditions, is significantly greater than migrant 
people, but not higher than local natives. With regard to what attracted residents 
to move to their present location, there are no significant differences among local 
natives and central Shanghainese. Nevertheless, when they are compared to 
migrants, they are less likely to be pulled by work-related factors than the quality 
of the estates. This suggests that migrants are less consumption-oriented.   









Table 6.10 Spatial sorting of the three groups in Songjiang (logistic regression results) 
 
Independent variable 
Local Vs Other places
 a
 Shanghai Vs Other places
 a
 Shanghai Vs Local 
b
 
B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) 
Age  0.006 0.18 1.006 0.031 0.02 1.031 0.024 0.17 1.025 
Marital status (single=1) -1.154 0.645 0.316 -1.089 0.885 0.337 0.065 0.893 1.067 
Educational attainment  (Reference: tertiary)           
Primary  -0.148 0.601 0.863 -1.852 0.878 0.157 -1.705* 0.821 0.182 
Secondary  -0.938* 0.417 0.391 -0.676* 0.493 0.509 0.262 0.461 1.3 
Hukou classification (nonagricultural =1 ) 1.013 0.563 2.753 1.672 1.032 5.321 0.659 1.091 1.933 
Employer type (Reference: others)          
Public sector 0.396 0.63 1.486 1.601 1.072 4.959 1.205 1.053 3.337 
SOE/COE 0.890 0.609 2.434 1.882 1.068 6.567 0.992 1.04 2.697 
Private/Foreign/Joint venture enterprises 0.323 0.545 1.382 1.485 1.016 4.413 1.161 1.012 3.194 
Private business owner -0.576 0.748 0.562 0.232 1.145 1.261 0.808 1.163 2.244 
Monthly Family Income (Baseline: > 20,000)           
<5,000  1.546* 0.646 4.693 0.857 0.805 2.357 -0.689 0.769 0.502 
5,000-10,000  0.323 0.6 1.381 0.204 0.725 1.226 -0.119 0.703 0.888 
10,000-20,000  0.241 0.631 1.272 0.291 0.741 1.337 0.05 0.728 1.051 
Housing tenure (own=1) 2.188*** 0.579 8.921 2.431* 0.992 11.37 0.243 1.089 1.274 
Car ownership(Yes=1)  0.625 0.38 1.869 0.4 0.463 1.491 -0.226 0.422 0.798 









Table 6.10 (continued) 
 
Independent variable 
Local Vs Other places 
a
 Shanghai Vs Other places 
a
 Shanghai Vs Local 
b
 
B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) 
Push factors (Reference: housing-consumption-related reasons)         
Other voluntary reasons -0.165 0.708 0.848 0.204 0.821 1.226 0.369 0.773 1.446 
Involuntary mobility 0.905 0.739 2.473 1.68* 0.808 5.368 0.775 0.627 2.171 
Life-related reasons -1.280 0.388 0.278 -0.449 0.483 0.638 0.831 0.46 2.295 
Pull factors (Reference: quality estates )          
A good environment 0.751 0.614 2.12 -0.054 0.71 0.947 -0.806 0.622 0.447 
Rapid access 0.484 0.66 1.622 -0.065 0.744 0.937 -0.549 0.659 0.578 
Employment opportunities -0.339** 0.679 0.712 -1.012 0.819 0.363 -0.673 0.799 0.51 
Cheap housing/rent prices 0.855 0.629 2.352 -0.34 0.733 0.712 -0.195 0.648 0.303 
Housing type (Luxury villa =1) -0.949 0.937 0.387 1.139 0.807 3.123 2.088* 0.815 8.07 
District (Reference: Fangsong)          
Sijing -1.801*** 0.48 0.165 0.154 0.613 1.166 1.955** 0.582 7.064 
Jiuting -1.108** 0.421 0.33 0.442 0.553 1.555 1.55** 0.511 4.721 
Constant -2.744* 1.213  -7.068*** 1.922  -4.324* 1.914  
 
 









Table 6.10 (continued) 
 
Model statistics          
N 349         
χ2 241.531         
DF 12         
Sig. ρ <0.001         
-2*log likelihood 497.108         
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.499         
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.571         
          
Notes: a. Outcome variable is the place of origin, and the group of migrants from other places is selected as reference 
           b. Outcome variable is the place of origin, and the group of local natives is selected as reference, results of the comparison between local natives and 
migrants are not shown 












After controlling for the effects of other individual-level attributes, different 
groups are found to be sorted into different housing markets and districts, 
demonstrating that multiple growth dynamics have created a heterogeneous 
spatial pattern in Songjiang. Firstly, in terms of housing types, compared to local 
natives, Shanghainese are proved to be about eight times more likely to live in 
high-end villas, if the socioeconomic status holds constant. This result suggests 
that urban elites are indeed leading the way of embracing lifestyles that mimic 
Western middle-class suburbia. Secondly, the model shows an uneven distribution 
of the three groups across the three urban areas, meaning different suburban 
spaces are created by different driving forces of suburbanisation. Local natives 
tend to concentrate in the new town Fangsong, while, in the opposite direction, 
both those from central Shanghai and migrants are highly concentrated in the two 
districts closer to Shanghai. Therefore, while centrifugal pull is emerging here, 
centripetal force remains strong. Although Songjiang New Town was 
well-planned and developed into a high-quality living environment, persuading 
people to move out of the central areas is not easy, particularly into the outer 
metropolitan area. It turns out that the new town has more of a magnetic pull of its 
surrounding areas.  
 
6.4.5 Spatial differentiation I: villas versus apartments 
A logistic regression model on the likelihood of living in villas compared to 
apartments confirms the significant differences between the two (Table 6.11). It is 
evident that households living in villas are more established and are more likely to 
be high income earners, regardless of their educational attainment, employer type 
and Hukou classification. Moreover, as expected, they are all homeowners and 
much more likely to own private cars. When it comes to originality, a similar 
conclusion is reached, that is, people from central Shanghai are more likely than 
local natives to live in villas. The chances between this group and the migrant 
group to live in villas, however, are not significantly different. Overall, these 





results point to the fact that people living in villas are difficult to identify in terms 
of distinctive socio-demographics except for their wealth. According to interviews 
with some staff in residential committees and the homeowner associations of 
some gated villa subdivisions, there are generally three typical types of residents 
(interviews C2, C3 and C4): rich businesspeople from surrounding provinces such 
as Zhejiang and Jiangsu
12
, entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Taiwan who run 
factories or conduct business in Songjiang, and government senior officers. By all 
accounts, it is clear that access to single-family houses in China is still restricted 
to the few privileged families who are upper-class rather than better-off waged 
families. 
 
Table 6.11 Likelihood of living in villas 
 (logistic regression results; y=1 if the household is living in a villa)  
 
Independent B SE Exp (B) 
Age  0.237** 0.074 1.268 
Marital status (single=1) -0.922 17.159 0.398 
Educational attainment  (Reference: tertiary)     
Primary  -0.893 1.873 0.409 
Secondary  0.585 1.114 1.795 
Hukou classification (nonagricultural =1 ) 0.594 1.699 1.811 
Originality (Reference: Shanghai)    
Other places -1.982 1.506 0.138 
Local -3.478* 1.571 0.031 
Employer type (Reference: others)    
Public sector 3.007 2.377 20.229 
SOE/COE 3.128 2.369 22.836 
Private/Foreign/Joint venture enterprises 1.583 1.932 4.87 
Private business owner 3.524 2.021 33.91 
Monthly family income (Baseline: > 20,000)     
<5,000  -9.533** 2.949 0.00 
5,000-10,000  -4.972** 1.771 0.007 
10,000-20,000  -3.369* 1.5 0.035 
                                                          
12
 For example, many residents are from Wenzhou in southern Zhejiang Province. People from 
Wenzhou have a reputation for being good at business. Recently, they shifted their investment 
towards real estate, and have been widely criticised for property speculation in an overheated 
housing market.  





Table 6.11 (continued) 
 
Independent B SE Exp (B) 
Housing tenure (own=1) 21.052*** 0 1.39E+09 
Car ownership(Yes=1)  5.565** 2.001 261.207 
Push factors (Reference: housing-consumption-related reasons) 
Other voluntary reasons -4.222 6.362 0.015 
Involuntary mobility -5.638 4.066 0.004 
Life-related reasons -2.457 1.546 0.086 
Pull factors (Reference: quality estates )    
A good environment -4.576* 1.903 0.1 
Rapid access -3.825 2.667 0.22 
Employment opportunities -3.381 1.906 0.34 
Cheap housing/rent prices -4.449* 1.873 0.12 
District (Reference: Fangsong)    
Sijing 0.623 1.586 1.865 
Jiuting -1.801 1.378 0.165 
Constant -32.662*** 4.491  
    
Model statistics    
N 349   
χ2 128.529   
DF 25   
Sig. ρ <0.001   
-2*log likelihood 42.402   
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.308   
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.796   
    
Notes: *ρ<0.05; ** ρ<0.01; ***ρ<0.001    
 
Another noteworthy commonality of families in villas compared to those 
living in apartments is that they are much more consumption-oriented. Although 
the variable of push factors is not significant after controlling for other variables, 
the model indicates that the odds ratio of moves motivated by 
housing-consumption related factors is very high. An analysis of the pull factors 
also supports this point, which implies that the quality of the estates themselves is 
the most important attraction for the families. Moreover, compared to the majority, 
they are much less concerned about housing prices. As a matter of fact, the survey 
shows that among all the respondents in villas, about 71% of households have 





more than one house in Shanghai. This is statistically different from the families 
in apartments, of whom only about 23.5% have another or more houses 
(χ2=31.039 with 1 degree of freedom, ρ<0.001). Therefore, the villas would appear 
to be less likely to be merely shelter for the residents. The single-family houses 
satisfy their needs for space and comfort. ‘We were considering living together 
with our parents, and villa-style houses are spacious and have enough bedrooms’ 
(Interview R_J2). Some moved to villas out of a desire for an Arcadian lifestyle. 
‘I love single-family style and have always wanted to have a garden of my own. 
With all the things here, the fresh air, the sky, and the earth, our home is a natural 
world of our own’ (Interview R_J1).  Others were attracted by distinctive 
building styles and a particularly Western milieu. ‘We went to see many estates 
nearby, but the design here is stunningly unique. We decided to give up others and 
buy into this community immediately. I have never seen anyone else as nice as 
this in mainland China’ (Interview R_F4). ‘The community and its landscapes just 
remind me of our joyful experiences in foreign countries’ (Interview R_F5).  
Last, but not least, the model suggests that, compared to others, families in 
villas are statistically more concerned with their own neighbourhoods than 
surrounding environments and public facilities. This result reflects that, to a large 
extent, villa communities are like enclaves in the socially-mixed suburbs. The 
survey reveals that residents in villas actually have few local connections, and 
they seldom use local public facilities. Moreover, compared to people in 
apartments, the frequency of their non-working trips to the central districts is 
statistically high. While only 30% of families in apartments stated that they went 
to central Shanghai at least once a week, the result for families in villas is 82.2% 
(χ2=32.118 with 2 degrees of freedom, ρ<0.001). This fact indicates that they 
continue enjoying their life in the city. Meanwhile, complaints about the lack of 
an urban atmosphere and high-quality commercial facilities were common. ‘The 
milieu of local shops is just like those in the 1980s’ (interview R_J3).  ‘We have 
to visit the city frequently mainly because it is difficult to find exquisite 





restaurants nearby’ (Interview R_F4). This is particularly apparent in Sijing and 
Jiuting. People in villas stated that, although they liked their houses, they had 
never been satisfied with the place. ‘Things are awful once you step out of the 
gate, disordered, filthy, and noisy. It appears the town would never rise above its 
rural character’ (Interview R_J1).  
Villa communities are highly homogenous inside the gate. Compared to 
those families in apartments, residents in villas care much more about who their 
neighbours are. In the survey, about 12.9% of respondents in villas reported that 
high quality neighbours are one of the primary reasons they chose their current 
houses, whereas only 3.9% people in apartments mentioned this (χ2=42.923 with 6 
degrees of freedom, ρ<0.001). Nevertheless, the class homogeneity does not mean 
that people value neighbourhood interaction or feel a sense of community. The 
interviewees showed no interest in developing close relationships with their 
neighbours. About 65.5% of respondents in villas stated that they disliked or felt 
indifferent to neighbourhood interaction, whereas the proportion for those in 
apartments is 40% (χ2=7.797, with 1 degree of freedom, ρ<0.01). ‘Here houses are 
all detached from each other. So we have little contact with our neighbours’ 
(Interview R_F4). ‘It is good for me at least. You don’t have to deal with people 
upstairs or downstairs anymore. And you could finally get rid of the gossips and 
disputes’ (Interview R_F6). The pursuit of privacy and exclusivity is most 
apparent in their worries about security. While only 29.7% of respondents in 
apartments ranked access control as the most important property management 
service, the proportion for villa respondents is about 46.9% (χ2=4.034, with 1 











6.4.6 Spatial differentiation II: whiter-collar suburb, migrant 
suburb and suburban new town 
To better understand the differences between the three districts, logistic 
regression analysis using the district as the outcome variable was carried out. 
Overall, the three districts appear to be distinct from one another in the ways that 
were expected (Table 6.12). The results confirm that, when compared to the other 
two districts, Fangsong is a place where local better-off local families concentrate. 
Residents here have statistically greater chances of being local natives and having 
secure jobs in public sectors. Moreover, it is found that Fangsong has more 
high-income families than middle- or low-income ones. As many interviewees 
suggested, to a large degree, it is local better-off families and their housing needs 
that have supported Fangsong’s housing market. More specifically, local civil 
servants constituted the most important customer group of the new houses 
(Interview E4). However, it is notable that, because Fangsong is relatively 
self-contained, residential mobility is more likely to be pushed by residents’ desire 
to live closer to workplaces and children’s schools, if compared to 
housing-consumption related factors only. This contrasts with the situation in the 
other districts. Therefore, it is reasonable to find that, in terms of pull factors, 
compared to the estates’ quality, the effects of rapid access to the centre, cheap 
housing prices or employment opportunities do not appear to be as important for 
residents in Fangsong as they are for residents in Sijing and Jiuting.  
It is more appropriate to characterise Sijing’s residents as young, single 
migrants rather than well-off local families, which is particularly significant when 
compared to Fangsong. They are therefore less likely to have formal jobs; in 
particular, they are statistically 3.83 times less likely than residents in Fangsong to 
hold positions in public sectors. Moreover, the income level of people in Sijing is 
relatively low, no matter where they came from or what kind of jobs they did. 
Practical considerations such as rapid access, employment opportunities and 





cheap housing/rent are their primary considerations. For example, compared to 
residents in Fangsong and Jiuting, respectively, they were about ten times and 
four times more likely to have moved to their houses because of the metro line 
nearby; about twelve times and eight times more likely to have settled down for 
job opportunities; and about twenty-five times (although not significantly) and 
five times more likely to have been mainly attracted by cheap housing/rent.  
However, since it is also affected by spillover effects from the central city, 
Jiuting’s residents are characterised by quite different socio-economic attributes. 
On the one hand, the regression model indicates that Jiuting’s residents are older, 
which is significant when they are compared to Fangsong.  This coincides with 
the fact that a large number of elderly people were displaced from central 
Shanghai. As one local realtor described,  
    Since 2000, many people came from Shanghai and bought houses 
here. In most cases, they could have a lump sum compensation 
payment of about two to three million Yuan, while a big house here 
needed only half of the money. Therefore, many families took it as 
a good idea to move to Jiuting, particularly for those aged retirees 
who would not have much to do with the central areas. It was 
common that old couples bought into an apartment, and then made 
down payment for another house in the centre for their children 
with the money left (Interview E2). 
On the other hand, Jiuting’s residents are more likely to have acquired higher 
education, implying a concentration of well-educated migrants who are often 
employed in service sectors in the city. Moreover, families in Jiuting are more 
likely to have a middle-income than high-income. Therefore, the elderly from 
central Shanghai and young professional migrants are the two main groups in 
Jiuting. Correspondingly, their residential moves to the suburbs are more likely to 
be driven by their housing needs rather than other life events. Cheap housing in 
the periphery location is thus the most important factor that has made them choose 





their current houses. For most middle-income families, Jiuting is a compromise 
featuring commuting distance, life quality and housing price. Therefore, compared 
to residents in Fangsong, people here are statistically about five times less likely 
to live in villas, demonstrating their choice to move to Jiuting is less 
consumption-oriented and less related to suburban lifestyles.  
 
 





Table 6.12 District differentiations (logistic regression results) 
 
Independent 
Sijing Vs Fangsong 
a
 Jiuting Vs Fangsong 
a
 Jiuting Vs Sijing
 b
 
B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) 
Age  0.21 0.17 1.022 0.39* 0.16 1.039 0.017 0.016 1.017 
Marital status (single=1) -1.419* 0.573 0.242 -0.643 0.566 0.526 0.777 0.58 2.175 
Educational attainment  (Reference: tertiary)           
Primary  0.912 0.571 2.489 -1.264* 0.64 0.282 -2.177*** 0.609 0.113 
Secondary  0.312 0.445 1.366 -0.148 0.398 0.863 -0.46 0.397 0.632 
Hukou classification (nonagricultural =1 ) 0.361 0.48 1.435 0.377 0.526 1.457 0.016 0.49 1.016 
Originality (Reference: other places)          
Local -1.852*** 0.478 0.157 -1.15** 0.438 0.317 0.72 0.434 2.018 
Shanghai 0.131 0.586 1.14 0.376 0.554 1.456 0.245 0.462 1.277 
Employer type (Reference: others)          
Public sector -1.342* 0.65 0.261 -0.898 0.65 0.408 0.444 0.659 1.559 
SOE/COE -0.494 0.574 0.61 0.23 0.622 1.024 0.518 0.594 1.678 
Private/Foreign/Joint venture enterprises -0.303 0.506 0.738 0.347 0.546 1.415 0.65 0.531 1.916 
Private business owner 0.449 0.804 1.567 1.026 0.788 2.79 0.577 0.709 1.781 
Income (Baseline: > 20,000)           
<5,000  1.674* 0.726 5.332 0.485 0.653 1.625 -1.188 0.675 0.305 
5,000-10,000  1.2 0.684 3.321 0.795 0.596 2.214 0.406 0.639 0.667 
10,000-20,000  0.92 0.774 2.51 1.621** 0.631 5.509 0.701 0.688 2.016 
Housing tenure (own=1) -0.362 0.495 0.696 -0.304 0.525 0.738 0.058 0.45 1.06 
Car ownership(Yes=1)  0.251 0.411 1.286 0.008 0.386 1.008 -0.244 0.378 0.784 
 






Table 6.12 (continued) 
 
Independent 
Sijing Vs Fangsong 
a
 Jiuting Vs Fangsong 
a
 Jiuting Vs Sijing
 b
 
B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) 
Push factors (Reference: housing-consumption-related reasons)        
Other voluntary reasons 1.045 1.14 2.844 1.426 1.057 4.164 0.381 0.642 1.464 
Involuntary moves 1.252 0.666 3.498 0.25 0.708 1.026 -1.227* 0.566 0.293 
Life-course related reasons -1.245** 0.455 0.288 -1.201** 0.417 0.301 0.044 0.399 1.045 
Pull factors (Reference: quality estates )          
A good environment 0.056 0.703 1.058 -0.392 0.562 0.675 -0.448 0.708 0.639 
Rapid access 2.304** 0.753 10.015 0.905 0.64 2.471 -1.399* 0.683 0.247 
Employment opportunities 2.517** 0.732 12.391 0.485 0.666 1.624 -2.032** 0.72 0.131 
Cheap housing/rent prices 3.234 0.747 25.37 1.687** 0.645 5.403 -1.547* 0.658 0.213 
Housing type (Luxury villa =1) -0.502 0.846 0.605 -1.625* 0.748 0.197 -1.122 0.804 0.326 
Constant -2.582* 1.234  -1.574 1.126  1.009 1.218  



















Table 6.12 (continued) 
 
Model statistics          
N 349         
χ2 196.271         
DF 48         
Sig. ρ<0.001         
-2*log likelihood 568.778         
Cox & Snell R
2
 .430         
Nagelkerke R
2
 .484         
          
Notes:  a. Dependent variable is district, Fangsong is selected as reference 
b. Dependent variable is district, Sijing is selected as reference, results of the comparison between local natives and migrants are not shown 











This chapter has examined the demand-based forces driving Songjiang’s 
rapid growth. It is clear that suburban Songjiang, no matter how hard the 
governments and developers have tried to attract residents by borrowing concepts 
and landscapes from Western suburbia, has not experienced a similar path of 
transformation. While the move to suburbs in the US and many other Western 
countries has been predominantly driven by people’s residential preferences for 
suburban living, the underlying forces in China include multiple dimensions. 
There are four pillars buttressing Songjiang’s rapid growth. Economic growth 
built on metropolitan industrial restructuring was one of the supports. Providing a 
large number of jobs for manufacturing workers on the one hand, and affordable 
housing for white-collar workers on the other hand, Songjiang has become the 
destination of migrants. At the same time, the logic similar to that of 
suburbanisation in Western countries has started to work. Along with a rise in 
demand for better living conditions, housing development in Songjiang has indeed 
attracted many better-off families in its own right. Thirdly, supporting such 
production- and consumption-based processes, however, is the fast urbanisation of 
rural areas. The government enforced massive conversion of agricultural land for 
industrial and urban development. After losing the land they depended on for 
generations, farmers have moved into urban settlements and adapted themselves 
to jobs in non-agricultural sectors. In other words, suburban growth in China 
involves the urbanisation of the suburbs. Lastly, in addition to housing demand, 
the demand for investment capital plays a necessary role. Of course, the city 
centre is not overlooked. Yet Songjiang as a peripheral location is more attractive 
for small or non-professional developers and investors due to its low entry 
threshold, low investment risk and quick returns. Without the flow of private 
capital in large amounts, Songjiang’s housing market would not have experienced 
the prosperity it has seen.  





Therefore, Songjiang’s residents consist of three groups: migrant people, 
local natives and residents from central Shanghai. Based on survey data collected 
in three main urban areas in Songjiang, it is evident that, even after controlling for 
the contribution of confounding factors, the three groups not only differ in terms 
of some socio-economic attributes, but also in their motivations and residential 
choices. Firstly, compared to the other two groups, migrant people are more likely 
to have a lower level of education. Yet, the income level of this group is not 
necessarily low, and a certain proportion of high-income migrant families does 
exist. In addition, when it comes to housing conditions, results are also discordant. 
One the one side, migrants constitute the major tenant group of the local rental 
market, where odds ratios are far greater for them to be tenants than the other two 
groups. On the other hand, the likelihood for migrants to live in high-end villa 
communities is not significantly different from the other two. These findings are 
consistent with the fact that, being employed in different sectors, migrants are 
themselves diverse in socioeconomic status. Furthermore, support was found for 
the hypothesis that migrants are more likely to have made their residential moves 
to Songjiang for work-related factors rather than housing-consumption.  
Secondly, including a fair number of people who were previously farmers, 
local natives are not advantaged in terms of educational attainment or income. 
However, compared to the migrant population, local natives are more likely to 
have their own houses. Therefore, rather than purely being determined by work, 
their residential moves are more likely to be associated with their pursuit of better 
living conditions; when making residential choices, they are more 
consumption-oriented. Lastly, those from central Shanghai are not significantly 
different from others in most socio-economic attributes, except that they are 
obviously better educated. Yet, factors driving this group to Songjiang are 
peculiar. On the one hand, compared to migrants, the likelihood of involuntary 
moves caused by (re)development projects is significantly greater. On the other 
hand, although both are motivated by their desire for better living conditions, 





compared to local natives, residential migrants from central Shanghai are more 
likely to move into villas, embracing a different way of life from that in the city.   
In spatial terms, it is evident that different driving forces of growth have 
resulted in a heterogonous suburban space. This is realised through the 
self-sorting of different types of households into different types of 
neighbourhoods and districts. In general, and on a larger spatial scale, both 
migrants and those from central Shanghai tend to concentrate in the nearer 
suburbs, namely Jiuting and Sijing. Local natives, on the other hand, tend to be 
located in the outer suburban new town Fangsong. Moreover, it is also supported 
that the three districts are developing into three distinctive types of suburbs. 
Jiuting is a typical high-density suburban settlement for white-collar commuters 
with jobs in the central city. Sijing is a less-developed suburban node in which 
migrants with informal jobs and lower income concentrate. Lastly, Fangsong is a 
well-planned suburban new town. Featuring relatively low density and 
high-quality living environments, it has successfully attracted many better-off 
families. However, its development is driven more by local growth. All in all, pull 
forces of the centre still appear to be strong. In this sense, the original aim of the 
municipality to develop the new town as a magnate pull has not been fully 
achieved.  
However, the suburbs are by no means without their own attractions. To 
return to the question of whether preferences favouring a distinctive suburban 
lifestyle play a role in Songjiang’s growth, the answer here is affirmative. 
Single-family villas and gated communities represent the ultimate form of the 
pursuit of a good life. Our survey shows that these communities share similar 
elements with Western suburbia. Lured by enchanting living environments, 
quality amenities, exclusive services, safety and security, as well as 
neighbourhood homogeneity and symbolic status, villa residents have voted with 
their feet and embraced a distinctive consumption-centred way of life. In the 
meantime, they maintain strong connections to the city, continuing to accrue 





wealth and pursue their leisure in the centre. Nonetheless, unlike Western 
suburbia, villas as a dream home are privileged to a few extremely rich families 
rather than the masses. Suburban growth in China remains primarily dominated by 
middle- to high-density apartment development and is supported by the expansion 
of mass transit like that to Jiuting and Sijing. Therefore, it would be incorrect to 
claim that suburban residents in China live a unique way of life, or that moves to 
the suburbs reflect changes in living habits and costumes or cultural attitudes, as 
found in conventional Western suburbia (Frey, 1979; Gans, 1967; Beauregard, 
2006). Urban lifestyles characterised by agglomeration, high-density and diversity 
(Wirth, 1938; Jacobs, 1961) still dominate most people’s daily lives.  





CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION 
7.1  Introduction 
Since 2000, urbanisation in China has evolved into a new phase in which 
suburbs have begun to function as the new frontier of economic growth. Major 
cities are witnessing unprecedented expansion towards outer suburban areas in a 
different form of mixed-use clustered development. The new stage has been 
captured by some scholars with reference to concepts such as a polycentric 
structure or post-suburbia (Feng et al., 2009; Yue et al., 2010; Wu and Phelps, 
2008). Nevertheless, few studies have systematically addressed this phenomenon 
and provided an explanation for the changing dynamics of China’s 
suburbanisation. Therefore, this research aims to investigate the origins, forms 
and functions of the emerging suburban settlements in China.  
In the meantime, Chinese suburbs offer a valuable empirical case for 
enriching current suburban theory. In a study on China’s earlier suburbanisation, 
Zhou and Ma (2000: 228-229) comment that ‘the circumstances under which 
urban decentralisation and suburbanisation have occurred in the west and China 
and the ensuing economic and spatial consequences have been vastly 
different…the forces of urban change…are unique to the transitional economy of 
China’. This statement is still applicable to the comparison between contemporary 
suburban growth in China and in Western countries. Institutionally, the state 
continues to play a powerful role in urban China. Economically, the country’s 
growth is still predominantly underpinned by export-oriented manufacturing 
rather than a service economy. Socially, the middle class is relatively weaker and 





luxury consumption is privileged to only a small group of urban new rich. 
Meanwhile, the cities are seeing an unparallel influx of rural-to-urban migrants. 
Chinese suburbs, therefore, have roots in a specific socio-economic context and 
unique local institutional innovations. The study attempts to identify the 
similarities and the differences between China and other countries.  
The research, therefore, attempts to explain why Chinese suburbs have 
evolved into their current form and how they have grown so quickly, i.e. the 
dynamics of recent suburban growth in China. Referring to existing literature of 
other places, an analytical framework is developed to examine the underlying 
forces that gave rise to the specific pattern of suburban growth. The framework 
accounts for both production- and consumption-based factors, and meanwhile sets 
up a platform for comparative analysis. The foundation for the explanation is that 
the rising suburbs resulted from capitalism’s creation of a new space to facilitate 
both the production and reproduction of capital. However, suburbanisation takes 
distinctive forms and involves different processes tailored to the needs of a 
specifically Chinese context. Based on this point, the study further explores the 
role of different actors involved in shaping the process. On the supply side, the 
rationale, the practise and the coalitions among various public and non-public 
sectors are examined. On the demand side, the composition of suburban residents 
and their residential choices are analysed. All the three themes are placed in a 
comparative perspective.  
 In terms of methodology, the study builds its findings on a case study of 
Shanghai and one of its suburban districts, Songjiang. A single case study is a 
suitable and reliable strategy to collect in-depth information regarding manifold 
aspects and deal with interrelations between a wide range of factors. Songjiang in 
Shanghai was selected for its representativeness. A mixed method combining 
qualitative and quantitative analysis is adopted. Empirical materials come from 
two resources. Firsthand data includes 1) 42 face-to-face interviews with a range 
of people including government officials and planners, design and planning 





consultants, property developers and real estate agents, as well as home buyers; 2) 
a questionnaire survey on a random sample of  393 residents in Songjiang. 
Second hand data consists of a wide variety of channels; open publications, 
planning and design documents, internal reports and media reports as well as 
promotional materials are extensively used.  
In this conclusion chapter, the empirical findings of the research elaborated 
in previous chapters are first summarised. These are organised in line with the 
three analytical themes, providing answers to the three research questions. The 
chapter then moves to compare the Chinese suburbs with others in terms of their 
forms, functions and processes. Finally, the last section provides a discussion on 
the broader implications of the Chinese case in both theoretical and practical 
terms.  
 
7.2 Dynamics of suburban growth in China: empirical 
findings 
7.2.1 Suburbs as a space for capital accumulation 
The thesis on suburbanisation as a solution to the capital accumulation crisis 
was well developed in the Western context. While earlier mass suburbanisation is 
an integral part of Fordist capitalism (Harvey, 1985; Walks, 1981), current 
post-suburban settlements have emerged as a new spatial fix of the post-Fordist 
regime (Keil, 1994; Phelps and Wood, 2011).  The study thus aims to explore 
‘what is the role of suburbanisation in China’s contemporary capital 
accumulation regime’. It is demonstrated that suburbanisation in the form of new 
town development is an essential accumulation strategy in response to a variety of 
specific new circumstances. In essence, it represents a peculiar land-centred 
accumulation regime facilitated by the state.  This answer is further developed in 
the following three aspects.  





Changing conditions. A range of new conditions that are embedded in 
China’s local context have emerged since 2000. On the supply side, there emerged 
an urgent need to expand accumulation and sustain growth. This not only required 
an increase in amounts of investment, but also involved the goal of economic 
restructuring towards higher-skilled and higher-value-added industries. Such 
expansion, however, was confronted with more stringent institutional restrictions. 
In particular, a strict land policy necessitated a more intensive growth mode. On 
the demand side, after twenty years of rapid economic growth, Chinese cities saw 
rapid population growth and an accompanying process of class and social 
stratification in urban society. It became imperative for the new accumulation 
regime to accommodate these social changes and tackle the problems that might 
impede further growth. In short, there were both motives and opportunities for 
furthering suburbanisation in the form of new town development to sustain 
growth.  
New town development as an accumulation strategy. Suburban new town 
development is essential to a successful accumulation strategy in six major ways. 
Firstly, suburban new town development expands the space for accumulation and, 
secondly, it makes it possible to reorganise economic activities on the 
metropolitan scale. In effect, this aids the process of deindustrialisation in the 
central city, but meanwhile strengthens industrialisation on the periphery. Thirdly, 
by building suburban new towns, a new type of space is created to facilitate 
capital accumulation in the second circuit (Harvey, 1985). The fourth reason is 
that the provision of different types of housing and living facilities in new towns 
offers the means of reproduction of the influx of a diverse labour force. Fifth, 
through promoting homeownership and high living standards, new towns help 
boost the domestic market in housing and other consumer durables. Finally, new 
town development achieves a more intensive use of space than previous 
featureless urban sprawl and drives growth by taking advantage of an 
agglomeration economy.  





Land-centred accumulation regime. In China, land is owned by the state and 
is actually the most important resource in local governments’ hands to achieve 
economic growth. Land is not only a factor of production, but also generates 
revenue for the local coffers itself. Therefore, for local governments, land 
development is critical to organising economic activities. Suburban new town 
development represents a sophisticated manipulation of land development to 
sustain growth. On the metropolitan scale, the central cities need their periphery to 
‘enlarge their spaces of engagement’ (Cox, 1998), and importantly, to acquire 
more land resources. Moreover, through urban planning, land use control and 
other regulatory policies, municipalities manage to shift central cities’ economies 
towards the service sectors on the one hand, and build suburbs as new industrial 
nodes on the other hand. Moreover, at the local level, mixed-use development is 
tactically used to facilitate growth. Some of the land is leased out for residential 
and commercial development, which is often carried out through open auction at 
highly-profitable prices. Land leasing and the property industry only generate 
one-off gains and do not drive economic growth directly. Therefore, discounted 
serviced land and other preferential policies are offered as local advantages to 
attract industrial enterprises. The arrival of manufacturing industries spurs local 
economic growth, increases local employment and, in turn, brings about 
population growth and boosts the local housing market. A growth mechanism is 
established in which real estate development and industrial development mutually 
reinforce each other.  
The role of the state.  Compared to many other countries, the state plays a 
decisive and indispensible role in creating conditions for suburban growth and 
thus capital accumulation. It is the municipal government that formulates 
development strategies and mobilises various resources and powers to ensure its 
materialisation. State interventions exert influence on the suburbanisation process 
through four aspects. First and foremost, in essence, suburbanisation through the 
form of new town development is a strategic project led by the municipality in 





response to a range of new conditions. Secondly, policies regarding land assembly, 
infrastructure financing, land leasing on the supply side, tax incentives, 
homeownership-related benefits such as social welfare or local Hukou registration 
on the demand side have been laid down to create a favourable market 
environment. Thirdly, the state directly invests in infrastructures and public 
facilities to support the development of strategically-selected suburbs. Last but not 
least are institutional changes, including the introduction of market operations and 
the adjustment of governance structure. A wide variety of actors and their 
resources are then engaged in the process.  
 
7.2.2 The building of suburbs: state-led entrepreneurial 
governance 
Pro-growth coalitions among public sections and business interests played a 
significant role in Western suburban and post-suburban development (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987; Phelps et al., 2006). The modes of suburban politics, however, 
vary over time and space. When examining Chinese suburbs, some important 
questions are: ‘Who are the characters of suburban governance in China? How 
are pro-growth coalitions formed? How do they work to facilitate suburban 
growth?’ It is shown in this study that suburban politics in China is characterised 
by state-led entrepreneurial governance. This point is discussed as follows.  
Institutional context and urban entrepreneurialism. It is argued that, under 
China’s peculiar institutional context, the rise of suburban new towns is 
predominately underpinned by the state’s entrepreneurial action. Non-state 
business interests have much less influence on local entrepreneurial agendas. The 
state has both motivation and power to organise local pro-growth coalitions. As a 
result of the rescaling of urban governance, great incentives for growth were 
generated and gave rise to fierce inter-locality competition at different levels of 
government. Through a series of fiscal and administrative decentralisation tactics, 





the central state transferred its powers to lower levels. In effect, it is the municipal 
governments that preside over urban management (Xu and Yeh, 2009). 
Correspondingly, the municipalities further down the state scale function to 
district governments, which are the lowest level of urban governance and 
inter-locality competition. Moreover, although economic reform since 1978 has 
broken down the monopolistic role of the state and a variety of non-state actors 
are involved, the state still plays a leading role in urban development due to the 
peculiar public ownership of land. This makes the state the de facto land owner, 
i.e. a market player on the one hand, and at the same time the policymaker of the 
market (Wu et al., 2007).  
Building new towns as entrepreneurial cities. The launch of the tax sharing 
system and the strictest land use policies by the central state made it an imperative 
for local governments to develop new entrepreneurial strategies to sustain growth. 
Suburban new towns were developed as entrepreneurial cities to improve local 
competitiveness. New town development is not only designed to shift away from 
industrialisation. Instead, the rationale underlying the strategy is to generate 
revenue by boosting land and property development, which is then used to 
sponsor industrial development. Revolving around the strategy of building 
suburbs as good environments in which to live, a new discourse, new urban form, 
and new methods of space production are invented. Strategically, the key to 
success is to install infrastructures for an urban economy, including physical 
infrastructures such as transportation and living facilities, social infrastructures 
such as new residents, and cultural infrastructures such as flagships and distinctive 
local brands and identities such as an attractive garden city of Shanghai. 
Practically, as the land owner of the new towns, the local governments set up 
development corporations as their agents to take charge of land management. 
Following a strategy flow such as ‘land acquisition  mega-projects and 
infrastructure construction  land leasing to private developers and the recovery 
of investment and profits  reinvestment in developing another plot of land’, 





these corporations operate like entrepreneurs and precisely embody the 
entrepreneurial nature of the state.  
Organisation of suburban growth coalitions. Suburban politics is illustrated 
by the building of Songjiang New Town as a growth machine underpinned by 
land-based coalitions led by a district government and followed by various public 
and private sectors, but one which is manipulated by the municipal government. 
As the actual administrator of the locality, the district government plays the 
leading role in local growth coalitions. On the one hand, quasi-public 
development corporations are established to perform on its behalf and develop 
partnerships with other public and private sectors. On the other hand, the district 
government struggles to beat other districts and attain sponsorship from the 
municipal government. In such a case, the two levels of government establish a 
horizontal and cooperative relationship. Nonetheless, beyond the local level, it is 
the municipality that initiates the whole suburban development project and makes 
a wide variety of institutional changes to facilitate suburbanisation. The role of the 
municipal government should never be underestimated in the Chinese context.  
 
7.2.3 Living in the suburbs: a heterogeneous world 
The pursuit of an Arcadian ideal by the middle class is a key factor giving 
rise to mass suburbanisation in the Western context (Fishman, 1987; Beauregard, 
2006), although the distinctive suburban lifestyle has largely been eroded by 
recent diversification of suburbs (Hall and Lee, 2009). The study attempts to 
further explore the demand-based driving forces of suburbanisation in China by 
asking: ‘What are the demand-based growth dynamics that are driving suburban 
growth? Who are the suburban residents? What factors have driven them to move 
to the suburbs? What are the characteristics of suburban spatial differentiation?’ 
It is revealed that, on the demand side, suburban growth results from four 
interwoven processes: industrial restructuring and economic growth, 
outwards-migration, urbanisation, and capitalisation. Three types of people, i.e. 





migrant people, local natives and residents from central Shanghai, constitute the 
main groups of suburban residents. Their spatial sorting creates a heterogeneous 
suburban space.  
Demand-based growth dynamics.  Four structural changes have an impact 
on the demand side of suburban growth. The first is metropolitan industrial 
restructuring and economic growth in both the centre and the suburbs. The central 
city has shifted towards a service economy and attracted large numbers of 
white-collar workers. However, they are pushed out by the high housing prices in 
the central area and seek affordable housing in the suburbs. The suburbs 
themselves have seen the growth of manufacturing industries and also an influx of 
blue-collar workers. Consequently, suburbs have become places which 
accommodate the newly-arrived labour force of both types. The second is 
outwards-migration led by the emerging new rich. With great spending power, 
this group of people has become the vanguard of consumerism. Housing and other 
domestic expenditure is at the heart of their consumption-oriented life. They are 
attracted to the suburbs by spacious rooms and a tranquil living environment. 
Thirdly, urbanisation is an important pillar of suburban growth. Farmers are 
coerced to give up their land and move into the newly-development commodity 
houses in urban areas. Finally, suburban housing development is driven by the 
high demand for investment capital. The effects have become increasingly 
apparent since 2008 when capital began to shift away from manufacturing 
towards the property industry. Although the inflow of capital alone does not 
contribute to population growth directly, it has created a rental market for migrant 
workers.  
Different groups, diverse motives. Suburban residents consist of three groups 
of people: migrant people, residents from central Shanghai and local natives, who 
are diverse in terms of socioeconomic attributes and settle in the suburbs for 
different reasons. Migrants from other provinces are the fastest-growing group of 
people in the suburbs. Notably, their socioeconomic attributes are not identical 





within the group. At one end of the spectrum are younger rural-migrant workers 
with a lower level of educational attainment and who have manufacturing or 
low-end service jobs. In the middle are white-collar workers with higher levels of 
educational attainment and high-end service jobs. At the other end are rich private 
entrepreneurs or business owners. However, their arrival is mainly driven by a 
common purpose, namely the careers and opportunities the city provides. People 
from central cities are more likely to have attained a higher level of education, but 
do not show superiority in most other attributes. It is unsurprising that the 
likelihood of involuntary moves for this group is significantly greater than that for 
migrants. Nevertheless, consumption-oriented factors such as the pursuit of better 
living conditions or a nice living environment in the suburbs are important 
considerations and drivers of their residential moves. Finally, local natives, 
including landless farmers in large numbers, have not received a better education 
or enjoyed better economic conditions compared with the migrants. Nevertheless, 
this group of people are entitled to have their own houses. By selling or renting 
out their original houses, some of them have even taken advantage of the rent gap 
created by local property boom. Houses have become an important source of 
wealth. Therefore, they have more chances to make residential moves for better 
living conditions.  
Heterogeneous suburban space. Different types of people tend to self-sort 
into different spaces. Focusing on formally-developed settlements, this study 
identifies two types of estates and three types of sub-districts in the suburbs. With 
regard to types of estate, unlike Western residential suburbs that are 
predominantly occupied by single family houses, both low-density villa 
developments and middle- to high-density apartments are found in China. 
However, representing the pursuit of a consumption-centred lifestyle, villas are 
privileged to only a few extremely rich families. Instead, apartments for the 
middle class represent the dominant form of mass suburbanisation. Similar to 
those in the central city, these suburban housing estates are only an outward 





expansion of housing developments, rather than embodying a suburban lifestyle 
that is distinctive from that of the inner city.  
As for types of sub-districts, the three urban areas in Songjiang are largely 
recognised as having developed into three different types of suburban settlements. 
As the district nearest to the central city, Jiuting has become a typical high-density 
residential suburb of white-collar commuters. Sijing remains less touched by 
formal development so far. Featuring low-price property and rapid transit, it has 
attracted large numbers of migrants with informal or low-income jobs. Fangsong 
is where the well-planned suburban new town is located. At present, it still 
functions more as a new residential settlement of local residents.  
 
7.3 Chinese suburbs: a variation of post-suburbia 
Suburban studies in the Western context tend to regard recent suburban 
development on the urban edge as something different from the traditional suburb. 
Harris and Larkham (1999:8) define traditional suburbs in five dimensions: 
peripheral location, residential land use, low density, distinctive social and 
cultural norms of life, and separate community identities. Nevertheless, the rise of 
‘technoburbs’ (Fishman, 1987), ‘edge cities’ (Garreau, 1991) and ‘edgeless cities’ 
(Lang, 2003) challenge such conventional definitions of suburbs. Findings in 
non-European-American countries further threaten the validity of existing theories 
on urbanisation based on the Western experience.  Some scholars thus suggest 
that the term ‘post-suburbia’ should be applied to capture contemporary suburban 
growth across the world, which provides an analytic perspective of comparison in 
both temporal and spatial terms (Phelps et al., 2010).  
This study uses the concept of ‘post-suburbia’ to frame Chinese suburbs for 
two reasons. Elements similar to those found in current Western suburban 
development are identified in China. These elements are evidently different from 
conventional residential suburbanisation. Nevertheless, Chinese suburbs exhibit 
unique traits and different dynamics. Going beyond physical forms, the concept 





opens up the possibility of placing Chinese suburbs in a broader theoretical 
background. Prior to this research, Wu and Phelps (2008:477) have attempted to 
examine how the concept of ‘post-suburbia’ is related to Chinese recent suburban 
development. It is recognised that some suburban settlements in China indeed 
‘present some of the traits of “post-”, in sense of the break from residential 
decentralisation, but with Chinese characteristics.’ This section further confirms, 
but refines this argument based on empirical evidence from the development of 
Songjiang in Shanghai.  
 
7.3.1 Physical form and population composition 
In appearance, Chinese suburbs are very different from Western low-density 
traditional suburbia or edge cities, but closer to peri-urban development desakota 
in other densely populated countries in East and Southeast Asia (McGee, 1991). 
Although luxury villas and gated communities are emerging, they are only 
available to a few rich people. Predominantly dominated by mid- to high-density 
developments, suburbs in China are far more intensified. Moreover, instead of 
private cars and highways, mass suburbanisation in China is supported by the 
expansion of public mass transit. Nevertheless, two distinguishing post-suburban 
features are identified.  The first is the mixing of land use and a spatial pattern 
characterised as a ‘patchwork structure’ (Kraemer, 2005: 44). The layout of 
Songjiang New Town (Chapter 5, Figure 5.3) explicitly illustrates the 
co-existence of diverse, but disjointed types of space, juxtaposing a variety of 
elements, industrial zones, university towns, a central business centre, high-rise 
apartments and single-family houses. The second feature is that, rather than being 
exclusive to the middle-class, suburban residents are quite diverse and have 
different socioeconomic attributes, ranging from wealthy families living in luxury 
villas to rural-to-urban migrant workers living in private rental houses. It is the 
heterogeneity of landscapes and residents that indicates an essential difference 
between Chinese suburbs and Western middle-class suburbia.  






In terms of function, this study recognises that Chinese suburbs match the 
concept of post-suburban settlements in two respects. Firstly, unlike traditional 
Western residential suburbs, the rising suburban nodes in China are economically 
significant, serving as strategic growth poles for the whole metropolitan area. 
New towns in Shanghai are developed as part of the municipality’s 
entrepreneurial strategy to compete with other cities in the Yangtze River Delta in 
order to build itself into a global city. To a great extent, this is similar to the 
‘metropolitan model’ reintroduced in Western countries since the end of the 1980s, 
in which ‘the metropolitan territory has become the scale on which the central 
cities reason’ (Lefèvre, 1998: 22). With regard to the trajectory towards the model, 
suburban growth in China has taken a form of amalgamation similar to Canada or 
Western Europe rather than secession like in the US (Lefèvre, 1998; Keil, 2000).  
Secondly, they function as both employment centres and residential areas. As 
the case of Songjiang illustrates, its rapid growth was built on the mutual 
reinforcement of the manufacturing industry and housing development. For 
Teaford (1997:5), the emergence of American post-suburbia results from the 
fiscal need to introduce economic activities and there is thus a tension between 
suburban living ideals and economic growth. On the contrary, the Chinese 
suburbs are evolving from industrial satellite towns towards comprehensive new 
towns. Residential development is particularly promoted which, interestingly, 
sometimes mimic settings of Western suburbia to attract home buyers and rebuild 
the image of the suburbs. 
The functional differences of the Chinese case are also apparent, which can 
be understood from perspectives of time and dimensional disparities (Phelps et al., 
2010). Compared with Western developed countries, China is still a country 
experiencing industrialisation. Although the rising suburban settlements are 
developed with urban functions and amenities in order to stimulate local property 
development, the real growth driver remains the manufacturing industry. In fact, 





in the case of Shanghai, the suburban development project was originally 
associated with the municipality’s strategic plan to develop the service industry in 
the centre, but keep its economic strength by encouraging industrial development 
on the periphery. Therefore, this is a different process from post-suburbanisation 
in Western cities. While suburbs in developed countries have been experiencing 
the rise of service sectors, deindustrialisation and the recent trend of retrofitting 
(Zukin, 1991; Nelson, 2006; Dunham-Jones and Williamson, 2009), Chinese 
suburban new towns serve more as regional industrial nodes. However, recently, 
the government has begun to promote the development of producer services in 
these new towns. In the next few years, an economic transition toward service 
employment is not unforeseeable.  
Another disparity concerns the relationship between the central city and the 
suburbs, as well as the degree of importance of suburban growth to the whole 
metropolitan area. The post-war US, UK, and other Western European countries 
experienced a shift to ‘parasitic urbanisation’, whereby suburban growth 
depended on ‘draining people and investment from the old industrial central 
cities’ (Beauregard, 2006: 40). This study has demonstrated that such urbanisation 
has not occurred in China; although suburbs are rising as new growth nodes in 
their own right, centripetal forces remain dominant. Central cities continue to 
prosper. Suburban growth has not weakened their attraction but, on the contrary, 
helped facilitate their industrial upgrading. Therefore, the relationship between the 
central and the periphery is still far from being turned ‘inside-out’ (Soja, 2000).  
 






Broadly, it is argued that the new round of suburb development in China, in 
which elements similar to post-suburbia are found, is underpinned by the same 
logic of capitalism. The motion of the new town project in Shanghai is in essence 
growth-oriented. During the process, there have been impacts resulting from the 
transfer of Western technology and ideas. For example, not only were Western 
planning ideas such as ‘garden cities’, ‘new urbanism’, ‘decentralised 
concentration’, ‘polycentric structure’ etc. widely introduced to justify the project, 
but Western residential suburbia was transplanted as an attractive setting to build 
the new image of the periphery. However, it is important to note that these similar 
morphologies have emerged more as a response to locally-embedded conditions, 
and the underlying growth mechanisms are unique to China.  
Chinese capital accumulation is different from both post-war suburbanisation 
and recent post-suburban development in advanced Western countries. It is 
documented that post-war residential suburbanisation is part of the Fordist-regime 
of mass production and consumption. In particular, the property circuit became an 
outlet for surplus capital and thus a response to the crisis in the primary circuit 
(Harvey, 1985; Walks, 1981). Post-suburban development in Western countries 
was largely associated with a shift towards a flexible post-Fordism production 
system, the rise of service sectors and global interregional competition (Keil and 
Ronneberger, 1994). However, in the case of China, suburbanisation through new 
town development is a strategic selection by the municipal governments to hurdle 
local accumulation barriers which have been directly created by the 
recentralisation of both fiscal and land development power. An intensive 
development mode based on an agglomeration economy, new town development 
provides a complete solution, which has not only tactically circumvented the 
restrictions of the central state, but also boosted the local housing market to 
increase land revenue. Funds raised through land development are then used to 





facilitate manufacturing production. Both primary and second circuits of capital 
accumulation are in action.  
The Chinese suburban regime is distinctive in terms of its reorganisation of 
entrepreneurial governance. If business models on the edge are distinguished as 
based on the roles played by the state and non-state sectors, there are roughly two 
groups countries can fall within. In the first group are the US and some Southeast 
Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, etc. whereby private 
business interests often dominate the pro-growth coalitions of suburbanisation and 
where suburban incorporation and private governance are widespread (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987; Dick and Rimmer, 2009). In the other group are the European 
countries and some Asian countries with a history of a strong developmental state; 
for example, Korea, where suburban development is largely guided or organised 
by the state and where local suburban governments often enjoy less autonomy 
(Phelps et al., 2006; Lee and Shin, 2011). Apparently China belongs to the latter 
group. Moreover, Chinese suburban urban politics are built around land interests 
and are thus close to the growth machine model (Logan and Molotch, 1987). 
Compared with other countries in which the state-led mode dominates, the unique 
nature of the Chinese case lies in three respects: 1) as the de facto land owner, 
local governments are the major stakeholder and are directly involved in the 
development as a market player; 2) local governments have much greater 
governance capacities to achieve their goals, while other actors can exert much 
less influence; 3) the municipality still administers suburban districts and leads the 
whole process of suburban development; nevertheless, suburban district 
governments are given greater decision-making power to organise pro-growth 
coalitions in their own ways.  
Demand-based factors driving suburban growth in China are manifold. 
Suburbs in Western countries are predominately at the mercy of centrifugal force, 
first residential suburbanisation and later the ‘urbanisation of the suburbs’ (Muller, 
1976). In the case of China, the rise of the suburbs involves the urbanisation of 





rural farmers, rural-to-urban migration led by metropolitan economic growth and 
outwards-migration from the central city, where the former two are dominant. 
Given that the Chinese suburbs used to be densely populated agricultural areas, 
large numbers of farmers are affected by suburban development. They are forced 
to give up their rural lives and resettle in suburban new towns. Meanwhile, 
employment opportunities have attracted migrants from other places. In the US 
and many other Western countries, immigrants and rural migrants flocked to the 
central city, but drove away white middle-class families (Frey, 1979). However, 
central locations are much less accessible to migrants in China, and most tend to 
live in the periphery. Finally, residential suburbanisation driven by the pursuit of 
suburban living is new to China and still exclusive to a few people. Therefore, in 
general, suburban growth is much less associated with changes in residential 
preferences or an embrace of a consumption-centred lifestyle by the masses.  
To sum up, the case of the Chinese suburbs confirms the necessity for 
comparative work across different spatial contexts to contribute to contemporary 
suburban theory. Echoing Golubchikov and Phelps’ (2011) emphasis on ‘political’ 
processes rather than ‘place’, when examining the political economy of place, in 
order to develop a flexible framework it is important to establish some essential 
elements of post-suburban settlements and also to examine the local context 
giving rise to these traits. The emerging Chinese suburban nodes bear one 
important feature distinguishing post-suburban settlements from middle-class 
residential suburbia; that is, they have developed into multifunctional settlements 
with a heterogonous population, and have played a significant role in the regional 
economy. Beyond this, however, as a response to local structural changes and 
being materialised through a unique development method, the form is created by 









7.4 Broader implications 
7.4.1 Emerging urbanism in China 
The final broader implication of this study on Chinese suburban growth 
concerns the role of urbanisation in China’s contemporary capital accumulation 
regime. Since 2000, two major transitions have led China’s economic 
development. One is the fact that the country is receiving massive FDI inflows 
and becoming a world factory. The other is that China, which was once known as 
a rural-dominated society, is evolving towards an urban society. Recent census 
data shows that by 2010, about 49.68% of the total population have lived in urban 
areas
1
. Accompanying the rapid growth of the urban population is the emergence 
of mega cities and radically-changing urban landscapes. Notifying the spread of 
consumption-oriented landscape elements familiar to postmodern Western 
countries, some scholars have linked the phenomenon to the emergence of 
urbanism in China (Lin, 2007; Wu, 2010). Yet, the question remains, from the 
perspective of capital accumulation: how is it possible to explain these urban 
landscapes, given that China is still a country experiencing industrialisation? 
Broadly speaking, suburban development is at the forefront of China’s urban 
revolution and its growth dynamics provide a useful explanation on urbanisation 
as an engine of China’s growth. It is demonstrated that urbanisation and 
industrialisation are mutually-promoted processes. On the one hand, the state 
attempts to attract foreign investment by offering a low cost labour force and land 
resources. On the other hand, it capitalises on land and housing development to 
raise funds to subsidise industrial development, which, in turn, leads to the 
promotion of a consumer culture and the creation of consumption space. In this 
way the production of urban space functions as a critical element of capital 
circulation. If developing itself as a world factory represents the country’s efforts 
                                                          
1
 See http://www.stats.gov.cn/, accessed 30
th
 Nov, 2011 





to promote economic growth under global labour division, urban-based 
accumulation provides an indispensible means to achieve this goal.  
 
7.4.2 Prospect of the Chinese state-led mode 
There are debates on whether suburban development under strong state 
control or a more liberalised system is more favourable to achieving sustainable 
growth (Phelps and Wood, 2011). Based on this study, suburban development in 
China can be depicted as a state-led mode. The state is prominently 
entrepreneurial in nature. Local states play as a market actor themselves and 
have direct economic interests in the land and property market. The governments 
thus not only mobilise various resources and administrative measures to remove 
possible obstacles to urban development, but also directly invest in infrastructure 
and other public facilities to create favourable conditions for a booming 
suburban housing market. Unlike the state in many South-east Asian countries, 
however, which tend to stimulate growth by privatisation and deregulation 
(Marcotullio, 2003), the Chinese government still have strong powers over land 
development. It is the great capacity and power of the state that ensures the rapid 
progress of new town development. Landscapes and the image of suburbs have 
been dramatically changed in a short period. Bearing in mind that the new towns 
are justified as a rational spatial arrangement alternative to an earlier 
land-extensive pattern of growth, it is important to question the overall effects of 
such development under strong state intervention, i.e. whether Chinese state-led 
suburbanisation is sustainable in economic, social and environmental terms.  
Economically, building entrepreneurial new towns in this way is not 
without risk. Because local governments are able to avoid investment loss by 
seeking help from the central state, they tend to excessively invest in 
infrastructures and mega-projects to attract private capital investment (Xu and 
Yeh, 2005). However, it is quite possible that there is still a lack of sufficient 
local demand. A large proportion of the suburban local labour force comprises 





manufacturing workers, most of whom cannot afford to buy a house. In such a 
case, it is particular important to attract wealthier residents from the central 
cities. Otherwise, over-optimistic expectations derived from the support of the 
government could lead to active speculation. Moreover, in social terms, property 
speculation in turn further intensifies social inequity and polarisation. Because 
rising housing prices are increasingly far beyond migrants’ reach, they tend to 
be trapped in private rental houses and poor neighbourhoods. Overall, with 
regard to the effects of growth containment, some empirical studies have shown 
that the outcome is far from stable at present (Zhao et al., 2009). Under the 
decentralised administrative system, suburban local governments within the 
same city rival each other for capital investment and economic growth. In many 
cases, they tend to work on their own behalf and risk breaking the municipal 
plan. The excessive competition among districts thus inevitable leads to 
ineffective growth management. To sum up, although the Chinese state-led 
mode can transform the suburbs quickly, there are hidden threats to 




Appendix 1  Interviewee list 





Deputy director of Songjiang Planning and 








Chief of Planning and Construction 
Management Section, SPLRMB 
25/05/2010 
G4 Deputy mayor of Jiuting Township 11/06/2010 
G5 Deputy mayor of Sijing Township 10/06/2010 
G6 
Deputy Chief of Planning Management 
Section, Shanghai Municipal Planning and 











Head of Shanghai Urban Planning and 
Design Research Institute (SUPDRI) 
13/01/2010 
P2 Deputy director of SUPDRI 24/05/2010 
P3 
President of Shanghai Association of City 
Planning 
Ex-head of SUPDRI 
20/05/2010 
P4  
Senior planning consultant  of Atkins Co. 





Chief executive director of Songjiang New 
Town Development Corporation (SNTDC) 
07/06/2010 
D2  Chief of construction department, SNTDC 26/05/2010 
D3 
Deputy director of Songjiang Chengtong 
Rail Transport Investment and 
Development Co. Ltd 
07/06/2010 
D4 
Chief executive director of Xiangda Real 




Deputy executive director of Shanghai 
Juying Real Estate Development Co.Ltd 
26/05/2010 
D6 




Project manager, Shanghai Chengtou 








Categories Code Character Date 
Real estate 
consultants 
and realtors (4 
cases) 
E1 
Senior real estate consultant of Centaline 
Property, Shanghai branch 
14/01/2009 
E2 
Senior manager of Shanghai Brilliant 
Future Real Estate consulting Co. Ltd 
24/06/2010 
E3 




Senior director of real estate investment 





(2 cases)  
U1 
Deputy director of Songjiang University 
Town Management Committee 
Vice president of Donghua University 
01/06/2010 
U2 
Chief of school office, Shanghai Institute 








Chief of community service and 
management Centre, Fangsong street office 
01/07/2010 
C2 
Chief of Thames Town residents’ 
committee, Fangsong street 
02/08/2010 
C3 
Chief of community service and 
management Centre, Jiuting township 
07/07/2010 
C4 





R_F1 Migrant, apartment house, Fangsong 22/06/2010 
R_F2 Local native, apartment house, Fangsong 17/07/2010 
R_F3 Local native, apartment house, Fangsong 14/08/2010 
R_F4 Migrant, villa-style house, Fangsong 27/07/2010 
R_F5 Local native, villa-style house, Fangsong 27/07/2010 
R_F6 








Resident from central Shanghai, apartment 
house, Sijing 
25/07/2010 
R_S3 Migrant, apartment house, Sijing 22/07/2010 
R_J1 








Resident from central Shanghai, apartment 
house, Jiuting 
09/07/2010 
R_J4 Migrant, apartment house, Jiuting 06/06/2010 





Appendix 2  Survey Questionnaire 




I am PhD student in the School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, 
UK, undertaking a research project on suburban residents’ living conditions and daily 
lives. I hereby invite you to participate in our survey, which is currently being conducted 
in a number of neighbourhoods in Songjiang. The aim of the survey is to provide valuable 
empirical evidence on Songjiang residents’ residential mobility and living conditions, and 
to make useful policy recommendations for Shanghai’s suburban development.   
 Your family represents many other similar households in Songjiang and the 
information you provide is very important to the research. We would be very grateful if 
you could spare some time filling out the questionnaire. Undergraduate students from the 
School of Social Development, East China Normal University will help distribute the 
questionnaires. Information provided here will be used to derive a series of aggregate 
analyses, and will be kept strictly CONFIDENTAL and not be used for any other purpose 
except academic research.   
Thank you for your cooperation and if you have any queries on the survey, please do 






The School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)29 208 75170 Email: ShenJ4@cardiff.ac.uk 
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2，□Married and living with spouse 
3，□Married but not living with spouse 
4，□Divorced or widowed 
 
A4：Educational attainment 
1，□Uneducated        2，□Primary 
3，□Junior high school 
4，□Senior high school 






1，□Local non-agricultural hukou 
2，□Local agricultural hukou 
3，□Nonlocal non-agricultural hukou 
4，□Nonlocal agricultural hukou 
4，□Foreign nationality 
 
A6 ：Hukou location 
1，□Shanghai Songjiang 
2，□Other districts in Shanghai 
3，□Relocated from other places 
（A6a. Present district：_________） 
4，□Relocated from other districts in 
Shanghai 










1，□Farmer     
2，□Manual worker/social service worker 




7，□Private enterprise owner (More than 
one employee) 
8，□Small business owner 
9，□Freelance 




2，□Public sector (e.g. education, 
healthcare, research institutions)  
3，□Large-scale (central or provincial) 
state-owned enterprise 
4，□Small- to medium-sized (local) 
state-owned enterprise 
5，□Collective owned enterprise 
6，□ (Self-owned) private enterprise   
7，□ (Non-self-owned) private enterprise   
8，□Foreign Enterprise 
9，□Joint venture 
10, □Household business 
11, □Others (A8a. Please specify：______） 
 
A9：a. Family monthly income 
1,  □< ¥1, 000   
2，□¥1,000 ~ ¥5,000 
3，□¥5,000 ~ ¥10,000 
4，□¥10,000 ~ ¥20,000 
5，□>¥20,000 
 
b. Which level applies to your family’s 
standard of living? 
1，□Wealthy          
2，□Xiaokang (moderately well off) 





A10：a. Total family members living 
together with you ______； 
      b. Total generations living together 
______； 
      c. Total non-family members living 
together with you _____； 
d. What are your relationships with 
people you live with? (Multiple 
choices) 
1，□Spouse/partner   2，□Children       
3，□Parents         4，□Parents in law   
5，□Other relatives   6，□Friends        
7，□Colleagues       
8，□Household maid 
 
B: Housing conditions and residential 
mobility 
B1：Housing tenure：  
A. Home ownership：  
1，□ Inherited housing 
2，□ Subsidised/welfare housing 
3，□ Affordable housing 
4，□ Incomplete property right housing 
5，□ Full property right new commodity 
housing 
6，□ Full property right second-hand 
commodity housing 
7，□ Resettlement housing 
8，□ Others (B1a. Please specify：______） 
 
B. Renting： 
9， □Private rented housing 
10，□Public rented housing from work 
units 
11，□Public rented housing from the 
government 







If you live in your own home, please 
answer B2-B6 
 
B2：a. When did you buy the house? 
       _____ (mm/yy) 
b.Total cost ____(Ten thousand Yuan) 
 
B3：Did you buy the house on mortgage?  
1，□Yes  
   (B3a. Down payment percentage _____) 
2，□No  
 
B4：Sources of funding（multiple choices）： 
1，□Income savings 
2，□Money raised by selling previous 
houses 
3，□Housing Provident Fund (HPF) 
4，□Parents or other relatives 
5，□Housing subsidy from work 
unit/employer 
6，□Loans from work unit/ employer 
7，□Private loans 
8，□Accumulation fund mortgage 
9，□Commercial mortgage 
9， □Housing subsidy from the government 
10，□Redevelopment compensation fee 
11，□Others（B4a. Please specify       ） 
 
B5：Use of the house: 
1，□As usual residence for self and family 
2，□As holiday residence for self and 
family 
3，□As usual residence for children 
4，□As usual residence for parents 
5，□For rent 
6，□For investment 
7，□Others (B5a.Please specify        )  
 
B6：Do you have another house in 
Shanghai？ 
1，□Yes （please answer B6a） 
2，□No 




If you live in a rental house, please 
answer B7- B8 
B7：a. Rental term：from         (mm/yy)              
to         (mm/yy) 
     b. Monthly rent：
________Yuan/month 
 
B8：The most important reason for not 
buying a house____ 
1，□Unable to afford down payments 
2，□Unable to guarantee the repayment of 
the mortgage 
3，□Renting a house is more cost-effective  
4，□To wait and see how the property 
market goes 
5，□Insecure employment 
6，□Others（B8a. Please specify        ） 
 
All please continue to answer the 
following questions 
B9：The date when you moved in this 
house：____ (mm/yy) 
 
B10：a. Total building area of the 
house____m
2
; b. Total bedrooms 
______ 
      c. Total living rooms ______ 
 
B11：The reason why you moved out of 
your previous house： 
A: Passive move 
a1，□Relocated by public works   
a2，□Relocated by property projects 
a3，□Housing congestion alleviation 
programmes 
a4，□Relocated by land acquisition 
a5，□Welfare housing allocation  






B: Active move 
b1，□For a location closer to work 
b2，□For a location closer to children's 
school 
b3，□Marriage or moving with family 
b4，□To improve living space  
b5，□To improve living environment 
b6，□To enhance life quality 
b7，□For cheaper rent 
b8，□Others (B11b.Please specify       ） 
 
B12：The reason for which you moved into 
your current house (please select three most 
important factors among the options below): 
a. The first important factor ______； 
b. The second important factor ______； 
c. The third important factor _______； 
 
Living environment 
1，A good city plan  
2，Songjiang University Town 
3，Quality living environment in suburbs 
4，All-round living facilities and services 
   
Accessibility 
5，No.9 Metro Line       6，Highways 
 
Employment 
7，More/better employment opportunities 
8，Close to work place 
 
Cheap housing/rent prices 
9，Cheap housing price   10，Cheap rent 
 
Quality estates 
11，Distinctive design style  
12，A good internal layout     
13，Good privacy 
14，Well-know development company 
15，A good investment 
16，High status neighbours 
 




B13：Please indicate how satisfied you are 
with the following factors of your current 
living conditions: 
5=Very satisfied        4= Satisfied   
3= Neutral             2=Dissatisfied    
1=Very dissatisfied      0=N/A 
 Score 
a Living area  
b Housing quality  
c Neighbourhood relationship  
d Community service  
e Schools and childcare  
f Market and shops  
g Transportation  
h Security  
i Cleanliness  
j Recreation and leisure facilities  
k Forestation and greenery  
l Property management  
m Overall satisfaction with the estate  




C1：Does your family own cars? 
1，□Yes  
2，□No (please go to C3)  
 
C2：a. When did you buy your first car? 
       __________(mm/yy) 
b. The most important use of the car： 
1，□Commuting    2，□Children shuttle 
3，□Visiting relatives and friends 
4，□Shopping 
5，□Entertainment and recreation 







C3：How do you commute to work?  
1，□On foot       2，□By bike 
3，□By bus        4，□By rail 
5，□By car     
6，□Not applicable/ working at home 
     （Please go to C5） 
7，□Others（C3a. Please specify _______） 
 
C4：How long is your one-way commute 
time? ___________ Minutes 
 
C5: a. How much was your family’s electric 
bill this June? ______Yuan 
b. What does your family spend on 
petrol every month on average?  
_______Yuan 
c. What does your family pay for rail 
transport every month on average? 
____Yuan 
d. What does your family spend on bus 
transport every month on average? 
____Yuan 
 
C6：a. Except for work, how often do you 
and your family go to the central city? 
________ 
b. The most frequent destinations are 
(multiple choices) 
1，□Shops           
2，□Sport complexes 
3，□Parks 
4，□Cultural and entertainment places 
5，□Restaurants 
6，□Library/hospital/post office 
7，□Visiting relatives and friends 
8，□Others（C6c please specify         ） 
 
C7：How often do you and your family 
contact your neighbours? 
1，□Frequently        2，□Sometimes  





C8：How do you feel about close contact 
with neighbours? 
1，□Troublesome       2，□Unimportant 
3，□Very important     4，□Indifferent 
 
C9：How much are the property 
management fees in your 
neighbourhood?  




C10：Which is the property management 





5，□Others （C10a. Please specify _____） 
 
C11：Do you think a homeowners 
association is necessary? 
1，□Necessary （Please go to C11a） 
2，□No need（Please go to C12） 
3，□Indifferent（Please go to C12） 
4，□Never heard of that（Please go to C13） 
 
C11a. What do you think is the most 
important responsibility of a 
homeowners association?  
1，□To supervise property management and 
maintain a good living environment 
2，□To maintain the quality of the estate 
and promote property values 
3，□To protect homeowners' interest 
 
C12： Are you satisfied with the job that the 
homeowner association in your 
neighbourhood does? 
1，□Very satisfied        2，□Neutral 
3，□Dissatisfied 
4，□No homeowner association 
 




C14：Has your present life met your original 
expectations? 
1，□Yes             2，□No 
 
C15：Do you and your family plan to settle 
down in Songjiang? 
1，□Yes              
2，□No 
3，□Hard to say 
 
C16：Do you have a sense of belonging to the 
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